Anton Gerashchenko
@Gerashchenko_en
The main source of the money Russia uses to wage its criminal war against Ukraine is oil revenue generated through the shadow fleet.
‼️Some European, primarily Greek, companies transport Russian oil, supporting Russia’s war economy.
The price cap regime was introduced in 2022 to reduce Russia’s revenues while preventing a sharp decline in global oil supply. But today it has become a more harmful instrument that not only fails to reduce Russian profits, but also allows some European shipping company owners to make money at the expense of European security.
Let’s look at the numbers. In July 2026, vessels linked to G7 countries and their partners carried 36.2% of Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports. This was the fourth consecutive month of growth and the highest figure since July 2025.
‼️Greek companies were the main source of this increase: in July, they transported 26.4 million barrels of Russian oil, compared with 24.9 million in June. This was the highest monthly volume in almost three years.
Greek shipowners have already become an important part of Russia’s export system. In May 2026, vessels controlled by them carried almost 15% of Russia’s total seaborne crude oil exports. Back in April 2025, Reuters found that 15 of the 25 tankers loading Urals crude at key Russian ports were managed by Greek companies. These included Dynacom Tankers, Minerva Marine, and TMS Tankers.
The scale of this business is substantial. According to a Financial Times estimate published on July 7, 2026, Greek shipping companies earned at least $3.8 billion from transporting Russian oil over the previous three years. This figure covers only approximately 389 million barrels for which freight-rate data was available. Another roughly 153 million barrels transported by Greek companies were not included in the estimate. This means the documented volume amounts to at least 542 million barrels.
Several Greek companies are particularly prominent. Dynacom Tankers Management, founded by George Prokopiou, earned at least $915 million from transporting Russian oil since July 2023, according to the FT. Olympic Shipping and Management, linked to the Onassis Group, earned at least $404 million. Stealth Maritime and Polembros Shipping earned more than $200 million each. Minerva Marine, linked to Andreas Martinos, was among the companies that returned to transporting Urals crude in 2025. All of these companies say they operate within the sanctions regime.
This is an important clarification: the mere transportation of Russian oil does not constitute a sanctions violation. Under current EU rules, European companies can transport Russian oil, insure vessels, and provide brokerage and financial services as long as the oil is sold below the established price cap. Since February 1, 2026, the EU price cap for Russian crude oil has been $44.10 per barrel. In other words, the problem is not only sanctions evasion. Some of this business is explicitly permitted by the sanctions regime itself.
▪️ The first step for the EU is obvious: it needs to move from a price cap to a complete ban on European maritime services for Russian oil. European companies should be prohibited from transporting, chartering, managing, insuring, reinsuring, brokering, financing, certifying, or providing technical maintenance for Russian oil shipments regardless of the price of the cargo. This would immediately eliminate the legal channel through which Dynacom, Olympic, Stealth, Polembros, Minerva, and others can currently operate with Russian oil.
▪️ The second step is to audit the largest European operators of Russia’s oil exports. This should include a full audit of voyages by Dynacom Tankers, Olympic Shipping and Management, Stealth Maritime, Polembros Shipping, Minerva Marine, and other major operators. For each voyage, authorities should establish the vessel and IMO number, owner and beneficial owner, manager, charterer, Russian supplier, cargo volume, declared price, freight rate, loading port, final destination, insurer, P&I club, attestation provider, as well as any possible ship-to-ship transfers and AIS anomalies.
▪️ The third step is to change the sanctions criteria themselves. The EU should be able to impose restrictions not only for specific violations of the price cap, but also for systematic and economically significant support of Russia’s energy exports. A company that has earned hundreds of millions of dollars over years by maintaining Russia’s oil logistics should be assessed differently from an operator that made a single isolated voyage. At the same time, the criteria must be clear and sufficiently well-founded to withstand judicial review.
▪️ The fourth step is to remove the financial incentive. If transporting Russian oil provides a 30-40% premium on freight rates, the EU should make this business less profitable. Companies that continue to systematically transport Russian oil could lose access to certain forms of European insurance, government financial guarantees, export credit, port services, or other forms of public support. The calculation needs to change: the additional profit from a Russian voyage should be lower than the expected regulatory and financial costs.
▪️ The fifth step is tighter control over tanker sales. The sale of old oil tankers to high-risk third countries should require disclosure of the ultimate beneficial owner, source of financing, future manager, flag, insurer, and intended area of operation. For the riskiest transactions, simple notification is not enough - prior approval should be required. Particular attention should be paid to sales of old tankers to newly established companies in jurisdictions regularly used by the shadow fleet.
▪️ The sixth step is to establish real accountability for the transfer of vessels into the shadow fleet. If a tanker sold from the EU begins transporting Russian oil a few months later, regulators should determine whether the seller could have foreseen its end use, whether the buyer was a shell company, whether the sale price was abnormally high, who the intermediary was, and how quickly the owner, manager, flag, and insurer changed. Liability should depend on intent, knowledge, gross negligence, or failure to carry out adequate due diligence.
▪️ The seventh step is to sanction not just the vessels, but the entire network. The EU has already placed more than 630 shadow-fleet vessels on its sanctions lists, but this approach remains reactive. A vessel can quickly be resold, reflagged, or assigned a new manager or formal owner. The focus therefore needs to shift toward beneficial owners, commercial managers, ISM managers, crewing companies, brokers, insurers, flag registries, financial structures, and permanent ship-to-ship hubs.
▪️ The eighth step is to accelerate the sanctioning of individual tankers. The EU should not have to wait months for large political packages. It needs a mechanism for regular technical updates to the sanctions lists based on predefined criteria: transporting oil above the cap, AIS manipulation, false flagging, suspicious ship-to-ship transfers, lack of reliable insurance, repeated ownership changes through opaque SPVs, or work for already-sanctioned Russian entities.
▪️ The ninth step is to strengthen maritime enforcement together with the United Kingdom and EU coastal states. The detention of the Smyrtos in June 2026 showed that sanctions become significantly more effective when they have physical consequences. Where there is a legal basis - from false flagging to lack of adequate insurance or sanctions violations - inspections, detentions, and denial of port services should be used more actively.
▪️ The tenth step is to bring the issue of Greek shipping to the political level. According to the FT, citing European diplomats, Greece and Cyprus have repeatedly opposed a stricter price cap during internal EU negotiations. This creates an obvious contradiction: Europe is trying to reduce Russia’s oil revenues, while companies from EU member states are earning substantial revenues by maintaining the very system Europe is trying to dismantle.
‼️This is no longer just a matter of shipping policy. It is a matter of European collective security.
3:24 PM · Aug 12, 2026 · 16.3K Views
https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/2087636381304869303
