NECESSITY, NOT PREFERENCE: WHY MILITARY STRATEGY TRANSCENDS CULTURE
Loris Lepri June 25, 2026
The operational environment, not culture, dictates strategy, East or West.
Henry Kissinger asserted that China possesses a unique, distinctive military theory. Claims like Kissinger’s often imply that the pivotal writings of Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-tung in particular have shaped a unique way of war fundamentally different from Western military traditions, a divergence most dramatically seen in a supposed Chinese preference for indirect warfare and deception. However, these seemingly unique Chinese strategic emphases were not matters of preference or tradition, but of necessity and survival, and when facing a similar challenge, Eastern and Western leaders consistently choose similar indirect strategies. The operational environment, not culture, dictates strategy, East or West.
Indirect Strategies and Force Preservation
According to Colin Gray, strategy can be expressed in seven pairings of opposing strategies with “direct or indirect” as one coupling, and if a different Chinese way of war existed, the use of indirect strategies would be a key component. A direct strategy targets an adversary’s strength. For Carl von Clausewitz, this was the center of gravity, “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends,” and he advocated striking at this source of strength through the entire conflict. Conversely, Sun Tzu advocated indirect strategies, avoiding an enemy’s strength and attacking him where he is least prepared or least expects action. Instead of seeking a decisive battle against the enemy force, he recommended keeping the enemy under strain and wearing him down. Mao also advocated for the indirect approach during the first two phases of a protracted war: When the enemy is on the strategic offensive in the first phase, the weaker opposing force should use mobile warfare supported by guerilla forces to exhaust and frustrate the enemy, shifting in the second phase, strategic stalemate, to widespread guerilla warfare to wear down the large opposing force and disintegrate its morale.
However, the character of the wars in which these two Chinese theorists fought drove the indirect rather than direct strategies which they employed. Clausewitz claims that a force must be able to score a decisive victory over the enemy and pursue that victory “to the point where the balance is beyond redress.” Sun Tzu, too, did not rule out decisive battle, advocating swift, decisive attacks if the situation permitted, such as when one’s forces significantly outnumbered the enemy.
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/necessity-not-preference/
