The Strategic Consequences of Deferred Maintenance: Challenges to the Resilience of U.S. Sea Power

[rangerrebew]

The Strategic Consequences of Deferred Maintenance: Challenges to the Resilience of U.S. Sea Power
by Dr. Emily Pesicka
 
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06.25.2025 at 06:00am
   
Abstract
The U.S. Sea Services – comprising the Navy, Coast Guard, and Military Sealift Command – face a mounting crisis born of decades of deferred maintenance, shrinking fleet size, and aging infrastructure. As great power competition with China and Russia intensifies these systemic issues have eroded America’s maritime dominance and compromised its ability to project power, sustain readiness, and respond rapidly to global contingencies.

This article argues that maintenance shortfalls are not merely logistical hurdles but represent a strategic vulnerability with far-reaching consequences. Drawing on data from the Government Accountability Office and defense assessments, it details how prolonged neglect has diminished naval capacity and capability, resulting in a force increasingly ill-suited to 21st-century threats. While past reform efforts have fallen short, the article contends that bold, immediate action to overhaul maintenance planning and investment in shipyard infrastructure is essential. Without decisive intervention, the U.S. risks ceding maritime advantage to adversaries prepared to exploit its inertia.

Introduction
The U.S. Sea Services are on the brink of a precipice. Years of ship maintenance neglect, complacency due to ship degradation, and an inability to keep up with a quickly changing global landscape have left the Navy, Coast Guard, and Military Sealift Command ill-prepared for the reality of 21st-century great power competition. It is common knowledge that military spending fluctuates with geopolitical and economic factors, often leading to deferred maintenance when funds are tight, or priorities shift. For the U.S. Sea Services, these maintenance delays directly impact readiness, increase long-term maintenance costs, and limit operational capabilities and capacities. Deferred maintenance erodes the foundation of America’s maritime dominance.

The era of global hegemony, when the U.S. could afford to drag its feet on maintaining ships, is over. China and Russia are actively advancing their strategic objectives, showing no inclination to wait for the United States to resolve its internal challenges and enhance its readiness. As great power competition intensifies, consistent and strategic planning is crucial to ensure the U.S. military remains prepared, regardless of budgetary changes. This article will show how the deferred maintenance crisis hinders our ability to project power and advocate for the steps the U.S. must take to avert a potential catastrophe.

Operational Consequences: Ships in Port

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/06/25/the-strategic-consequences-of-deferred-maintenance-challenges-to-the-resilience-of-u-s-sea-power/

[BobfromWB]

Operational Consequences: Ships in Port

"The Coast Guard faces similar challenges, with older vessels, such as its Polar-class icebreakers, suffering from deferred maintenance and aging equipment that limits their operational capabilities in the Arctic. The MSC, responsible for prepositioning ships, also deals with maintenance deficiencies. These issues include inadequate preventative maintenance plans and poor contractor oversight, which have led to unplanned repair costs and extended dry dock periods, impeding the readiness of vital logistics and support vessels."
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The Coast Guard is suffering from near total disregard, since it was passed from Treasury to DHS. The only heavy ice breaker is the Polar Star, the only remaining ship in the Polar Class, and is currently in for maintenance.

US icebreakers are all conventionally powered, unlike Russia's which either have one or 2 nuclear reactors for power, and are capable of braking 9 feet of ice an 3 knots. Their crews have gourmet meals, a heated swimming pool and a sauna, plus hand ball courts. US crews have standard fare and no other amenities. Russia has over 12 nuclear powered heavy breakers and is building more every year.

The 3 new breakers are designed by a committee so that they can cross open ocean between the Arctic and the Antarctic. Which compromise means they are not as efficient as they need to be breaking ice. I don't know the final specs because the first one in due for launch sometime this year or next, and the other 2 are still on paper. Since they are conventionally powered, they will likely only break 3-4 feet at 3 knots. On any case, the designs are not final, and [ as traditional ], they are behind schedule and over budget.

The Finns [ best in the business ] have offered to build state of the art, nuclear powered breakers cheaply and quickly for us, but likely that offer will be ignored because 'made in America' prevails.