Leadership: History of Command Efficiency
Ezoic
September 6, 2024: Military staffs strive to become efficient during peacetime, but rarely achieve that goal until they are actually in a wartime environment. In peacetime there is no life or death incentive to be efficient with planning. When the shooting starts, the need for speed is a matter of life or death. Even irregular forces, like Islamic terrorists or guerillas, survive because they were able to develop and execute plans quickly enough. That is often due to the efforts of one or a few leaders of these groups. By identifying and killing these leaders, using assassins or air strikes, the organizations these men controlled become less effective, at least temporarily, until new leaders can be installed. More effective military or terrorist organizations have succession plans indicating who will replace dead or disabled leaders and planners. This sort of thing does not get much or any media coverage. Instead there are reports of an organization becoming less effective due to the loss of leaders or planners.
While military organizations recognize this problem and seek to address it, irregular groups often do not. The irregulars depend on a charismatic leader to keep them well organized and effective. If that leader is killed, the organization is less effective until a new leader, whether planned or improvised, can take over.
As has been recently demonstrated in Ukraine, you can’t teach experience. It’s something that requires actually doing the deed or using training methods that accurately portray what you need experience in handling. This was evident during the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine. The nine new Ukrainian armored brigades involved were equipped with 230 tanks and 1,550 other armored vehicles. Some of the new tanks and IFVs (Infantry fighting vehicles) were Western models but most were the Russian type tanks and IFVs Ukraine had many of and had long used. There was also additional artillery ammunition, HIMARS missiles and long range Scalp guided bombs as well as short range anti-aircraft missiles. There were also specialized armored engineer vehicles for clearing paths through minefields. There were drones for reconnaissance, surveillance and spotting targets for artillery, missiles or longer range weapons. But those nine new brigades weren’t very effective.
https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/2024090601816.aspx#gsc.tab=0
