The Africa Blind Spot: The US National Security Strategy and the Risks of Retreat
.By Christopher Faulkner , Raphael Parens
On November 5, the Trump administration unveiled the new National Security Strategy (NSS) for the United States. Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, presidents have been required by Congress to provide an NSS. Waiting for this strategic guidance has become a routine across parts of the U.S. government, and the document’s release attracts considerable international attention. That has certainly been the case with the 2025 NSS, which prompted a surge of commentary and analysis. That attention is rightly deserved, given the distinct changes made to enduring themes and commitments that have characterized American National Security Strategies over nearly four decades. The new strategy is revisionist in a way many thought possible but did not fully anticipate.
While scholars and pundits alike have focused on the dramatic reshaping of Washington’s perceived ironclad relationship with European partners and allies, the new NSS also indicates a significant shift in how the United States will approach Africa in the near term. Those who have been watching the trajectory of the second Trump administration will perhaps find it unsurprising that Africa gets limited attention in the NSS—roughly half a page at the very end. Yet, over the previous several months, the administration’s engagements with the continent have been more visible than one might expect, albeit narrowly cast. Most attention reflects a preference for transactionalism, driven by the president’s pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize, his economic agenda, or ideological priorities. From efforts to negotiate a tenuous peace between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and aspirations for critical minerals access in relation to that deal, to an emphasis on protecting Christians in Nigeria, the limited textual attention devoted to Africa in the NSS does not inherently reflect a lack of interest. Instead, it demonstrates that the administration’s interest in Africa will be constrained, selective, and dependent on what Africa can offer in an increasingly competitive world.
This logic exposes the United States to serious strategic risks. Competitors such as China and Russia, as well as middle powers such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, continue to treat Africa as a key arena in their foreign policy agendas. And while some African leaders may appreciate the flurry of deal-making diplomacy, Washington’s political appetite for providing the level of investment and aid required to counter persistent social, economic, security, and political challenges appears to be over. Instead, in the second Trump administration, relevancy rests on a narrowing set of issues.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/01/08/the_africa_blind_spot_the_us_national_security_strategy_and_the_risks_of_retreat_1157411.html
