It doesn't matter what they think as long as Jill Biden likes them.

Thank you.

I am pretty much outa here anyway. Too much of masturbatory circle jerk echo chamber. Even when presented with facts that contradicts their narrow misinformed view (in many cases  not all)  it's your a Troll lol

What is scary that even when presented with facts they refuse to believe any different. I have admitted here numerous times I was wrong when presented with research.

This is why I have become an independent.

No problem...

Admit that I posted my reply BEFORE reading all the replies...just that right out of the gate, you were called a "troll".

Don't leave.  They're just a protected class here at TBR.

Even the owner felt the need to warn @sneakypete to stop the insults...yet the reason he went into lurk mode is because the same half-dozen pets in here are given free passes.

We're expected to STFU and turn the other cheek...and like you, I'm getting sick of it.

Army’s future artillery may include wheeled howitzers, automated cannons, and long-range mortars
Wheeled howitzers are “having great effect in a place like Europe,” Army Futures chief says.
SAM SKOVE | MAY 16, 2024 02:59 PM ET
ARMY ARMS CONGRESS UKRAINE
   
An Army plan to modernize its artillery could include howitzers fielded in Europe, automated cannons, and long-range mortars, Army Futures Command chief Gen. James Rainey suggested Thursday at a Senate hearing.

“There are some very good wheeled howitzers that are having great effect in a place like Europe,” said Rainey, speaking while describing acquisition plans informed by an Army study on artillery modernization, also dubbed the tactical fires study.

The U.S. is planning on a competition between various mobile artillery systems this summer to select a new self-propelled howitzer. The competition follows the cancellation of the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) howitzer.

Rainey may have been referring to artillery systems fielded in Ukraine, the only place in Europe where wheeled howitzers are being used in combat.

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/05/armys-future-artillery-may-include-wheeled-howitzers-automated-cannons-and-long-range-mortars/396641/

Seems like common sense to me that the solution to the USAF and USN's aircraft woes is to keep procuring existing proven airframes but with updated avionics and other technologies, instead of contracting for wholly new untried aircraft that turn out to be grotesquely expensive duds, like the F-35.

But what do I know?

WAR ON THE 21ST CENTURY BATTLEFIELD: REVISITING GENERAL STARRY’S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
 FRANK JONES  MAY 16, 2024 

Starry’s work initiated an intellectual renaissance in twentieth-century military thought, which can still serve as a model for the army (and other services) as they develop operational concepts, weigh the trade-offs associated with modernization, and more generally seek to understand how wars will be fought on the twenty-first-century battlefield.

Today, U.S. Army General Donn A. Starry, the commanding general of the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from July 1977 to July 1981, is best remembered as the architect of the Cold War doctrine known as AirLand Battle, that first appeared in the 1982 edition of Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. AirLand Battle doctrine was an artifact of a dispirited army turning its attention away from recent failed counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam to focus instead on the Warsaw Pact and the defense of Western Europe. Starry’s work initiated an intellectual renaissance in twentieth-century military thought, which can still serve as a model for the army (and other services) as they develop operational concepts, weigh the trade-offs associated with modernization, and more generally seek to understand how wars will be fought on the twenty-first-century battlefield.

Starry developed AirLand Battle to replace the controversial doctrine of Active Defense that his predecessor and inaugural TRADOC commander, General William DePuy, had developed for the 1976 version of FM 100-5. Many U.S. Army officers and defense analysts rejected DePuy’s approach, deeming Active Defense as reactive, emphasizing defense and stopping the “Soviet operational breakthrough maneuver” rather than taking the offensive. But affecting change in an institution as large as the army is challenging. As retired brigadier general Huba Wass de Czege has pointed out, “the Army’s struggle to get the doctrine ‘right enough’ after Vietnam” took “13 years”, and when AirLand Battle was “right enough,” it was a “way of thinking about war and a mental conditioning rather than a rigid set of rules and list to be done in lock-step fashion.”

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/conceptual-framework/