Four lessons on sea denial from the Black and Red seas

[rangerrebew]

Four lessons on sea denial from the Black and Red seas
By Gen. Christopher Mahoney
 Jun 18, 2024, 11:14 AM
 
The U.S. Navy destroyer Gravely launches Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles in response to increased Iranian-backed Houthi malign behavior in the Red Sea on Jan. 12, 2024. (MC1 Jonathan Word/U.S. Navy)
In the early morning hours of Feb. 1, 2024, six Ukrainian sea drones destroyed the Russian missile ship Ivanovets in the Black Sea. The day prior, 2,000 miles away in the Red Sea, the U.S. Navy destroyer Carney successfully shot down three Iranian drones and an anti-ship ballistic missile fired by Houthi forces.

Two events, disparate in geopolitical context, present evidence that land-based maritime forces play a decisive role in naval operations. It does not take an act of imagination to see how U.S. Marines, the world’s foremost land-based maritime force, operating with a suite of high-end anti-ship weapons and uncrewed systems, would prove instrumental in a sea-denial campaign.


Since the dawn of the gunpowder age, land-based forces along coastal areas have challenged navies in their quest to dominate coastal seas. But in the last two decades, long-range precision weapons have proliferated among state and nonstate actors due to their plummeting costs. This development continues to favor terrestrial forces and has given new life to the sage wisdom of the 18th century naval strategist and tactician Adm. Horatio Nelson, who said: “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.”

https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/06/18/four-lessons-on-sea-denial-from-the-black-and-red-seas/

[PeteS in CA]

Yeaaaahhhhhh ... it's actually more complex, and has been for a long time. The attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated that with proper planning, adequate forces, and surprise, a naval force could overwhelm a large land base. Later in WW2 the USN turned the tables with air attacks on Rabaul and Truk, and just before the Leyte landing and without the element of surprise, overwhelmed the island of Formosa, which Japan had occupied for over 4 decades and was even reinforced from Japan early in the US attack.

When naval forces are careful to attack on advantageous terms, the decisive factor will be that they are mobile while major land facilities and formations are not.

[DB]

Yeaaaahhhhhh ... it's actually more complex, and has been for a long time. The attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated that with proper planning, adequate forces, and surprise, a naval force could overwhelm a large land base. Later in WW2 the USN turned the tables with air attacks on Rabaul and Truk, and just before the Leyte landing and without the element of surprise, overwhelmed the island of Formosa, which Japan had occupied for over 4 decades and was even reinforced from Japan early in the US attack.

When naval forces are careful to attack on advantageous terms, the decisive factor will be that they are mobile while major land facilities and formations are not.

Except for modern ground/air based weapons can take out ships easily these days.

[DefiantMassRINO]

... all the more reason to have submersible platforms for launching missiles and drones, as well as gathering intelligence.

Aggregating military assets in a single location makes it easier for the enemy to launch a pre-emptive strike.

Future naval tactics may involve nimble, multifunction indepenently operating assets that can coalesce into swarms to carry out strategic objectives.

[Smokin Joe]

... all the more reason to have submersible platforms for launching missiles and drones, as well as gathering intelligence.

Aggregating military assets in a single location makes it easier for the enemy to launch a pre-emptive strike.

Future naval tactics may involve nimble, multifunction indepenently operating assets that can coalesce into swarms to carry out strategic objectives.

Especially if the adversary is willing to use nukes.

I foresee an increasing use of drones, coordinated swarm attacks, loitering munitions with AI, and more numerous and smaller platforms from which to launch and control them. Those platforms could operate with their assets in concert or independently, bringing in attacks from multiple directions to converge on the enemy, while providing only dispersed targets to retaliate against. Properly done, command and control could be handed off to coalesce assets or kept separate to utilize them in independent attacks.

[PeteS in CA]

Except for modern ground/air based weapons can take out ships easily these days.

Maybe it's news, but carrier battle group defenses have also advanced since the 1940s.

[DB]

Maybe it's news, but carrier battle group defenses have also advanced since the 1940s.

You can't take down a swam of a missiles/drone coming from many different directions at the same time.