I think it is reasonable to wonder why the SCOTUS refused to grant Standing in the 2020 challenges. The cases were ripe.
Because the Court does not want to wade into election-related cases unless the evidence is crystal clear and undeniable. Which was not the case. Wading into a dubious case would jeopardize the Court's independence.
2000 Election was more clear than 2020? Well, I suppose the Dem cheating was better at burying the facts in the case in 2020.
Because the Court does not want to wade into election-related cases unless the evidence is crystal clear and undeniable. Which was not the case. Wading into a dubious case would jeopardize the Court's independence.
They did not, and do not, have discretion to refuse to hear cases in which they have original jurisdiction.
This court, under Roberts, is systematically cementing in place the judicial tyranny that plagues this nation currently. Throwing us a bone or two occasionally is not winning.
:mauslaff:
Spoken like a good liberal.
They concluded that there was no standing. They heard it, and disposed of it. You need stop engaging in ends-justifies-means analysis of court decisions you do not like.
You and your fellow members of the brotherhood of the bar might be perfectly ok with judicial tyranny but I am not nor will I ever be. If that is a liberal position in your mind so be it counselor.
Read the dissents councilor.
It isn't judicial tyranny; that's your ends-justifies-the-means take on it.
Guess what dissents are, at bottom: bloviation by someone who has a chapped ass because they couldn't convince enough other justices to go along with them.
It's wonderful that the dissenters feel that strongly; but the fact that you emotionally prefer the dissents doesn't make them correct, no more than that liberals' keen love of Jackson's dissent in the affirmative action case makes her dissent correct.
Like hell it's not! What does "in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct" mean in plain English?
LOL! If you say so! It doesn't matter anymore in any case. Lawyers Rule!
It does not mean, as the Court pointed out, without the traditional review by courts.
Of course not! If it actually meant what it plainly says the courts would be excluded from the process, and we just cannot have that! /S
It does not plainly say what you wish it did. Sorry about that.
"in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct"
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii
It does not say that the legislature may do as it pleases without review from a court of competent jurisdiction.
Sorry, but it does not. That is certainly a possible reading of it, but it is not the only possible reading because the language does not expressly make it solely the prerogative of the legislature.
The fact that you so desperately want it to mean that in this case is coloring your view of the matter. That is not how cases are to be decided by the Supreme Court, however.
It says what it says and does not say what it does not say! Seems like I've heard something like that somewhere previously.
I posted the exact language, which is perfectly clear to me, and cited the source. Sorry if you don't like that.
It isn't perfectly clear that it negates judicial review of a decision by a particular legislature because it doesn't say that. If there were words such as "sole discretion" then you would have a case. As it is, you do not. That is the nature of language.
It is astounding how desperate you are to import into the Constitution private meanings that aren't in the text either expressly or by logically necessary implication, just to suit your view of how things should be.
And the fact that there are others who agree with you does not change that fact.
Yes, as I said before, it is a plausible potential interpretation of that language, but it is not the only interpretation and the Court, for reasons stated in its opinion, found a more persuasive interpretation.
That is the way that statutory and constitutional interpretation goes. I'm sorry that you don't like it, but the meaning you want to import into it simply is not mandated by the text of the Constitution itself.
I think the men who wrote that were perfectly capable of saying exactly what they meant and did so. If they had wanted to include "after judicial review" they would have done so.
That's my story and I'm sticking to it.
You're welcome to stick to it - you're just incorrect.
Did the Founders write in judicial review on Congressional enactments in just so many words? No, they did not, and yet, as Marbury v. Madison demonstrated, that is a logically necessary corollary to how the Founders structured the entire Constitution and the three co-equal branches of government.
Hence, it was not necessary to expressly state that Congressional enactments were subject to judicial review because the structure of the Constitution necessarily implied that result.
Ergo, just because the Founders did not expressly provide for judicial review of this particular phrase does not mean that judicial review is not available.
I will freely stipulate that they started making shit up a LONG time ago.
I think the men who wrote that were perfectly capable of saying exactly what they meant and did so. If they had wanted to include "after judicial review" they would have done so.
That's my story and I'm sticking to it.
Because the Court does not want to wade into election-related cases unless the evidence is crystal clear and undeniable. Which was not the case. Wading into a dubious case would jeopardize the Court's independence.I honestly believe discovery would have revealed much.
@Bigun
The appeal of the independent state legislature theory is strong on first look, but if you really take it literally, there are all sorts of problems. The operative language of the Constitution says:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
So suppose the state of California establishes that the "Manner" of holding elections in California requires all voters to pay a poll tax of $50,000, with the proceeds all being split between BLM, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Democratic Party of California. Or that nobody over the age of 50 can vote. If you say there is no judicial review, there is literally no way to challenge or prevent whatever screwy biased, partisan, or offensive conditions a state attached to voting.
Hell, while the Constitution says how many representatives each state gets, nowhere does it specify that those representatives have to be equally apportioned throughout the state, even by population. A corrupt/partisan legislature -- by a bare one vote majority -- could say that all of the state reps are to be elected by the vote in specific counties, regardless of how the population is spread throughout the state.
If you take judicial review out of the equation, then literally anything a state legislature does relating to voting/elections cannot be challenged.
Yeah @Maj. Bill Martin I suppose you are right. We just couldn't make it without folks in black robes telling the rest of us what EVERYTHING means as though we cannot read and interpret plain English! /S
And BTW: Do you ever tire of arguing out of both sides of your mouth?
I'm just saying that if you have a doctrine that is as absolutist as independent state legislature, then you have to consider how it could be abused, and whether or not it is reasonable to think it was intended that there be no remedy for that abuse. That's how courts look at those kind of issues, and rightfully so.
You're going to have to explain that one, because I honestly don't know to what you are referring.
I honestly believe discovery would have revealed much.
But ultimately, the SCOTUS is the court of primary jurisdiction in disputes between the States, which ultimately that was. Some states did not follow the Constitutional requirement for their Legislatures to set the election rules, and instead changed them willy-nilly with edicts from appointed or minor officials. Those rule changes made fraud not just possible, but probable (at the least), materially affecting the outcome of a national election.
Just how much evidence did the court review?
Here's a list:
Which specific cases were State v. State as plaintiff and defendant?
I honestly believe discovery would have revealed much.
But ultimately, the SCOTUS is the court of primary jurisdiction in disputes between the States, which ultimately that was. Some states did not follow the Constitutional requirement for their Legislatures to set the election rules, and instead changed them willy-nilly with edicts from appointed or minor officials. Those rule changes made fraud not just possible, but probable (at the least), materially affecting the outcome of a national election.
Just how much evidence did the court review?
Here's a list:
You're going to have to explain that one, because I honestly don't know to what you are referring.
One day you are here arguing that the language of the 14th amendment absolutely grants birthright citizenship to anyone who can drag themselves across the border for long enough to have a child on U. S. soil and would not even look at the legislative history that clearly denies that then, in the next breath, you tell us that the crystal clear language of the constitution itself does not say what it clearly says. @Maj. Bill Martin That is what I'm talking about.
Doubtful. Three years of constant agonizing by people like Trump haven't produced much evidence.
The primary evidence adduced is that there is no really good way to audit a U.S. election; but that is not, without more, clear and definitive proof that massive, election-changing, fraud happened, it is merely evidence that fraud could have taken place without the ability to catch it forensically.
That is not the sort of minefield the Court is going to wade into. Any ruling other than the ruling the Court made would have damaged the Court irreparably.
For better or for worse, the case would have come down to inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. That would never have satisfied anyone on the losing side of any substantive decision.
What really sucks, however, is that, with the exception of a few intrepid souls like DeSantis in Florida, nobody is taking significant steps to make U.S. elections more fraud-proof by making them more auditable, or requiring more proof of eligibility to vote.
Particularly egregious is Mr. Trump's consummate failure to say anything about the alleged vote fraud other than "I wuz robbed". He hadn't done a g*d-damned thing to put his considerable influence behind a national movement to make U.S. elections as secure or auditable as, say, elections in Mexico, even.
The failure is, at bottom, a political failure, not a judicial failure, and we have been abetting that failure by refusing to galvanize our anger into practical, functional responses.
:facepalm2:
Just using a different standard of signature verification between blue cities and red areas was enough to swing Arizona and other swing states.
Just using a different standard of signature verification between blue cities and red areas was enough to swing Arizona and other swing states.
Repeating an earlier question; What does "in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct" mean in plain English?
Where does it say "without judicial review"? Point to those words in the Constitution! If you cannot, then STFU and stop being such a plain vanilla liberal, engaging in ends-oriented criticism because you just don't personally like the result.
What part of "It says what it says and does not say what it does not say" do you not understand. @Kamaji I will refrain from responding to your childish name calling.
Sorry, but you are engaging in "living constitution" nonsense that, quite frankly, I would only expect from a liberal.
It does not say that no judicial review is allowed and therefore the question is whether, as a matter of statutory construction, judicial review is permissible or not.
The Court engaged in precisely that sort of analysis, and decided that judicial review of the decision by a legislature is permissible.
There is no requirement that the Constitution say "a court can review the decisions of the legislature" before a court can do precisely that.
The courts have the power to review enactments by Congress, despite the fact that Article I of the Constitution nowhere says that the enactments of Congress are reviewable by a court.
Thus, your argument is false on its face. It's too bad you are too wedded to your subjective desires to see that fact.
Once again repeating myself; "the men who wrote that were perfectly capable of saying exactly what they meant and did so. If they had wanted to include "after judicial review" they would have done so."
"I will freely stipulate that they (courts) started making shit up a LONG time ago."
LOL! The exact opposite! It is you who are adding things clearly not there.
[
https://www.gopbriefingroom.com/index.php/topic,504384.msg2859509.html#msg2859509
https://www.gopbriefingroom.com/index.php/topic,504384.msg2859527.html#msg2859527
Bullshit.
The phrase you are hung up on neither requires, nor prohibits, judicial review of the decision of a state legislature.
READ THE GODDAMNED LANGUAGE FOR WHAT IT SAYS, WITHOUT IMPORTING YOUR OWN PERSONAL DESIRES INTO IT.
That means that statutory construction is required to determine whether or not the courts of a particular state can review a decision by a state legislature.
The Supreme Court decided that it did not forestall such review. You lost, pure and simple, and if you had an ounce of integrity, you would acknowledge that fact.
Instead, you want to engage in the exact same sort of anti-court demagoguery that Jackson and Sotomayor just engaged in because they were so personally bent out of shape that the Court finally decided that racial discrimination is verboten, pure and simple, and that Congress didn't give the President the authority to erase student loans.
You don't like the result, so you decide the Court is illegitimate. Just like Jackson and Sotomayor. No integrity.
It's clear that we are wasting each other's time at this point. I've made it clear on many occasions that the brotherhood of the bar has won and are our rulers whether we like it or not. (I don't like it but can see very clearly.)
I'll put my integrity against yours any day.
Bye now!
A bunch of conservatives (especially Trump supporters....)
No, you've merely made it clear that you do not wish to understand how to interpret the English language in a meaningful way.
That's too bad, but you're entitled to your own childishness.
I'll put you on ignore for now; that way, you won't have to be bothered with any more uncomfortable statements from me.
Adios.
the Court's actions in 2000 were to stop a recount in one state
not to attempt to invalidate an entire election.
Held:
1. [Jurisdiction summary omitted]
2. The Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, famously proclaimed this Court’s authority to invalidate laws that violate the Federal Constitution. But Marbury did not invent the concept of judicial review. State courts had already begun to impose restraints on state legislatures, even before the Constitutional Convention, and the practice continued to mature during the founding era. James Madison extolled judicial review as one of the key virtues of a constitutional system, and the concept of judicial review was so entrenched by the time the Court decided Marbury that Chief Justice Marshall referred to it as one of society’s “fundamental principles.” Id., at 177.
The Elections Clause does not carve out an exception to that fundamental principle. When state legislatures prescribe the rules concerning federal elections, they remain subject to the ordinary exercise of state judicial review. Pp. 11–26.
(a) In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565, this Court examined the Elections Clause’s application to a provision of the Ohio Constitution permitting the State’s voters to reject, by popular vote, any law enacted by the State’s General Assembly. This Court upheld the Ohio Supreme Court’s determination that the Federal Elections Clause did not preclude subjecting legislative acts under the Clause to a popular referendum, rejecting the contention that “to include the referendum within state legislative power for the purpose of apportionment is repugnant to §4 of Article I [the Elections Clause].” Id., at 569. And in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, this Court considered the effect of a Governor’s veto, pursuant to his authority under the State’s Constitution, of a congressional redistricting plan. This Court held that the Governor’s veto did not violate the Elections Clause, reasoning that a state legislature’s “exercise of . . . authority” under the Elections Clause “must be in accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments.” Id., at 367. The Court highlighted that the Federal Constitution contained no “provision of an attempt to endow the legislature of the State with power to enact laws in any manner other than that in which the constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be enacted.” Id., at 368.
This Court recently reinforced the teachings of Hildebrant and Smiley in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U. S. 787, a case concerning the constitutionality of an Arizona ballot initiative to amend the State Constitution and to vest redistricting authority in an independent commission. Significantly for present purposes, the Court embraced the core principle espoused in Hildebrant and Smiley: Whatever authority was responsible for redistricting, that entity remained subject to constraints set forth in the State Constitution. The Court dismissed the argument that the Elections Clause divests state constitutions of the power to enforce checks against the exercise of legislative power.
The basic principle of these cases—reflected in Smiley’s unanimous command that a state legislature may not “create congressional districts independently of” requirements imposed “by the state constitution with respect to the enactment of laws,” 285 U. S., at 373—commands continued respect. Pp. 15–18.
(b) The precedents of this Court have long rejected the view that legislative action under the Elections Clause is purely federal in character, governed only by restraints found in the Federal Constitution.
The argument to the contrary does not account for the Framers’ understanding that when legislatures make laws, they are bound by the provisions of the very documents that give them life. Thus, when a state legislature carries out its federal constitutional power to prescribe rules regulating federal elections, it acts both as a lawmaking body created and bound by its state constitution, and as the entity assigned particular authority by the Federal Constitution. Both constitutions restrain the state legislature’s exercise of power.
This Court’s decision in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, in which the Court analyzed the Constitution’s similarly worded Electors Clause, is inapposite. That decision did not address any conflict between state constitutional provisions and state legislatures. Nor does Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130, which involved a contested vote by a state legislature to ratify a federal constitutional amendment, help petitioners. That case concerned the power of state legislatures to ratify amendments to the Federal Constitution. But fashioning regulations governing federal elections “unquestionably calls for the exercise of lawmaking authority.” Arizona State Legislature, 576 U. S., at 808, n. 17. And the exercise of such authority in the context of the Elections Clause is subject to the ordinary constraints on lawmaking in the state constitution. Pp. 18–22.
(c) Petitioners concede that at least some state constitutional provisions can restrain a state legislature’s exercise of authority under the Elections Clause, but they read Smiley and Hildebrant to differentiate between procedural and substantive constraints. But neither case drew such a distinction, and petitioners do not in any event offer a defensible line between procedure and substance in this context. Pp. 22–24.
(d) Historical practice confirms that state legislatures remain bound by state constitutional restraints when exercising authority under the Elections Clause. Two state constitutional provisions adopted shortly after the founding expressly constrained state legislative action under the Elections Clause. See Del. Const., Art. VIII, §2 (1792); Md. Const., Art. XIV (1810). In addition, multiple state constitutions at the time of the founding regulated the “manner” of federal elections by requiring that “elections shall be by ballot.” See, e.g., Ga. Const., Art. IV, §2. Moreover, the Articles of Confederation—from which the Framers borrowed—provided that “delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct.” Art. V. Around the time the Articles were adopted, multiple States regulated the appointment of delegates, suggesting that the Framers did not understand that language to insulate state legislative action from state constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Del. Const., Art. XI (1776). Pp. 24–26.
3. Although the Elections Clause does not exempt state legislatures from the ordinary constraints imposed by state law, federal courts must not abandon their duty to exercise judicial review. This Court has an obligation to ensure that state court interpretations of state law do not evade federal law. For example, States “may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests.” Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U. S. 156, 167. While the Court does not adopt a test by which state court interpretations of state law can be measured in cases implicating the Elections Clause, state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures to regulate federal elections.
The Court need not decide whether the North Carolina Supreme Court strayed beyond the limits derived from the Elections Clause, as petitioners did not meaningfully present the issue in this Court. Pp. 26–29.
380 N. C. 317, 868 S. E. 2d 499, affirmed.
They did not, and do not, have discretion to refuse to hear cases in which they have original jurisdiction.
The precedents of this Court have long rejected the view that legislative action under the Elections Clause is purely federal in character, governed only by restraints found in the Federal Constitution.
The argument to the contrary does not account for the Framers’ understanding that when legislatures make laws, they are bound by the provisions of the very documents that give them life. Thus, when a state legislature carries out its federal constitutional power to prescribe rules regulating federal elections, it acts both as a lawmaking body created and bound by its state constitution, and as the entity assigned particular authority by the Federal Constitution. Both constitutions restrain the state legislature’s exercise of power.
A dissent is merely an interesting curiousity until and unless it gets picked up by a majority opinion. That does happen from time to time, but until it does, the dissent is meaningless.
Harlan's dissent of Plessy was cited and included in the opinion for Brown.
They do have that discretion. They just don't want us to know that sheer cowardice is the reason for their discretion. That's why they invent cute terms like "standing" to cover for the fact that they are too chickenshit to uphold the oaths they took when they joined the Court.
Because the Court does not want to wade into election-related cases unless the evidence is crystal clear and undeniable.
Wading into a dubious case would jeopardize the Court's independence.
No, they don't want to wade into election-related cases because they are cowards.
Wading into these cases would have affirmed the Court's independence.
"Standing" is not merely chickenshit cowardice.
No, they don't want to wade into election cases that would require them to invalidate an entire election without absolutely rock-solid, undeniable direct evidence.
Indeed, it was, but it had no authoritative weight until it was cited as the rationale for the holding in Brown. And, at any event, the binding holding is the holding in Brown, not the dissent in Plessy.
In this case it is. Voters in numerous States were indirectly denied franchise when their votes were cancelled out by illegal votes. If they don't have "standing", no one does.
The biggest flaw in the cases of plaintiffs here is that they are asking for the election to be overturned due to fraud. And that dog won't hunt. But they do have standing to challenge the election process and negate electoral votes emanating from illegal votes to be counted in the electoral process.
But chickenshit cowardice is what ruled the day. No one dares to have an old-fashioned electoral college 'convention' where electors are selected directly by the people to come together and select the best person for the job. Throw out Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Arizona, all of which selected their electors under egregious violations of election law, and you are left with only 259 Biden voters - not enough to secure a 270 vote majority. And that's where the Electoral College is called to do it's job as our Founding Fathers intended, not to be rubber stamps for the Uniparty.
Georgia, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Nevada all offered exactly that - undeniable direct evidence. Election laws on the books were openly violated in each of those States. That is a fact.
So Harlan's dissent had validity. And the ruling of the majority did not. The Constitution be damned.
Prove it. With undeniable evidence.
Otherwise, face facts: there is not sufficient evidence to warrant the Supreme Court stepping into that minefield. Y'all think liberals are working themselves up to pack the Court now, just because the Court said they can no longer discriminate on the basis of race, and that they couldn't waive student loans without Congress enacting a law? Then try undoing an entire election on the basis of anything less than absolutely crystal clear results.
You don't have that level of evidence; you have circumstantial evidence, plus some statistical arguments, that would support a "more likely than not" finding that fraud changed the 2020 election. What we do not have is 100% guaranteed evidence.
And instead of going out and spending the last three years doing our level best to enact laws that would provide that sort of evidence - that would, e.g., get rid of things like mail-in ballots or ballot-harvesting - what have we done? We've listened to the Big Orange Crybaby moan and wail about how he wuz robbed. We've made memes by the truckload. We've indulged in all manner of conspiracy theories.
But we haven't gotten off our lazy a$$es and gotten out there and involved to actually start changing things.
And, when it comes to the few GOP politicians who have done something - like DeSantis - we trash them because they haven't displayed sufficiently supine fealty to Donald Trump.
We are our own worst enemies - worse even than the democrats - and Donald Trump is our siren of helplessness.
The Supreme Court provided the correct reading of Article 1, Section 4 in this case—or at least the most reasonable reading of this provision.
Even if a law was violated, that does not ipso facto mean that fraud was committed
That's pretty much all one needs to take away from that.
But the majority opinion is a mishmash of previous precedent and conventional state practice. The Court’s reading of similar language regarding state legislative decision-making powers in different provisions of the U.S. Constitution remains a muddle of inconsistency.
Nonetheless, the majority’s reasoning falls flat. Ultimately, it identifies little more than a proverbial “distinction without a difference.” There is little reason that constitutional delegation of national decision-making power to state legislatures should not be read uniformly across the Constitution, whether as an exclusive grant to state legislatures themselves, or, more reasonably, reading “legislatures” as a synecdoche for state legislative processes more generally.
The Supreme Court identified a reasonable outcome in Moore v. Harper...
Yes, yes it does.
Perhaps for you, but I rather liked the following sentence;
And this:
I personally don't like a synecdoche any more than I do a penumbra.
Article III
Section 1
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State,—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
Section 3
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.
Perhaps someone can direct us to the language in Art. I, Sec. 4, Cl. 1 of the Constitution where it says that the time, place, and manner of electing Representatives and Senators is exclusively given to the state legislature, without any power of review by the courts that were instituted under the same state constitution that empowered said state legislatures. I.e., where does it, in so many words, necessarily exclude state court review?
I don't give a fig about what it DOESN'T exclude! What I do care about intensely is what it specifically permits!
A state legislature can only act in conformity with the organic law that brought it into existence,...
Gonna have to explain that one to me counselor. Organic law that brought what into existence? The Legislature?
(I'm purposefully ignoring all the BS you posted following the above that I quoted.)
Ok chief. To be perfectly honest, your innate liberalism is rather disappointing, and pretty much puts the lie into most of what you post on this forum.
Whatever. Have a nice life. I'm sure there's a good echo chamber someplace where you'd be a lot more comfortable.
Lawyers, including the ones called judges or justices, are going to protect their turf no matter what and the constitution takes the hindmost.