The battle that changed the course of history

[SZonian]

Washington, D.C., was in a panic. 72,000 Confederate troops were just 60 miles away near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

After the Confederate victory at the battle of Chancellorsville, Robert E. Lee was under a time deadline. Mounting casualties of the war were causing Lincoln’s popularity to fall, so if Lee could get a quick victory at Gettysburg, he could pressure Lincoln to a truce.

But this window of opportunity was fast closing, as Union General Ulysses S. Grant was about to capture Vicksburg on the Mississippi, which would divide the Confederacy and free up thousands of Union troops to fight Lee in the east.

Unfortunately for Lee, his tremendously successful general, “Stonewall” Jackson, had died two months earlier, having been mistakenly shot by his own men. On the Union side, Lincoln replaced Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker with Maj. Gen. George Meade to command the 94,000 men of the Union Army of the Potomac.

The Battle of Gettysburg began July 1, 1863. After two days of intense combat, with ammunition running low, General Robert E. Lee ordered a direct attack. Confederate General James Longstreet disagreed with Lee’s plan, resulting in his delayed advance till after all the Confederate artillery had been spent, leaving no cover fire.

Historians speculate that if General Longstreet had made a timely attack, the Confederates may have won the day.

[excerpted]

http://www.wnd.com/2016/07/the-battle-that-changed-the-course-of-history/

[kartographer]

Gettysburg (1993) 20th Maine bayonet charge at Little Round Top


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZL-5uyp44WA

[Chieftain]

Troops armed with rudimentary rifles with bayonets fixed, marching into the mouths of 3" & 4" cannon firing canister rounds that consisted of a load of 3/4" 1 oz lead musket balls, a very effective shotgun round fired at ground level.  These tactics enabled the slaughter an mutilation of thousands, an event of such violence that has not been seen on American shores since.

The problem now is exactly that...nobody born in America today has ever experienced such brutal warfare on our soil, but many of the immigrants have experienced generations of nothing but brutal all out warfare.  The special snowflakes rampaging across American campuses would change their tune if they did six months of volunteer work in Turkey, any of the 'stans, or anyplace on the Continent of Africa...

 

[RedHead]

After two days of intense combat, with ammunition running low, General Robert E. Lee ordered a direct attack. Confederate General James Longstreet disagreed with Lee’s plan, resulting in his delayed advance till after all the Confederate artillery had been spent, leaving no cover fire.

Historians speculate that if General Longstreet had made a timely attack, the Confederates may have won the day.

Two things.  One, there was a lot of confusion in assembling the men for the assault.  Neither Longstreet or Lee had ordered Pickett's division up the day before so by the time Pickett got his orders and moved into position the morning was gone.

But it didn't really matter.  Regardless of when the attack happened, the Union position would still have been as strong.  The Confederate bombardment wouldn't have been any more effective.  Southern artillery shells would not have been any less reliable.  And the outcome would not have changed.

[r9etb]

Two things. .... Historians speculate that if General Longstreet had made a timely attack, the Confederates may have won the day.

Three things, actually: Pickett's Charge was just one of dozens and dozens of failed frontal assaults on fixed defenses during the Civil War, and they all failed for essentially the same reason: time and space. 

Basically, rifle and cannon range was much greater (and more accurate) in the Civil War than in previous conflicts.  Defenders could get off many more shots in the time it took for the attackers to reach the defenses. 

One wonders how WWI would have played out had the generals of that war learned and heeded the lesson of the Civil War....

[skeeter]

Two things.  One, there was a lot of confusion in assembling the men for the assault.  Neither Longstreet or Lee had ordered Pickett's division up the day before so by the time Pickett got his orders and moved into position the morning was gone.

But it didn't really matter.  Regardless of when the attack happened, the Union position would still have been as strong.  The Confederate bombardment wouldn't have been any more effective.  Southern artillery shells would not have been any less reliable.  And the outcome would not have changed.

When you visit the battlefield you wonder why Lee didn't take Longstreet's advise and flank the union line to the south around Big Round Top. A half days quick march.
 
I guess Lee wanted to make an emphatic point.

[RedHead]

When you visit the battlefield you wonder why Lee didn't take Longstreet's advise and flank the union line to the south around Big Round Top. A half days quick march.
 
I guess Lee wanted to make an emphatic point.

Lee had tried the Union right on the first day and the Union left on the second.  He thought the center would have been weakened to strengthen the flanks but it wasn't.

Lee also had the experience of watching what happened to his troops at Malvern Hill and Burnside's troops at Fredericksburg.  He should have known better than to order the charge up hill against fixed defenses.

[skeeter]

Lee had tried the Union right on the first day and the Union left on the second.  He thought the center would have been weakened to strengthen the flanks but it wasn't.

Lee also had the experience of watching what happened to his troops at Malvern Hill and Burnside's troops at Fredericksburg.  He should have known better than to order the charge up hill against fixed defenses.

He had tried turning maneuvers on both flanks, but I guess I'm referring to more of an indirect approach like Jackson at Chancellorsville or Howe and Cornwallis at Brandywine.

[Chieftain]

Three things, actually: Pickett's Charge was just one of dozens and dozens of failed frontal assaults on fixed defenses during the Civil War, and they all failed for essentially the same reason: time and space. 

Basically, rifle and cannon range was much greater (and more accurate) in the Civil War than in previous conflicts.  Defenders could get off many more shots in the time it took for the attackers to reach the defenses. 

One wonders how WWI would have played out had the generals of that war learned and heeded the lesson of the Civil War....

Those Generals had four centuries of examples to learn from and failed to heed any of those either.  Napoleon did the same thing to most of his opponents that the Germans did to the Allies in WWI, minus the efficiency of the machine gun.  Napoloen's cannon decimated enemy infantry columns long before they were within musket range.

It is important to note that at the Somme, the Germans were incredulous that the British kept walking into their sustained machine gun and artillery fire as if they were out on a Sunday stroll.  At the close of the first day of the Somme there were over 19,000 British dead.  That is one of the worst failures of leadership in History.

 

[r9etb]

At the close of the first day of the Somme there were over 19,000 British dead.  That is one of the worst failures of leadership in History.

Probably the ultimate failure of leadership rested with the governments: the British kept Haig in command; and the French continued to elevate disciples of "the offensive," despite the unending slaughter in fruitless attacks.  Their resolute failure -- refusal, even -- to learn from experience, and the politicians' failure to take charge....

There was some horrible compulsion on all sides to continue the slaughter.  It truly defies comprehension.

[RedHead]

He had tried turning maneuvers on both flanks, but I guess I'm referring to more of an indirect approach like Jackson at Chancellorsville or Howe and Cornwallis at Brandywine.

In the Wilderness Lee had the advantage of the heavy forests to cover his movements.  There was no such cover at Gettysburg.  Any move he made towards the Union center or flanks would have been seen.

[RedHead]

It is important to note that at the Somme, the Germans were incredulous that the British kept walking into their sustained machine gun and artillery fire as if they were out on a Sunday stroll.  At the close of the first day of the Somme there were over 19,000 British dead.  That is one of the worst failures of leadership in History.

Good book on the subject by Martin Middlebrook: https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_2?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=first+day+on+the+somme

[Chieftain]

Good book on the subject by Martin Middlebrook: https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_2?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=first+day+on+the+somme

Thanks!  That'll be a good addition to my reading list...

 

[SunkenCiv]

Neither Longstreet or Lee had ordered Pickett's division up the day before so by the time Pickett got his orders and moved into position the morning was gone. But it didn't really matter. Regardless of when the attack happened, the Union position would still have been as strong.  The Confederate bombardment wouldn't have been any more effective.  Southern artillery shells would not have been any less reliable.  And the outcome would not have changed.

Three things, actually: Pickett's Charge was just one of dozens and dozens of failed frontal assaults on fixed defenses during the Civil War, and they all failed for essentially the same reason... rifle and cannon range was much greater (and more accurate) in the Civil War than in previous conflicts...

When you visit the battlefield you wonder why Lee didn't take Longstreet's advise and flank the union line to the south around Big Round Top. A half days quick march.

Lee also had the experience of watching what happened to his troops at Malvern Hill and Burnside's troops at Fredericksburg.  He should have known better than to order the charge up hill against fixed defenses.

The attempt to push responsibility off from Lee onto Longstreet, or Stuart, or literally anyone else, is just a tiresome old dodge.  Lee botched it, he knew it at the time and said so, and put it in writing after the retreat.  At the very least, people should take him at his word.  Watching that division dissolve under fire must have devastated him there, and come back each time he faced the steadily declining numbers and supply shortages.

It's also unlikely that anyone waiting to make that charge was unaware that it wasn't too hot an idea, and yet they did it because they were ordered to do it and steeled by previous advances under fire.

Longstreet had actually advocated a nighttime shift around the flanks and to dig in eastward, between Meade and DC.  Lee didn't want to do that either.  The dodge to in that case has been to blame Stuart, because he hadn't finished his big reconn, but it was Lee's view that the frontal attack was best.  My guess has been that, had Jackson been alive, something like Longstreet's plan might have prevailed, or at the very least, he'd have talked Lee out of Pickett's Charge.