What We Learned from Russia’s Assaults on Nuclear Plants
Governments, international organizations, and nuclear plant operators have a lot of work to do.
ERNEST J. MONIZ and RICHARD A. MESERVE | MARCH 23, 2022
Immediate disaster was averted during Russia’s military assault on two Ukrainian nuclear facilities, but the events unfolding there have implications for nuclear safety and security both in Ukraine and around the world.
Nuclear facilities are designed to ward off a wide range of threats by non-state terrorists, who are generally not capable of marshalling military forces and weapons on par with a nation. While such facilities should not be required to fight off an invading army, governments must now consider how to prepare for their safety and security in such a scenario.
National governments and international institutions should begin by strengthening norms against attacks on civilian nuclear facilities. While Russia’s invasion is the first full-scale war in a country with a large nuclear infrastructure, nations had envisioned this situation. In 1988, India and Pakistan agreed to a prohibition on “any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.” In 2009, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, General Conference endorsed a statement prohibiting the “armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.” Additionally, Russia’s attacks run contrary to the Geneva Convention, international humanitarian law, and even Russian military doctrine. Governments should build on these norms and legal precedents and pursue further international agreements that nuclear facilities should be protected in war zones. The agreements should not only cover direct assault from an attacking army, but also incidental damage arising in war zones.
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/what-we-learned-russias-assaults-nuclear-plants/363487/
