I've declared no such thing. I've simply given you the public information, in full.
Do I think there's a good chance Netanyahu's long standing "mow the grass/bribe Hamas" strategy had run its course and blew up all over him and his citizens? Do I think the UAE, Egypt (3 times), Shin Bet and the IDF warned Netanyahu of an approaching "earthquake"? "Yes" to both.
Do I think it's essential for an Israeli independent state commission to investigate,the lead up to Oct 7 --- and am I furious Netanyahu was able to block such a commission for three years --- pushing it to possibly being formed after his election. Again, "yes" to both.
How does finding the truth about how Oct 7 happened and fixing what broke in security and political protocols help Hamas? Did the 9/11 Commission help AQ?
Could I speak with the rational, thinking Luis, please? --- I miss him. ....
You’re doing exactly what you accuse everyone else of doing: deciding what you want to be true first and then treating every subsequent allegation as confirmation.
There is a very large difference between “Netanyahu received warnings about the possibility of escalation or an attack from Gaza” and “Netanyahu knew the October 7 attack was coming and deliberately did nothing.” You keep sliding from the first proposition into the second as though they’re interchangeable. They aren’t.
In fact, today’s WSJ reporting contains the caveat that blows a hole straight through the certainty you’re displaying: the warnings reportedly did not identify the date, targets, scale or nature of the October 7 attack. Contemporary Israeli reporting of the WSJ story says exactly that.
That’s rather important, isn’t it?
Egypt’s first reported warning was essentially that Gaza was “explosive.” Another reportedly warned that Gaza could “blow up.” The UAE information concerned indications that Hamas might undertake a major action. Those are serious warnings and absolutely deserve investigation. But none amounts to somebody handing Netanyahu the October 7 battle plan and saying, “They’re coming across the border Saturday morning.”
And here’s where your argument becomes particularly sloppy. When Luis asks for evidence that Netanyahu knew October 7 was coming, you respond by citing evidence that Netanyahu may have received general or nonspecific warnings of Hamas action. That’s not answering his question. That’s quietly lowering the evidentiary bar until the evidence you possess can clear it.
Nor does Netanyahu’s opposition to the particular state commission of inquiry you favor magically supply the missing evidence. You write, “It appears Netanyahu is still quite afraid of the truth.” No. That’s your inference about his motive. Opposition to a particular investigative mechanism can be criticized, but it isn’t evidence of what was in Netanyahu’s head in September 2023. You can’t use the absence of an investigation as proof of the conclusion you want the investigation to establish.
The irony gets thicker when you tell Luis you’re merely providing “the public information, in full.” No, you’re doing considerably more than that. You explicitly say you think Netanyahu’s policy “blew up all over him,” answer “yes” when asked whether multiple actors warned him of an approaching “earthquake,” and then characterize his conduct toward an inquiry as fear of “the truth.” Those are conclusions and interpretations, not the neutral delivery of information.
And the 9/11 Commission analogy doesn’t rescue the argument. Of course Israel should investigate the catastrophic intelligence and security failures surrounding October 7. But an investigation is how you determine what happened. You are using the demand for an investigation as though it demonstrates that your preferred explanation has already been established. If the answer were already known with the certainty you’re projecting, there wouldn’t be much point in investigating it.
There is also an inconvenient fact for anyone trying to reduce this to Netanyahu was warned and simply ignored it: former defense minister Yoav Gallant now says the Shin Bet itself received Sinwar’s “earthquake” message before October 7 and misinterpreted what it meant, apparently viewing it in the context of prisoner negotiations.
Think about what that means. The very security professionals whose job was to evaluate intelligence reportedly possessed an ominous warning and didn’t recognize it as notice of the October 7 assault. Yet three years later, sitting safely behind a keyboard and armed with perfect hindsight, you apparently find the intelligence so unmistakable that Netanyahu’s failure to interpret it correctly proves something sinister.
That’s not analysis. That’s hindsight bias wearing a detective’s hat.
Now, the new reports are serious. An Emirati source has reportedly confirmed that the UAE-Netanyahu conversation occurred, despite Netanyahu’s denial, and a Palestinian intermediary, Sufian Abu Zaida, has publicly described transmitting Sinwar’s “earthquake” warning. Those developments make the matter more substantial than anonymous newspaper gossip and are precisely why a credible investigation is warranted.
But they still don’t establish that Netanyahu knew the October 7 attack—its date, method, scale and targets—was coming and consciously allowed it to happen.
That’s the distinction Luis keeps asking you to make, and it’s the distinction you keep avoiding.
So investigate the hell out of it. Subpoena records. Establish whether the UAE and Egyptian calls occurred. Determine exactly what was said. Find out what Netanyahu was told, what the Shin Bet knew, what the IDF knew, how each warning was evaluated, and why Israel’s defenses were catastrophically unprepared.
Then follow the evidence wherever it goes.
But that’s the opposite of what you’re doing here. You’ve announced the verdict and are now demanding an investigation to validate it.
And spare us the “Could I speak with the rational, thinking Luis?” routine. When your substantive argument has deteriorated into questioning the other guy’s rationality because he insists on distinguishing an allegation, corroborating evidence, and a proven conclusion, the problem isn’t Luis’s reasoning.
It’s yours.
