Betrayal of Command - LtCol Asad "Genghis" Khan –
By Commander Dan O’Shea (SEAL) USN (ret)
March 31, 2026
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About Face for the Afghanistan (& Iraq) Veteran
Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) Asad “Genghis” Khan USMC’s book, Betrayal of Command, is the modern day About Face for the Post 9/11 Afghanistan (and Iraq) war veteran. Colonel David Hackworth US Army wrote About Face: The Odessey of an American Warrior in 1989 almost two decades after he walked away from a distinguished 30-year military career. Hackworth, one of the most decorated US soldiers of the post WWII era, wrote a brutally honest critique of US military leadership, bureaucratic ineptitude, and strategic failures in Vietnam. The memoir exposed a persuasive culture of careerist officer mentality that contributed to losing the war. Khan’s Betrayal of Command memoir reveals a similar culture of combat leadership – a lead from the front versus manage from the rear mindset. Both war memoirs share a disdain for senior officers and staff, who work in safe, comfortable areas far removed from the ground truth, extreme danger and austere field conditions facing frontline soldiers and Marines. The same deployment but vastly difference experiences for the infantry grunt in the field patrolling through poppy fields laced with IED minefields and eating MREs between “Troops in Contact” (TIC) compared to living in a Forward Operating Base (FOB) with air-conditioned tents, typing “power-point briefings” and eating in a Dining Facility or “DFAC” every day. Grunt life is a far cry from FOBBIT life on the shire for POGs (Personnel Other than Grunts).
Pakistani-born, American immigrant, Khan earned the nickname “Genghis” due to his hands-on leadership style, being “visible in the barracks” and aggressive warrior mentality. Like the original Genghis Khan, he was a transformative leader, who maintained strict discipline, fostered extreme loyalty through shared sacrifice, demonstrated adaptability, tactical execution and strategic acumen. He took command of First Battalion, Sixth Marines (1/6) originally under-strength by 25% and had them qualified as a Special Operations Capable (SOC) Battalion Landing Team in five months, versus the normal one-year workup. Khan’s willingness to get “dirty in the field with his Marines” was in direct opposition to his 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Commander, Colonel Frank McKenzie USMC, who enjoyed the privileges of command more than being out in the field with his Marines.” McKenzie had no prior combat experience, yet built his career advancement on staff assignments and special projects working directly for the Commandant of the Marine Corps. A book-smart intellectual with an extensive library and “polished vocabulary” but he wasn’t the “gritty, hard-nose infantryman that young Marines instinctively rally behind.” McKenzie and Khan’s leadership styles would come in direct conflict that ultimately led one to retire and the other to be promoted to general, largely based on the combat record of that BLT 1/6 deployment to Afghanistan in 2004.
https://armedforces.press/dan-oshea-column/2026/03/31/betrayal-of-command-ltcol-asad-genghis-khan/
