The Briefing Room
State Chapters => Texas => Topic started by: Elderberry on February 23, 2021, 09:43:24 pm
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Houston Chronicle by Marcy de Luna 2/23/2021
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/5-ERCOT-board-members-resign-15973390.php (https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/5-ERCOT-board-members-resign-15973390.php)
Several board members of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, the manager of the state's power grid, have resigned.
Sally Talberg, chair of the state's power grid operator, Vice Chair Peter Cramton, and board members Raymond Hepper, Terry Bulger, Vanessa Anesetti-Parra, according to Bloomberg.
The announcement comes a week after the catastrophic energy crisis caused by last week's winter storm.
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ERCOT board members resign after being criticized for living outside of Texas
Dallas Morning News by James Barragán 2/23/2021
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2021/02/23/ercot-board-members-resign-after-being-criticized-for-living-outside-of-texas/ (https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2021/02/23/ercot-board-members-resign-after-being-criticized-for-living-outside-of-texas/)
Four board members of the state’s power grid operator, including chairwoman Sally Talberg, resigned Tuesday, a week after power outages left millions across Texas shivering in their homes during severe winter storms and state officials criticized some board members for not living in the state.
Along with Talberg, the three other current board members who resigned are: Peter Cramton, an unaffiliated director; Terry Bulger, an unaffiliated director; and Raymond Hepper, an unaffiliated director.
All four are believed to live out of state. Talberg’s bio on the ERCOT website said she lives in Michigan. Bulger’s bio said he lives in a suburb of Chicago.
The four board members resigned together in a joint letter addressed to other ERCOT members and the Public Utility Commission, which oversees ERCOT. The letter was posted on the Public Utility Commission’s website.
ERCOT officials are expected to testify in front of lawmakers on Thursday during hearings about last week’s power failures.
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So they resigned rather than face the music over the debacle of last week.
This really exposes Abbott as a first class fool for supporting them in the first place, then claiming "they reassured me we will have not problems in the grid this winter".
He is to blame in selecting incompetent people and believing they were trustworthy.
He needs to go.
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Let me see if I understand this,ok?
These people are being forced to retire because they didn't predict the freak,once in a century,weather circumstances Texas is experiencing this year?
WTF? Are they supported to be seers,who can predict the future?
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Let me see if I understand this,ok?
These people are being forced to retire because they didn't predict the freak,once in a century,weather circumstances Texas is experiencing this year?
WTF? Are they supported to be seers,who can predict the future?
E(energy) R(reliability) C(Commission) O(f) T(exas)
They are supposed to ensure that Texas has a reliable power grid and they totally failed to do that. They should ALL resign!
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Let me see if I understand this,ok?
These people are being forced to retire because they didn't predict the freak,once in a century,weather circumstances Texas is experiencing this year?
WTF? Are they supported to be seers,who can predict the future?
I agree with you @sneakypete . Sometimes things happen...because they just do. I say this as someone who has/is dealing with this. This is so far out of the norm it's unbelievable. The whole state being down is what makes it so crazy. Ya really couldn't flee to a safer place because of road conditions.
Heck...my vehicle doors were frozen shut... Hopefully this will bring attention to the weaknesses in the system and can be repaired. If that doesn't happen...then I'll be livid.
As far as the ERCOT execs being "forced" to resign...I don't see that will help them when heads start to roll. I do think the ERCOT execs should live in Texas. These folks evidently do not. I don't blame Abbott either. Having been in mgt, you kinda have to rely on those that do the jobs.
We can't rage at the iceberg after the ship has sunk. Just FIX the problem and quit wasting time assigning blame. jmho
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So they resigned rather than face the music over the debacle of last week.
This really exposes Abbott as a first class fool for supporting them in the first place, then claiming "they reassured me we will have not problems in the grid this winter".
He is to blame in selecting incompetent people and believing they were trustworthy.
He needs to go.
*****rollingeyes*****
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E(energy) R(reliability) C(Commission) O(f) T(exas)
They are supposed to ensure that Texas has a reliable power grid and they totally failed to do that. They should ALL resign!
@Bigun
Just exactly HOW were they supposed to know,when it caught the National Weather Service by surprise?
Remember,these people are NOT Climatologists. They are regular people,chosen to sit on the board as regular people,not as scientists.
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I agree with you @sneakypete . Sometimes things happen...because they just do. I say this as someone who has/is dealing with this. This is so far out of the norm it's unbelievable. The whole state being down is what makes it so crazy. Ya really couldn't flee to a safer place because of road conditions.
Heck...my vehicle doors were frozen shut... Hopefully this will bring attention to the weaknesses in the system and can be repaired. If that doesn't happen...then I'll be livid.
As far as the ERCOT execs being "forced" to resign...I don't see that will help them when heads start to roll. I do think the ERCOT execs should live in Texas. These folks evidently do not. I don't blame Abbott either. Having been in mgt, you kinda have to rely on those that do the jobs.
We can't rage at the iceberg after the ship has sunk. Just FIX the problem and quit wasting time assigning blame. jmho
@berdie
*I* don't "think" they should live in Texas to sit on a board about the climate in Texas,it should have been a freaking REQUIREMENT since Day One.
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@Bigun
Just exactly HOW were they supposed to know,when it caught the National Weather Service by surprise?
Remember,these people are NOT Climatologists. They are regular people,chosen to sit on the board as regular people,not as scientists.
The National Weather Service was talking about the possibility of such an event for at least a full month that I personally know about and WARNING about it for at least 14 days @sneakypete so your argument doesn't hold water.
They were NOT paying any attention and ASSUMED that everything would be fine. They were flat wrong about that!
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The National Weather Service was talking about the possibility of such an event for at least a full month that I personally know about and WARNING about it for at least 14 days @sneakypete so your argument doesn't hold water.
They were NOT paying any attention and ASSUMED that everything would be fine. They were flat wrong about that!
@Bigun
I was not aware of that.
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I agree with you @sneakypete . Sometimes things happen...because they just do. I say this as someone who has/is dealing with this. This is so far out of the norm it's unbelievable. The whole state being down is what makes it so crazy. Ya really couldn't flee to a safer place because of road conditions.
Heck...my vehicle doors were frozen shut... Hopefully this will bring attention to the weaknesses in the system and can be repaired. If that doesn't happen...then I'll be livid.
As far as the ERCOT execs being "forced" to resign...I don't see that will help them when heads start to roll. I do think the ERCOT execs should live in Texas. These folks evidently do not. I don't blame Abbott either. Having been in mgt, you kinda have to rely on those that do the jobs.
We can't rage at the iceberg after the ship has sunk. Just FIX the problem and quit wasting time assigning blame. jmho
My times in Management made me responsible for the people I selected.
Abbott personally selected the three members of the PUC. Two are lawyers who were his Asst General Counsels. The third is an Anthropology graduate whose resume was as an aide to two Senators and is a Greenie. All are pure patronage positions. Do you believe any are qualified to discern the complex operational issues surrounding replacing reliable coal powered generation with the unreliable renewable power generation?
They are the overseers of Ercot.
Abbott is incompetent in his selection of those responsible for grid reliability.
Abbott is fresh off his State of the State in which he deprioritized anything related to the power grid reliability out of his speech.
In my world of management, one is responsible and is accountable for personnel selection. Apparently, in your management world, you are like Abbott when he says "But they told me it would be reliable."
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@Bigun
Just exactly HOW were they supposed to know,when it caught the National Weather Service by surprise?
Remember,these people are NOT Climatologists. They are regular people,chosen to sit on the board as regular people,not as scientists.
They are supposed to know something about which they are responsible for, aren't they?
Two members of the PUC which oversee Ercot are lawyers and one has a degree in Anthropology.
Are you satisfied those are qualifications to be responsible for managing a complex power grid?
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@berdie
*I* don't "think" they should live in Texas to sit on a board about the climate in Texas,it should have been a freaking REQUIREMENT since Day One.
Which is one more reason whoever approved them being there should be fired.
Not living in the state you are managing the power grid means you do not know enough about what you are managing or just don't freaking care what happens cause it does not affect you.
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They are supposed to know something about which they are responsible for, aren't they?
I doubt it. They are political appointees. Since when have political appointees had to know anything about anything to get appointed to a job?
Two members of the PUC which oversee Ercot are lawyers and one has a degree in Anthropology.
What is that supposed to mean? Does the job requirement state that members should be climatologists?
Probably not,although I STRONGLY agree that should be THE base requirement over all other requirements.
Are you satisfied those are qualifications to be responsible for managing a complex power grid?
Absolutely not,but I didn't write the requirements.
What should be done,is going after the politicians that established the qualifications and make THEM responsible by booting their asses out of office for incompetence.
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I agree with you @sneakypete . Sometimes things happen...because they just do. I say this as someone who has/is dealing with this. This is so far out of the norm it's unbelievable. The whole state being down is what makes it so crazy. Ya really couldn't flee to a safer place because of road conditions.
Heck...my vehicle doors were frozen shut... Hopefully this will bring attention to the weaknesses in the system and can be repaired. If that doesn't happen...then I'll be livid.
As far as the ERCOT execs being "forced" to resign...I don't see that will help them when heads start to roll. I do think the ERCOT execs should live in Texas. These folks evidently do not. I don't blame Abbott either. Having been in mgt, you kinda have to rely on those that do the jobs.
We can't rage at the iceberg after the ship has sunk. Just FIX the problem and quit wasting time assigning blame. jmho
We would do SOOOO much better to focus on the causes (essential equipment at all levels, in different technologies) not being able to handle the severe cold.
Assigning people to blame, instead of focusing on what needs fixed, and who pays for that is the real problem. And focusing on blame rather than the problem, means we will be doing this again because we did not get it fixed, just like last time.
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We would do SOOOO much better to focus on the causes (essential equipment at all levels, in different technologies) not being able to handle the severe cold.
Assigning people to blame, instead of focusing on what needs fixed, and who pays for that is the real problem. And focusing on blame rather than the problem, means we will be doing this again because we did not get it fixed, just like last time.
You are speaking in the corporate world in which we are both familiar and spent careers in.
This is a political matter totally.
If one assigns patronage positions to incompetent people in the political world, one must be accountable.
That is the way it worls.
Anthropology graduates should never be responsible for handling our power supply.
You would never see that in the company you work for, and it should not be seen in government either.
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This is a political matter totally.
The people that think that way are dooming us to repeat the problem.
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You are speaking in the corporate world in which we are both familiar and spent careers in.
This is a political matter totally.
If one assigns patronage positions to incompetent people in the political world, one must be accountable.
That is the way it worls.
Anthropology graduates should never be responsible for handling our power supply.
You would never see that in the company you work for, and it should not be seen in government either.
Are we talking about the ERCOT board or the Public Utilities Commission?
I'll certainly agree that members of the PUC should have some competence about public utilities, and an anthropology degree alone would not confer that competence; in fact I don't know of *any* degree program that would confer that competence. In fairness I don't know what experience that person might have gained after finishing their anthropology degree; actual work experience counts for more than formal education, and I say that as someone who possesses as much formal education as one can acquire. Our recent experience with appropriately-degreed experts like Dr. Fauci should put to rest any belief that having the "correct" education makes one effective in managing public policy.
The argument made on this thread about the ERCOT board is that those members should live in TX or else they are incompetent to consider the TX grid and apathetic about what happens within it. I find that argument ill-reasoned. The bio summaries I've seen on some of the now-resigned ERCOT board members indicate they have significant experience in understanding and managing widespread power infrastructure, and living outside TX makes them more neutral in considering the competing interests of TX consumers, TX transmission companies, and TX generators.
I was initially taken aback, and irritated, that ERCOT board members would live out of state. But on further thought that doesn't bother me. The position that they must live here to be effective falls into the standard liberal fallacy of confusing empathy with effectiveness. As a now-dead research manager I used to work with sometimes reminded us, "We don't have all the smart people."
Perhaps a careful and dispassionate analysis of all the facts will indicate that heads should roll over last week's power failures. But so far the only blame I can assign is with ERCOT and private company leadership for failures in communication, and with the TX State Legislature/PUC for not requiring by statute or administrative law effective winterization for weather that happens once in a generation.
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The people that think that way are dooming us to repeat the problem.
so it is your belief that the private sector controls the grid, not the PUC or Ercot?
Why would you assume that? It is not reality.
I repeat: This is not a problem that an engineer put in the wrong system. It is a problem that political entities decided to put in the wrong systems and did not plan prudently.
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We would do SOOOO much better to focus on the causes (essential equipment at all levels, in different technologies) not being able to handle the severe cold.
Assigning people to blame, instead of focusing on what needs fixed, and who pays for that is the real problem. And focusing on blame rather than the problem, means we will be doing this again because we did not get it fixed, just like last time.
@thackney
And THERE it is.
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The argument made on this thread about the ERCOT board is that those members should live in TX or else they are incompetent to consider the TX grid and apathetic about what happens within it. I find that argument ill-reasoned.
@HoustonSam
How about the reasoning that states they should live in Texas so that if they don't take their positions seriously,they have to suffer with everyone else?
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@HoustonSam
How about the reasoning that states they should live in Texas so that if they don't take their positions seriously,they have to suffer with everyone else?
We always have emotional affinity for people who have "skin in the game" with us. But that doesn't necessarily make them the best problem solvers; I don't insist that my physician suffer the same malady as I in order to treat me for it, or that my plumber must himself have burst pipes in order to repair mine.
If it is demonstrated that the PUC and ERCOT Board members were actually malfeasant, or even misfeasant, in their duties, I'll agree that there should be accountability and remedy. But simply living out of state is not evidence for those contentions.
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Are we talking about the ERCOT board or the Public Utilities Commission?
I'll certainly agree that members of the PUC should have some competence about public utilities, and an anthropology degree alone would not confer that competence; in fact I don't know of *any* degree program that would confer that competence. In fairness I don't know what experience that person might have gained after finishing their anthropology degree; actual work experience counts for more than formal education, and I say that as someone who possesses as much formal education as one can acquire. Our recent experience with appropriately-degreed experts like Dr. Fauci should put to rest any belief that having the "correct" education makes one effective in managing public policy.
The argument made on this thread about the ERCOT board is that those members should live in TX or else they are incompetent to consider the TX grid and apathetic about what happens within it. I find that argument ill-reasoned. The bio summaries I've seen on some of the now-resigned ERCOT board members indicate they have significant experience in understanding and managing widespread power infrastructure, and living outside TX makes them more neutral in considering the competing interests of TX consumers, TX transmission companies, and TX generators.
I was initially taken aback, and irritated, that ERCOT board members would live out of state. But on further thought that doesn't bother me. The position that they must live here to be effective falls into the standard liberal fallacy of confusing empathy with effectiveness. As a now-dead research manager I used to work with sometimes reminded us, "We don't have all the smart people."
Perhaps a careful and dispassionate analysis of all the facts will indicate that heads should roll over last week's power failures. But so far the only blame I can assign is with ERCOT and private company leadership for failures in communication, and with the TX State Legislature/PUC for not requiring by statute or administrative law effective winterization for weather that happens once in a generation.
The PUC controls Ercot.
Ercot is an acronym for Electric Reliability Council of Texas.
The emphasis is on Electric Reliability. Did we achieve that by the way the PUC and Ercot handled the design and operation of the Texas grid last week?
Are you seriously suggesting otherwise?
Damn right we need accountability. My mother almost died in a nursing home that lost power and heat last week due to negligence by the authorities in the composition of the electric grid we use.
This is not the fault of an engineer which designed the system.
It is the fault of political decisions made that did not recognize consequences of those decisions.
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The PUC controls Ercot.
Ercot is an acronym for Electric Reliability Council of Texas.
The emphasis is on Electric Reliability. Did we achieve that by the way the PUC and Ercot handled the design and operation of the Texas grid last week?
Are you seriously suggesting otherwise?
Damn right we need accountability. My mother almost died in a nursing home that lost power and heat last week due to negligence by the authorities in the composition of the electric grid we use.
This is not the fault of an engineer which designed the system.
It is the fault of political decisions made that did not recognize consequences of those decisions.
Very sorry to hear of your mother's experience @IsailedawayfromFR, and I hope she is resting comfortably now.
No, the grid certainly was not reliable last week and I agree that the fundamental failure is in political decisions, but it's not clear to me that those decision failures were by the PUC or by ERCOT. The grid failed because it is not winterized, it's not winterized because there is no regulatory requirement that it be winterized, and there is no regulatory requirement because TX rarely sees the temperatures we experienced last week.
It is not my understanding that ERCOT has the authority to order generators, transmission companies, and pipeline operators to winterize. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I haven't seen it reported anywhere that ERCOT is accountable for regulating the physical maintenance of the grid. ERCOT is accountable to monitor the balance between generation capacity and power demand, and they did that.
Does the PUC have the authority to order winterization? I don't know, perhaps they do. But the organization that unquestionably DOES have that authority is the TX State Legislature. When the law is inadequate, it's the job of law makers, not executives, to make the law adequate, either by direct legislation or by delegating authority for administrative law to an appropriate agency. I don't want appointees to commissions and boards asserting the right to make law and I'm pretty sure you don't either.
So yes, it's fundamentally a political issue, but the undergraduate majors of the PUC members and the home mailing addresses of the ERCOT board are irrelevant distractions. PUC and ERCOT can only operate within the authority they have been given by the legislature and I haven't seen it documented anywhere that either of them have been given the authority to order winterization of grid assets.
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Very sorry to hear of your mother's experience @IsailedawayfromFR, and I hope she is resting comfortably now.
No, the grid certainly was not reliable last week and I agree that the fundamental failure is in political decisions, but it's not clear to me that those decision failures were by the PUC or by ERCOT. The grid failed because it is not winterized, it's not winterized because there is no regulatory requirement that it be winterized, and there is no regulatory requirement because TX rarely sees the temperatures we experienced last week.
It is not my understanding that ERCOT has the authority to order generators, transmission companies, and pipeline operators to winterize. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I haven't seen it reported anywhere that ERCOT is accountable for regulating the physical maintenance of the grid. ERCOT is accountable to monitor the balance between generation capacity and power demand, and they did that.
Does the PUC have the authority to order winterization? I don't know, perhaps they do. But the organization that unquestionably DOES have that authority is the TX State Legislature. When the law is inadequate, it's the job of law makers, not executives, to make the law adequate, either by direct legislation or by delegating authority for administrative law to an appropriate agency. I don't want appointees to commissions and boards asserting the right to make law and I'm pretty sure you don't either.
So yes, it's fundamentally a political issue, but the undergraduate majors of the PUC members and the home mailing addresses of the ERCOT board are irrelevant distractions. PUC and ERCOT can only operate within the authority they have been given by the legislature and I haven't seen it documented anywhere that either of them have been given the authority to order winterization of grid assets.
This is not just a case of freezing pipes as you suggest.
It is a case of spending tax dollars to subsidize and prioritize unreliable power systems like wind power while shutting down cheaper and much more reliable coal derived power.
It is about failing miserably to recognize that reliance upon natural gas power by pipeline alone gives no contingency should that supply become interrupted.
The power heroes in our political world have been awarding accolades to those who bring about the so-called renewables into the world, disregarding whether these are in fact environmentally better than what they replace.
When is the last time anyone in our government actually suggested reliability of base power supply should be a concern? If it were, we should be subsidizing coal and nuclear rather than yoking them with ever increasing fiats.
Another thing on winterization. Why install assets that will not take the winter climates thrown at them, such as solar or wind? As I understand it, government demands preference for these to operate and provide power over hydrocarbon power production. Any preferences like that certainly weaken hydrocarbon power plant prioritization, while weakening our abilities to withstand future colder weather.
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Here is another piece of the puzzle.
In addition to ERCOT reporting to the PUC, they also follow the standards of NERC.
As of June 18, 2007, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granted NERC the legal authority to enforce
Reliability Standards with all U.S. users, owners, and operators of the BPS, and made compliance with those standards
mandatory and enforceable.
Does ERCOT meet these standards of Reliability? Are the standards insufficient and need to be modified?
(https://i.postimg.cc/MpxQVfg3/NERC.png)
https://www.nerc.com/files/IVGTF_Task_1_5_Final.pdf
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This is not just a case of freezing pipes as you suggest.
It is a case of spending tax dollars to subsidize and prioritize unreliable power systems like wind power while shutting down cheaper and much more reliable coal derived power.
It is about failing miserably to recognize that reliance upon natural gas power by pipeline alone gives no contingency should that supply become interrupted.
You and I are in complete agreement that subsidies and tax breaks should not artificially favor one generation technology over another in a market. If we're going to leave it to markets to select the winners and losers, each contestant has to stand on its own two feet. Perhaps a subsidy is merited to maintain a more reliable, but less cost-effective, source of energy, but it means consumers pay an inflated price every day in exchange for that reliability for a few days in a decade.
If last week doesn't teach that reliability is critical then nothing will ever teach it. I don't know what that means for specific generation technologies; I would like to see a more clear analysis of the freeze-driven failures of each technology last week in per cent terms, and a better presentation of how the various technologies are included "in the mix" as the seasons change during the year. I've seen arguments here that wind was a very small part of the mix going in to last weekend so the absolute magnitude of its failure was immaterial; I've also seen that wind had been a much larger part of the mix just one week earlier.
I think the Achilles heel of "renewables" is not weather resistance so much as their intermittent nature, requiring redundant capacity and as-yet-uninvented energy storage capabilities. I suppose that's just a fancy way of saying they are inherently unreliable and thus require huge additional capital investment to compensate.
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As of June 18, 2007, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) granted NERC the legal authority to enforce
Reliability Standards with all U.S. users, owners, and operators of the BPS, and made compliance with those standards
mandatory and enforceable.
Does that mean the grid in TX *is* within the jurisdiction of federal regs, in spite of everything that's been reported in the last week? And if so, how specifically is ERCOT "on the hook" for that accountability and is there evidence for some kind of federal crime in last week's failure?
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Very sorry to hear of your mother's experience @IsailedawayfromFR, and I hope she is resting comfortably now.
No, the grid certainly was not reliable last week and I agree that the fundamental failure is in political decisions, but it's not clear to me that those decision failures were by the PUC or by ERCOT. The grid failed because it is not winterized, it's not winterized because there is no regulatory requirement that it be winterized, and there is no regulatory requirement because TX rarely sees the temperatures we experienced last week.
It is not my understanding that ERCOT has the authority to order generators, transmission companies, and pipeline operators to winterize. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I haven't seen it reported anywhere that ERCOT is accountable for regulating the physical maintenance of the grid. ERCOT is accountable to monitor the balance between generation capacity and power demand, and they did that.
Does the PUC have the authority to order winterization? I don't know, perhaps they do. But the organization that unquestionably DOES have that authority is the TX State Legislature. When the law is inadequate, it's the job of law makers, not executives, to make the law adequate, either by direct legislation or by delegating authority for administrative law to an appropriate agency. I don't want appointees to commissions and boards asserting the right to make law and I'm pretty sure you don't either.
So yes, it's fundamentally a political issue, but the undergraduate majors of the PUC members and the home mailing addresses of the ERCOT board are irrelevant distractions. PUC and ERCOT can only operate within the authority they have been given by the legislature and I haven't seen it documented anywhere that either of them have been given the authority to order winterization of grid assets.
@HoustonSam
Not that I think politicians would try to shift the blame away from themselves,but :yowsa: :yowsa:
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Does that mean the grid in TX *is* within the jurisdiction of federal regs, in spite of everything that's been reported in the last week? And if so, how specifically is ERCOT "on the hook" for that accountability and is there evidence for some kind of federal crime in last week's failure?
I see a lot of shades of grey in this issue, and a LOT of equipment that has to change in multiple industries to prevent it from happening again. Water supply has lots of problems as does the Nat Gas system, but people are mostly focused on Electric Generation.
This storm was so bad that Canada had significant Nat Gas supplies shut down from the cold. Exactly what standard do you build for? Some standards become conflicting. Building Nat Gas Power turbines inside heated building instead of open structures makes our summers requiring derating of units capacity during the summer peak electrical demand.
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E(energy) R(reliability) C(Commission) O(f) T(exas)
They are supposed to ensure that Texas has a reliable power grid and they totally failed to do that. They should ALL resign!
"You Had ONE JOB!"
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In my world of management, one is responsible and is accountable for personnel selection. Apparently, in your management world, you are like Abbott when he says "But they told me it would be reliable."
First Rule of Leadership: EVERYTHING is YOUR Fault!
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You and I are in complete agreement that subsidies and tax breaks should not artificially favor one generation technology over another in a market. If we're going to leave it to markets to select the winners and losers, each contestant has to stand on its own two feet. Perhaps a subsidy is merited to maintain a more reliable, but less cost-effective, source of energy, but it means consumers pay an inflated price every day in exchange for that reliability for a few days in a decade.
If last week doesn't teach that reliability is critical then nothing will ever teach it. I don't know what that means for specific generation technologies; I would like to see a more clear analysis of the freeze-driven failures of each technology last week in per cent terms, and a better presentation of how the various technologies are included "in the mix" as the seasons change during the year. I've seen arguments here that wind was a very small part of the mix going in to last weekend so the absolute magnitude of its failure was immaterial; I've also seen that wind had been a much larger part of the mix just one week earlier.
I think the Achilles heel of "renewables" is not weather resistance so much as their intermittent nature, requiring redundant capacity and as-yet-uninvented energy storage capabilities. I suppose that's just a fancy way of saying they are inherently unreliable and thus require huge additional capital investment to compensate.
I understand what you are conveying and we seem to be mostly in agreement.
I will point out a couple of things:
One, wind power has preferences over other power generation, so the week before it was robust because of this and weather did not impact it. It is why natural gas and coal were both reduced. Both coal and gas had to step in to replace the loss of wind power when the weather affected it. You seem to suggest that during the freeze that wind was such a small part of the problem that it was not a primary issue for the lack of power to the grid, oddly because it was already out of the mix. Don't you find that odd? It is supposed to generate power and when it does not, it is not its fault? The overall fact is that wind cannot step in when needed, so why is it there in the first place if one needs reliability as well as power generation? It fails on one side of the coin. Wind and solar to me are considered novelties, and should never be relied upon without substantial backup with other, more reliable systems.
Second, you also suggest a subsidy for ensuring more reliability may be needed. Simply taking an unreliable power generation scheme out of the mix will provide that reliability as more strength toward installing and operating other reliable systems will exist. Also, the most reliable power generation by far is coal and nuclear, and both are faced with increasingly onerous regulations that threaten their survival.
Texas requires political leadership that stands up to the imposition of these regulations and asserts its sovereign rights to decide what is best for its citizens rather than to permit dictates from unaccountable DC bureaucrats to decide. If Texans suffer or die from bad decisions, we want state accountability we can change out. We do not need just politicians who receive accolades from the wind energy like Abbott.
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Very sorry to hear of your mother's experience @IsailedawayfromFR, and I hope she is resting comfortably now.
No, the grid certainly was not reliable last week and I agree that the fundamental failure is in political decisions, but it's not clear to me that those decision failures were by the PUC or by ERCOT. The grid failed because it is not winterized, it's not winterized because there is no regulatory requirement that it be winterized, and there is no regulatory requirement because TX rarely sees the temperatures we experienced last week.
It is not my understanding that ERCOT has the authority to order generators, transmission companies, and pipeline operators to winterize. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I haven't seen it reported anywhere that ERCOT is accountable for regulating the physical maintenance of the grid. ERCOT is accountable to monitor the balance between generation capacity and power demand, and they did that.
Does the PUC have the authority to order winterization? I don't know, perhaps they do. But the organization that unquestionably DOES have that authority is the TX State Legislature. When the law is inadequate, it's the job of law makers, not executives, to make the law adequate, either by direct legislation or by delegating authority for administrative law to an appropriate agency. I don't want appointees to commissions and boards asserting the right to make law and I'm pretty sure you don't either.
So yes, it's fundamentally a political issue, but the undergraduate majors of the PUC members and the home mailing addresses of the ERCOT board are irrelevant distractions. PUC and ERCOT can only operate within the authority they have been given by the legislature and I haven't seen it documented anywhere that either of them have been given the authority to order winterization of grid assets.
As far as I know, ERCOT has no ability to order anyone to winterize anything but IMHO no one should ever need to do that. If your business is to generate and sell electricity, it seems to me that it is in your best interest to make sure you can do that at all times. YOU CANNOT SELL WHAT YOU DO NOT GENERATE. It's the same with Natural Gas suppliers as well.
Beyond that, I hold the government (both state and federal) culpable for tilting the table in favor of highly unreliable (green) generators and away from proven reliable generators. THAT should end immediately as the marketplace cannot work its magic under those conditions. No government subsidies to anyone and let the market rule.
@HoustonSam
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Also, the most reliable power generation by far is coal and nuclear, and both are faced with increasingly onerous regulations that threaten their survival.
:yowsa: If we stopped subsidizing the unreliable methods of generation and ended the needless overregulation you speak of The marketplace would resolve the probems for us in no time. @IsailedawayfromFR @HoustonSam
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.... If your business is to generate and sell electricity, it seems to me that it is in your best interest to make sure you can do that at all times. YOU CANNOT SELL WHAT YOU DO NOT GENERATE. It's the same with Natural Gas suppliers as well.
But they didn't winterize @Bigun . If it's just plain good business to do so, then why didn't they? Are they not good businessmen? I think they calculated that it's better for their bottom line to shut down and lose revenue for, say, five days out of a decade, than to pay the cost of winterizing for 3650 days out of a decade.
In my industry we are very guilty of chasing revenue rather than profit. I think the power generators are better businessmen and recognize that their bottom line, not their top line, is what matters; they can give up those five days of revenue in exchange for 3645 days of higher profit. But that leaves the consumers at risk of the kind of disaster we experienced last week; if we're going to avoid that disaster again I think we'll need a legal obligation for the companies that participate in the grid to demonstrate winterization to some standard. It will be very difficult to figure that out and make it work, but last week's consequences are just too severe to risk again, in my opinion.
Beyond that, I hold the government (both state and federal) culpable for tilting the table in favor of highly unreliable (green) generators and away from proven reliable generators. THAT should end immediately as the marketplace cannot work its magic under those conditions. No government subsidies to anyone and let the market rule.
I join you in opposing subsidies to some generators over others; let them fight it out on fair ground and the best man should win. I think it's still unproven whether the green generators were more affected by cold last week than the traditional generators.
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I understand what you are conveying and we seem to be mostly in agreement.
We're in close agreement, just using different words.
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Both coal and nuclear had similar problems in Texas. Only requiring more of them does not solve the problem. We haven't built a coal or nuclear plant in Texas for a long time. It has been 10 years since the last coal plant built in the lower 48.
If every wind and solar facility was replaced with Nat Gas AND winterized to keep running in the weather, our problems would have been WORSE last week. MORE power would have gone offline and MORE people would have been out of power. We did not have enough gas available to serve the amount we did have available to run.
We haven't built a coal or nuclear plant in Texas for a long time. It has been 10 years since the last coal plant built in the lower 48.
Ercot has neither the responsibility nor the authority to require fuel types. This stupid blame game is going to keep the problems from getting fixed.
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Both coal and nuclear had similar problems in Texas. Only requiring more of them does not solve the problem. We haven't built a coal or nuclear plant in Texas for a long time. It has been 10 years since the last coal plant built in the lower 48.
If every wind and solar facility was replaced with Nat Gas AND winterized to keep running in the weather, our problems would have been WORSE last week. MORE power would have gone offline and MORE people would have been out of power. We did not have enough gas available to serve the amount we did have available to run.
We haven't built a coal or nuclear plant in Texas for a long time. It has been 10 years since the last coal plant built in the lower 48.
Ercot has neither the responsibility nor the authority to require fuel types. This stupid blame game is going to keep the problems from getting fixed.
Granted that coal and nukes in fact are *not* being built; I think the argument is that they *should* be built. Would coal and nukes be less vulnerable, not invulnerable but less vulnerable, to the kind of weather we saw last week?
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But they didn't winterize @Bigun . If it's just plain good business to do so, then why didn't they? Are they not good businessmen? I think they calculated that it's better for their bottom line to shut down and lose revenue for, say, five days out of a decade, than to pay the cost of winterizing for 3650 days out of a decade.
I believe it was more a case of not realizing just how bad the cold could get, how widespread and for how long.
More than just not getting to supply power, that $9,000 per MWH is not just the bonus to supply extra power, it is also the applied penalty for contracting to supply power and not delivering.
...There is an offer cap placed on the wholesale market price. The maximum wholesale market
price for electricity is reserved for extreme scarcity conditions to encourage any and all
generation able to come online. These peak prices are paid by wholesale buyers that
have failed to purchase power in advance to hedge risk exposure for their customers.
They are also paid by generators who do not generate power that they have committed
to provide. This acts as a penalty for generators who fail to show up when needed....
https://www.puc.texas.gov/consumer/facts/factsheets/elecfacts/WinterStormPriceExplainer-FIN.pdf
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Granted that coal and nukes in fact are *not* being built; I think the argument is that they *should* be built. Would coal and nukes be less vulnerable, not invulnerable but less vulnerable, to the kind of weather we saw last week?
Coal dropped ~30% and Nuke ~20%. Nat Gas maybe ~35% but some of that was fuel supply from others.
(https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/images/2021.02.19/chart2.svg)
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Granted that coal and nukes in fact are *not* being built; I think the argument is that they *should* be built. Would coal and nukes be less vulnerable, not invulnerable but less vulnerable, to the kind of weather we saw last week?
Anyone remember this?
In a brief order on Monday, FERC rejected the DOE's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), which would have provided cost recovery for power plants that keep 90 days of fuel onsite. Instead, the Commission asked regional grid operators to review an extensive list of questions about improving power system resilience and report back within 60 days.
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-rejects-doe-nopr-kicking-resilience-issue-to-grid-operators/514334/
Jan. 8, 2018
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More than just not getting to supply power, that $9,000 per MWH is not just the bonus to supply extra power, it is also the applied penalty for contracting to supply power and not delivering.
Excellent point, which you had shared earlier. So that can be as much as an $18,000/MWH net penalty (losing the revenue AND paying the penalty) on the generators who "tripped off" Sunday and early Monday AM, presumably paid for every committed MWH until they came back on line. I wonder whether there is a Force Majeure provision, and if so, how it would apply to the generators' inability to get NG versus their decision to forego adequate winterization.
I don't know what sort of profit margin they routinely get; I would still like to see the numbers run on a few days paying that penalty versus many days at higher profit margin due to lower operating costs.
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Both coal and nuclear had similar problems in Texas. Only requiring more of them does not solve the problem. We haven't built a coal or nuclear plant in Texas for a long time. It has been 10 years since the last coal plant built in the lower 48.
If every wind and solar facility was replaced with Nat Gas AND winterized to keep running in the weather, our problems would have been WORSE last week. MORE power would have gone offline and MORE people would have been out of power. We did not have enough gas available to serve the amount we did have available to run.
We haven't built a coal or nuclear plant in Texas for a long time. It has been 10 years since the last coal plant built in the lower 48.
Ercot has neither the responsibility nor the authority to require fuel types. This stupid blame game is going to keep the problems from getting fixed.
How could our problems be worse using natural gas if the contribution from wind and solar was negligible during the freeze? That makes no sense whatsover because wind was already essentially offline.
And one does not simply assume we use natural gas the way we are. A prudent and operationally astute regulatory authority would have recognized the threat of online deliveries via pipeline alone as a fuel supply was an unreliable mechanism to support reliable power generation during severe weather and implemented strategies beforehand to accommodate a more ready supply via storage.
Instead, the regulatory authority existing emphasized the usage of unreliable power generation systems such as wind and ensured we achieve greater losses when they went down during the storm.
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Coal dropped ~30% and Nuke ~20%. Nat Gas maybe ~35% but some of that was fuel supply from others.
Thanks, you had shared this chart earlier but I failed to pay adequate attention. So these data suggest some differences in cold weather resiliency, but still significant vulnerability for coal and nukes also.
Why do you think wind dropped so much one week before the front hit?
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I think it's still unproven whether the green generators were more affected by cold last week than the traditional generators.
Basic science should tell you that they were. Airfoils CANNOT work when they become loaded up with snow and ice and it's the exact same with solar except clouds, bird droppings, and tumbleweeds work just as well as snow and ice for them.
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Anyone remember this?
In a brief order on Monday, FERC rejected the DOE's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), which would have provided cost recovery for power plants that keep 90 days of fuel onsite. Instead, the Commission asked regional grid operators to review an extensive list of questions about improving power system resilience and report back within 60 days.
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-rejects-doe-nopr-kicking-resilience-issue-to-grid-operators/514334/
Jan. 8, 2018
I certainly do not remember that. It seems to really break against coal, which presumably can be piled up and ready to use, and nukes, which don't have to receive fuel regularly, and to favor solar and wind and even NG generation, which can't store their fuel for later use.
Stated differently it disables a good method for improving reliability.
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Basic science should tell you that they were. Airfoils CANNOT work when they become loaded up with snow and ice and it's the exact same with solar except clouds, bird droppings, and tumbleweeds work just as well as snow and ice for them.
That tells me they were affected, not that they were more affected. @thackney has shared the actual data above, and it doesn't show that the "renewables" were more vulnerable to the cold.
And just to be clear, I'm not an advocate of "renewables."
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Excellent point, which you had shared earlier. So that can be as much as an $18,000/MWH net penalty (losing the revenue AND paying the penalty) on the generators who "tripped off" Sunday and early Monday AM, presumably paid for every committed MWH until they came back on line. I wonder whether there is a Force Majeure provision, and if so, how it would apply to the generators' inability to get NG versus their decision to forego adequate winterization.
I don't know what sort of profit margin they routinely get; I would still like to see the numbers run on a few days paying that penalty versus many days at higher profit margin due to lower operating costs.
I don't think you can fully double dip that in cost justification. You could earn that much with surplus capacity above what you already contracted to deliver. But if you had not contracted to deliver power, you could not be charged the penalty.
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Basic science should tell you that they were. Airfoils CANNOT work when they become loaded up with snow and ice and it's the exact same with solar except clouds, bird droppings, and tumbleweeds work just as well as snow and ice for them.
Wind turbines in northern climates typically have heating elements in the blades for this reason. It is not a reason to eliminate wind. It is the same problem with the other types of traditional power, not spending the money up front for full winter ratings.
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I certainly do not remember that. It seems to really break against coal, which presumably can be piled up and ready to use, and nukes, which don't have to receive fuel regularly, and to favor solar and wind and even NG generation, which can't store their fuel for later use.
Stated differently it disables a good method for improving reliability.
I do not favor the subsidy. But perhaps a tiered generation payout. One level for any power available. A bonus for dispatchable power (comes on when needed, needs to include penalty for not) and an even higher rate for power with its own site fuel supply, even a week would make a heck of difference. That could even generate some integrated Nat Gas storage.
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I don't think you can fully double dip that in cost justification. You could earn that much with surplus capacity above what you already contracted to deliver. But if you had not contracted to deliver power, you could not be charged the penalty.
Understood; the upside of the $9000/MWH would only be on excess delivery beyond what is contracted. So the net loss on failure would be whatever price you would have gotten on the contracted delivery plus the $9000/MWH added penalty.
So contract to deliver the power, then calculate how many days you can afford to fail before you've lost more than you would save by skipping the winterization. If it's fewer days than you think we'll be knocked out by cold weather, winterization clearly pays for itself. And it REALLY pays for itself if you'll have spare capacity to sell for that $9000.
Of course I realize actual capital budgets aren't determined this way, and even if they were it fails to consider the dire consequences of failure on the consumers. So I'm coming around to a required degree of winterization to some standard. It wouldn't keep the gas flowing into the now-winterized generation plant, but it would make that one part of the system more resilient.
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Understood; the upside of the $9000/MWH would only be on excess delivery beyond what is contracted. So the net loss on failure would be whatever price you would have gotten on the contracted delivery plus the $9000/MWH added penalty.
So contract to deliver the power, then calculate how many days you can afford to fail before you've lost more than you would save by skipping the winterization. If it's fewer days than you think we'll be knocked out by cold weather, winterization clearly pays for itself. And it REALLY pays for itself if you'll have spare capacity to sell for that $9000.
Of course I realize actual capital budgets aren't determined this way, and even if they were it fails to consider the dire consequences of failure on the consumers. So I'm coming around to a required degree of winterization to some standard. It wouldn't keep the gas flowing into the now-winterized generation plant, but it would make that one part of the system more resilient.
We need more winterization, but not just our electrical power. All "essential" services, public water, fuel delivery, ect. I favor intensives payed by the user of product, but likely requiring more legislative regulations. And I hate adding government regs.
After Hurricane Ike, Texas added some rules regarding onsite generation for gasoline/diesel retail. It may have had some size/volume limits before kicking in.
The easiest way for most of this is making it a requirement for permits, I believe.
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Just because last week's weather has not happened since 1989 does not mean it will be anywhere near that long before it happens again. Weather is cyclic and some of those cycles are longer than a lifetime.
And with that, I will leave this discussion to others now since electrical power generation is not my primary area of expertise
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We need more winterization, but not just our electrical power. All "essential" services, public water, fuel delivery, ect. I favor intensives payed by the user of product, but likely requiring more legislative regulations. And I hate adding government regs.
After Hurricane Ike, Texas added some rules regarding onsite generation for gasoline/diesel retail. It may have had some size/volume limits before kicking in.
The easiest way for most of this is making it a requirement for permits, I believe.
Sounds like we agree, and your understanding is much more robust and experienced than mine.
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Understood; the upside of the $9000/MWH would only be on excess delivery beyond what is contracted. So the net loss on failure would be whatever price you would have gotten on the contracted delivery plus the $9000/MWH added penalty.
So contract to deliver the power, then calculate how many days you can afford to fail before you've lost more than you would save by skipping the winterization. If it's fewer days than you think we'll be knocked out by cold weather, winterization clearly pays for itself. And it REALLY pays for itself if you'll have spare capacity to sell for that $9000.
Of course I realize actual capital budgets aren't determined this way, and even if they were it fails to consider the dire consequences of failure on the consumers. So I'm coming around to a required degree of winterization to some standard. It wouldn't keep the gas flowing into the now-winterized generation plant, but it would make that one part of the system more resilient.
I got an email from Reliant yesterday stating that my rates were locked in and that the HUGE price spike would not affect me. WHEW!
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I got an email from Reliant yesterday stating that my rates were locked in and that the HUGE price spike would not affect me. WHEW!
We got ours, about double price for the month. But I am in an Index rate tied to the monthly average of Nat Gas price, and we used a lot more since the power mostly stayed on. I am happy with double for a month with that cold snap and staying warm.
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We need more winterization, but not just our electrical power. All "essential" services, public water, fuel delivery, ect. I favor intensives payed by the user of product, but likely requiring more legislative regulations. And I hate adding government regs.
After Hurricane Ike, Texas added some rules regarding onsite generation for gasoline/diesel retail. It may have had some size/volume limits before kicking in.
The easiest way for most of this is making it a requirement for permits, I believe.
After Ike I was without power for just shy of 2 weeks. Sometime around a week of running my generator on my 100# propane bottle, it felt like it was half full or so. So I went on a drive to find where I could get it refilled. Driving down SH35, I had to go somewhere halfway between Alvin and Angleton before I found a place that could fill my bottle. I drove past lots of places that sold propane, when they had power. Where I got my propane was running on a generator.
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I certainly do not remember that. It seems to really break against coal, which presumably can be piled up and ready to use, and nukes, which don't have to receive fuel regularly, and to favor solar and wind and even NG generation, which can't store their fuel for later use.
Stated differently it disables a good method for improving reliability.
That is a false statement for NG, and if one uses batteries or gravity/thermal storage, as well as for the power produced by renewables that can be stored.
Natural gas can be stored effectively as LNG or in underground reservoirs and has been done so for many decades.
And the electric power generated by any method including NG and renewables can be stored in batteries, as has been pointed out repeatedly.
The only measure is how much does it cost to do so.
The stored potential energy of nuclear and hydrocarbons is a powerful reason to utilize those methods if one wants surety of supply as batteries usage are minimized.
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I see a lot of shades of grey in this issue, and a LOT of equipment that has to change in multiple industries to prevent it from happening again. Water supply has lots of problems as does the Nat Gas system, but people are mostly focused on Electric Generation.
This storm was so bad that Canada had significant Nat Gas supplies shut down from the cold. Exactly what standard do you build for? Some standards become conflicting. Building Nat Gas Power turbines inside heated building instead of open structures makes our summers requiring derating of units capacity during the summer peak electrical demand.
I agree that attention needs to be paid to water supply and natural gas as well as electrical generation. But, as in most things in life will the consumer be willing to handle the extra cost involved? This reminds me of when the roads in major cities are impassable during a storm. Everybody screams "Why don't we have the equipment like in other states?"
I claim no expertise in this area, at all. But in reading this thread (especially your posts) there seems to be a lot of fingers in the electrical grid pie. In my experience, that never bodes well. So I must assume alot is due to deregulation?
In any event, we can never truly thwart Mother Nature.
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Just because last week's weather has not happened since 1989 does not mean it will be anywhere near that long before it happens again. Weather is cyclic and some of those cycles are longer than a lifetime.
And with that, I will leave this discussion to others now since electrical power generation is not my primary area of expertise
True statement, as attested by my father, a career meteorologist who knew better than anyone how often rain amounts come. He used that knowledge and purchased a lakehouse below a dam spillway as he believed only a hundred year flood could cause him to go under water.
We had three hundred year storms over the past 25 years and it flooded each time.
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I claim no expertise in this area, at all. But in reading this thread (especially your posts) there seems to be a lot of fingers in the electrical grid pie. In my experience, that never bodes well. So I must assume alot is due to deregulation?
We had the same problem, the same outcome, in 1989 before deregulation. But it was a smaller storm with a smaller impact.
...Moreover, some of the same equipment, the report noted, had failed during previous cold snaps. One in December 1989 prompted the state’s grid operator to resort to system-wide rolling blackouts for the first time.
“Many generators failed to adequately apply and institutionalize knowledge and recommendations from previous severe winter weather events, especially as to winterization of generation and plant auxiliary equipment,†the 2011 report said....
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-17/texas-was-warned-a-decade-ago-its-grid-was-unprepared-for-cold
In any event, we can never truly thwart Mother Nature.
Absolutely
February 1899 Arctic Outbreak across Texas - In February of 1899 record cold affected
Texas. A record February low for San Antonio of 4 degrees was set February 12, 1899. It
was also a record February low for Austin of -1 on February 12, 1899. During this
historic cold spell, extremely cold temperatures affected the entire state of Texas. On
February 13, 1899 the whole part of Galveston Bay, except the main channel, was
covered by thin ice. Lows in other locations around Texas on Feb. 12, 1899 include:
Tulia -23; Amarillo -16; Brownsville 16; Dallas-Ft. Worth -8; Waco -5; Laredo 5;
Galveston 8; and Corpus Christi 11. In the February of 1899 arctic outbreak, the coldest
low in Brownsville was 12 on Feb. 13, 1899, still an all time record low for Brownsville.
The low of -23 at Tulia, in the southern part of the Texas panhandle, Feb. 12, 1899 was a
record low for the state of Texas, then was tied when Seminole observed -23 on Feb. 8,
1933. Unofficial reports of -30 came from Wolf Creek and also southeast of Perryton,
both in the northern part of the Texas panhandle.
https://www.weather.gov/media/ewx/wxevents/ewx-18992000.pdf
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That is a false statement for NG, and if one uses batteries or gravity/thermal storage, as well as for the power produced by renewables that can be stored.
Natural gas can be stored effectively as LNG or in underground reservoirs and has been done so for many decades.
And the electric power generated by any method including NG and renewables can be stored in batteries, as has been pointed out repeatedly.
The only measure is how much does it cost to do so.
The stored potential energy of nuclear and hydrocarbons is a powerful reason to utilize those methods if one wants surety of supply as batteries usage are minimized.
I recognize that NG in fact can be stored; of course it's routinely stored in underground reservoirs as you point out.
My belief - I stand to be corrected - is that at the point of electrical power generation NG is not routinely stored, while coal is and nuclear effectively is; consequently the decision thackney referenced favors NG, wind, and solar relative to coal and nukes, who have a working capital investment on hand.
Storing produced energy in batteries, while of course possible and routine on a small scale, is not relevant to the reference thackney shared.
I agree with you in favoring hydrocarbons and nukes; it seems to me that all-in-all they will be the most energy dense and the most reliable.
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Just because last week's weather has not happened since 1989 does not mean it will be anywhere near that long before it happens again. Weather is cyclic and some of those cycles are longer than a lifetime.
And with that, I will leave this discussion to others now since electrical power generation is not my primary area of expertise
Reminded me a lot of 1989.
I remember a lot of broken pipes but not the power outage.
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Reminded me a lot of 1989.
I remember a lot of broken pipes but not the power outage.
https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/February%202011%20Southwest%20Cold%20Weather%20Event/Final_Draft_Assessment_of_Previous_Severe_Winter_Weather_Report.pdf
December 21-24, 1989 – TRE and FRCC Cold Weather Event
TRE: During December 21-24, 1989, Texas experienced the coldest temperatures recorded in over 100
years. It was the first time in history that ERCOT (which serves 85 percent of load in Texas)
implemented region-wide load shedding due to heavy demands on the electric grid. ERCOT shed 1,710
MW of firm customer load. Natural gas supplies were also curtailed to most utilities (generators) during
the cold weather event. The peak that occurred on December 22, 1989 was 12.4 percent above
forecast and 10.8 percent over the 1988/1989 actual peak.
FRCC: During December 23-25, 1989 Florida experienced extremely cold weather throughout the state.
Natural gas supplies to Florida's utilities were curtailed beginning December 22 through December 26.
Record low temperatures were experienced. Record load (34,776 MW) from extreme cold temps
combined with numerous units offline due to maintenance resulted in rotating blackouts (five to eight
hours maximum). On December 24, 4,744 MWs of firm load was not being served.
In both TRE and FRCC, the circumstances, size, geographic area, and impact on the bulk power system
(BPS) of this event were deemed to be very similar to the February 2011 Cold Weather Event.
Issues Identified:
Inadequate cold weather preparations
Frozen ancillary plant equipment
Fuel oil problems
Natural gas supplies were curtailed
Recommendations:
There were numerous recommendations for utilities in both the FRCC and ERCOT footprints. For ERCOT,
according to the PUCT Report dated November 1990, certain corrective actions were implemented by
the utilities.
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I recognize that NG in fact can be stored; of course it's routinely stored in underground reservoirs as you point out.
My belief - I stand to be corrected - is that at the point of electrical power generation NG is not routinely stored, while coal is and nuclear effectively is; consequently the decision thackney referenced favors NG, wind, and solar relative to coal and nukes, who have a working capital investment on hand.
Yes to all.
Since you had pointed out that NG, in the same vein as renewables, cannot be stored, I wanted to correct that in order to not give a false impression on NG to others who do not have the knowledge.
And that NG storage is indeed not as common for power station fuel as it is for burner tip needs for residential usage, but it seems it should be.
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https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/February%202011%20Southwest%20Cold%20Weather%20Event/Final_Draft_Assessment_of_Previous_Severe_Winter_Weather_Report.pdf
December 21-24, 1989 – TRE and FRCC Cold Weather Event
TRE: During December 21-24, 1989, Texas experienced the coldest temperatures recorded in over 100
years. It was the first time in history that ERCOT (which serves 85 percent of load in Texas)
implemented region-wide load shedding due to heavy demands on the electric grid. ERCOT shed 1,710
MW of firm customer load. Natural gas supplies were also curtailed to most utilities (generators) during
the cold weather event. The peak that occurred on December 22, 1989 was 12.4 percent above
forecast and 10.8 percent over the 1988/1989 actual peak.
FRCC: During December 23-25, 1989 Florida experienced extremely cold weather throughout the state.
Natural gas supplies to Florida's utilities were curtailed beginning December 22 through December 26.
Record low temperatures were experienced. Record load (34,776 MW) from extreme cold temps
combined with numerous units offline due to maintenance resulted in rotating blackouts (five to eight
hours maximum). On December 24, 4,744 MWs of firm load was not being served.
In both TRE and FRCC, the circumstances, size, geographic area, and impact on the bulk power system
(BPS) of this event were deemed to be very similar to the February 2011 Cold Weather Event.
Issues Identified:
Inadequate cold weather preparations
Frozen ancillary plant equipment
Fuel oil problems
Natural gas supplies were curtailed
Recommendations:
There were numerous recommendations for utilities in both the FRCC and ERCOT footprints. For ERCOT,
according to the PUCT Report dated November 1990, certain corrective actions were implemented by
the utilities.
It's a great thing that they seem to have the load-shedding thing down very well. Now they need to work on no having to do that when the demand gets high!
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If every wind and solar facility was replaced with Nat Gas AND winterized to keep running in the weather, our problems would have been WORSE last week. MORE power would have gone offline and MORE people would have been out of power. We did not have enough gas available to serve the amount we did have available to run.
Ercot has neither the responsibility nor the authority to require fuel types. This stupid blame game is going to keep the problems from getting fixed.
@thackney I see that during yesterday's blame-storming fest in Austin the chairwoman of the TX RR Commission Christi Craddick testified that NG production in TX fell last week *because the producers lost electrical power*, not because of the cold; i.e. she testified that NG production in TX is sufficiently winterized to manage last week's temperatures : https://www.click2houston.com/news/texas/2021/02/26/after-tense-first-day-ercot-hearings-to-pick-back-up-this-morning/
Craddick’s testimony countered ERCOT CEO Bill Magness’ reports that freezing temperatures and precipitation are what unexpectedly knocked dozens of power plants offline, and natural gas was hit harder than most. Craddick fought back those claims.
“When you ask if we have enough gas in this state, the answer is yes, if we can keep the electricity on,†Craddick said. “Time and time again, the number one problem we heard from our operators was the lack of power at their production sites.â€
Power plant executives offered similar testimony - they could have stayed on line producing power had they not themselves experienced blackouts driven by their utility companies : https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/fault-investigation-texas-blackout-begins-004047307.html
"The testimony offered a troubling new look at how quickly America’s energy capital ran out of energy. Curtis Morgan, the CEO of Vistra Corp., told lawmakers at the outset that the blackouts affected plants that could have generated more power that was urgently needed. He said when officials from his company called utility providers, they were told they weren’t a priority.
“How can a power plant be at the bottom of the list of priorities?†Morgan said.
“You-know-what hit the fan, and everybody’s going, ‘You’re turning off my power plant?'" he said."
If true, this might shed a different light on the relative reliability of the NG portion of the generation grid. Any thoughts?
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If true, this might shed a different light on the relative reliability of the NG portion of the generation grid. Any thoughts?
:yowsa: More nukes and far less unreliables!
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@thackney I see that during yesterday's blame-storming fest in Austin the chairwoman of the TX RR Commission Christi Craddick testified that NG production in TX fell last week *because the producers lost electrical power*, not because of the cold; i.e. she testified that NG production in TX is sufficiently winterized to manage last week's temperatures : https://www.click2houston.com/news/texas/2021/02/26/after-tense-first-day-ercot-hearings-to-pick-back-up-this-morning/
BS. Yes it contributed, but we have our own @mrpotatohead to explain they were shutting down wells ahead of the storm due to the coming cold.
...As for the clueless people who wonder why gas/oil wells were shut in... We shut ALL of our production in before the freeze, because we have waaaay too much equipment to put at risk of being destroyed. What idiot would risk their equipment for the pitiful price we receive for the product?
Power plant executives offered similar testimony - they could have stayed on line producing power had they not themselves experienced blackouts driven by their utility companies : https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/fault-investigation-texas-blackout-begins-004047307.html
If true, this might shed a different light on the relative reliability of the NG portion of the generation grid. Any thoughts?
I am going to have to learn more first, but I am quite doubtful this is more than miscommunication/misunderstanding during chaos.
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:yowsa: More nukes and far less unreliables!
If true; the people offering the testimony had plenty of self-interested reasons for that testimony. And they didn't say anything about nukes, only that they could have stayed in production had they not lost power themselves.
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If true; the people offering the testimony had plenty of self-interested reasons for that testimony. And they didn't say anything about nukes, only that they could have stayed in production had they not lost power themselves.
Picture lines of dominoes standing on end with all the lines interconnected. Knock one domino over and who knows where it stops.
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New estimates today show last week's winter storms could cost more than $200 billion across the state. And that's way more money than Hurricane Harvey.
https://news.yahoo.com/ercot-ceo-grilled-state-lawmakers-020400399.html
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ACK FINK: But today, Governor Abbott blamed ERCOT again for the situation, saying they blew an opportunity to slowly implement rolling outages.
GREG ABBOTT: Instead, what they did, they delayed their decision-making process about rolling blackouts until they got right to a few minutes before the entire grid crashing, and they did the equivalent of slamming on brakes while driving on ice.
JACK FINK: Power companies said ERCOT's actions forced their power plants offline.
THAD HILL: What we have found lead us to believe that there was a greater disturbance.
BILL MAGNESS: If they're right, then absolutely we have to do something, because there was something going on that we weren't seeing.
JACK FINK: The company said that exposed another problem: the industry and state agencies never updated the critical infrastructure list. So power plants were among those that lost power. The CEO said they winterize their plants, but in some cases it wasn't adequate.
https://news.yahoo.com/ercot-ceo-grilled-state-lawmakers-020400399.html
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BS. Yes it contributed, but we have our own @mrpotatohead to explain they were shutting down wells ahead of the storm due to the coming cold.
I am going to have to learn more first, but I am quite doubtful this is more than miscommunication/misunderstanding during chaos.
Thanks @thackney and @mrpotatohead; this is good ground-level insight to counter testimony offered with at least some motivation for bureaucratic self-preservation.
I suspect it will be a while before all the competing cause-effect issues can be sorted out; a combination of technical and policy responses is probably needed. If I could pick one single human driver of last week's disaster, it would be that no one is really in charge during a crisis; decisions which are designed to be market-based (hence de-centralized) cannot be effectively coordinated in the heat of the moment.
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@thackney I see that during yesterday's blame-storming fest in Austin the chairwoman of the TX RR Commission Christi Craddick testified that NG production in TX fell last week *because the producers lost electrical power*, not because of the cold; i.e. she testified that NG production in TX is sufficiently winterized to manage last week's temperatures : https://www.click2houston.com/news/texas/2021/02/26/after-tense-first-day-ercot-hearings-to-pick-back-up-this-morning/
Power plant executives offered similar testimony - they could have stayed on line producing power had they not themselves experienced blackouts driven by their utility companies : https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/fault-investigation-texas-blackout-begins-004047307.html
If true, this might shed a different light on the relative reliability of the NG portion of the generation grid. Any thoughts?
The driver of choice in the oilpatch is electric motors on pumping units, so this makes total sense.
To put it another way, electric power => oil well production => NG production => NG into pipeline => NG power plant feed => Electric power production
Summary: No electric power, no nothing
Recommendaton: Emphasis on making electric power from other than NG, such as coal or nuclear.
Alternative is to store NG nearby power plants to use as fuel
And anybody with a thread of knowledge of the energy industry could have come up with this simple analysis. It is why we need technical people involved with the decision making of our grid reliable instead of a bunch of political hacks on the PUC>
Those hacks focused on bringing in more renewables into the grid that decreased the reliability of power generation during times like this and were oblivious to the consequences of these actions.
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Thanks @thackney and @mrpotatohead; this is good ground-level insight to counter testimony offered with at least some motivation for bureaucratic self-preservation.
I suspect it will be a while before all the competing cause-effect issues can be sorted out; a combination of technical and policy responses is probably needed. If I could pick one single human driver of last week's disaster, it would be that no one is really in charge during a crisis; decisions which are designed to be market-based (hence de-centralized) cannot be effectively coordinated in the heat of the moment.
There are a lot of moving parts to this.
No singular thing caused the lack of power.
The media, both left and right, are trying to simplify the blame down to single sources and causes.
Not so easy, or accurate, to do so.
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I am still convinced there is blame at all levels in multiple industries and assigning a few scapegoats only means the real problems will still be with us next time. There is not simple easy solutions to a problem this large and widespread. Accept that and start prioritizing the fixes and get the problems much smaller for next time.
Catastrophic Texas power outages prompt finger pointing and blame shifting at legislative hearings
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/25/texas-house-senate-ercot/
...Earlier in the day, state Sen. John Whitmire, D-Houston, asked whether lawmakers should reexamine ERCOT’s governance structure.
“Y’all made us,†Magness said. “You should change us.â€...
...“Some of the blame belongs right here in this building,†State Rep. Charlie Geren, R-Fort Worth, said Thursday. “There’s blame out there for everybody.â€...
...“If the Legislature fails to mandate weatherization of pipelines or power plants, there are limits to how far the regulatory agencies can go to step beyond where the Legislature has given them direction,†Alison Silverstein, an Austin-based energy consultant who has advised state and federal agencies, said Wednesday on a virtual conference with other energy experts....
...The head of the PUC, DeAnn T. Walker, appeared before lawmakers on Thursday after Magness testified for roughly five hours....
...Later, in the House, AnchÃa quizzed Walker surrounding the PUC’s authority over ERCOT, concluding that the commission did have decision-making ability over the operator.
“It seems to me, comprehensive," AnchÃa said.
“We told you to report to us if you thought we were unprepared because we had promised our constituents, ‘This was not going to happen again,’ and we told PUC to take care of it," he said. "And we gave you power, we gave you rule-making authority to take care of it."
AnchÃa said the PUC was empowered to winterize with legislation passed in 2011, after frigid temperatures caused equipment failures and blackouts. He asked if the commission ever submitted a report as was it was authorized to in the bill. Walker answered no....
...The executives agreed: The entire energy system in Texas saw widespread problems that ultimately led to supply failing to meet demand. Texans demanded an amount of electricity normally not seen in the winter months. The power grid was not prepared for that level of demand or equipment failure due to freezing temperatures.
“The entire energy sector failed Texans, we know we can do better,†NRG Energy CEO Mauricio Gutierrez said. “And we must do better to make sure that this never happens again.â€
Vistra Corp. CEO Curt Morgan acknowledged that his company could have performed better, but said the biggest problem they faced was disruptions in the state’s natural gas supply system, which was not prepared for the winter weather. Morgan instructed his employees to buy gas at any price, but they couldn’t get it at the pressures necessary. He said that even if all equipment was winterized, it wouldn’t have prevented gas interruptions....
...After the outages began, Abbott asked state lawmakers to mandate the winterization of generators and power plants, a proposal previously floated but not implemented by state leaders in the aftermath of another winter storm in 2011. And Abbott requested that lawmakers provide power companies with funding to make the necessary changes....
One way the state could have communicated the emergency better was through something similar to an amber alert, recommended state Sen. Angela Paxton, who left the state with her husband during the outages. Some of her colleagues agreed. note by thackney ARE YOU KIDDING! THIS IS A SOLUTION?!?!?!?!?! 22222frying pan...
...Toward the end of the House committees' joint hearing, state Rep. Donna Howard, D-Austin, at times seemed to struggle to contain her frustration as testimony stretched past the 15-hour mark.
“Why are people not talking to each other? Why do we have this set up to where the PUC and ERCOT and the Railroad Commission and the Legislature and whoever else needs to be involved here, why are we not talking to each other?†she said. “I am dumbfounded by it. And I don’t want tonight to be the last thing we say about this.â€...
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There are a lot of moving parts to this.
No singular thing caused the lack of power.
The media, both left and right, are trying to simplify the blame down to single sources and causes.
Not so easy, or accurate, to do so.
:yowsa: Rows and rows of dominoes stood on end and all interconnected! WAY more complicated than it should be!
K.I.S.S.
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I am still convinced there is blame at all levels in multiple industries and assigning a few scapegoats only means the real problems will still be with us next time. There is not simple easy solutions to a problem this large and widespread. Accept that and start prioritizing the fixes and get the problems much smaller for next time.
Catastrophic Texas power outages prompt finger pointing and blame shifting at legislative hearings
https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/25/texas-house-senate-ercot/
It is damning that the 2011 legislation empowering the PUC to spend funds to winterize was apparently not used and instead focused funds on deploying more unreliable renewables to the grid, as is still being done by offering renewable credits.
Renewable Energy Credit
ERCOT acts as the program administrator of the Renewable Energy Credit (REC) trading program, which was established by the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) to (1) promote an additional 2,000 megawatts of new renewable energy capacity to be built in Texas by 2009, to be increased to 10,000 megawatts by 2025; and (2) allow customers to have access to providers of energy generated by renewable energy resources.
To earn RECs, a generator must be a new facility or a small producer that meets the requirements in PUCT Substantive Rule §25.173(c).
A facility is eligible to earn RECs if it relies exclusively on an energy source that is naturally regenerated such as solar, wind, geothermal, hydroelectric, wave/tidal, biomass or biomass-based waste products. The energy source can not be derived from fossil fuels, waste products from fossil fuels or waste products from inorganic sources.
Where to File: Applicants should visit the Renewable Energy Credit Program website.
Who Should File: A generator that is a new facility or a small producer as defined in PUCT Substantive Rule 25.173(c), meets the requirements of 25.173 and would like to earn RECs is encouraged to file. All competitive retailers, as they are approved to do business in Texas, are required by law to register in the REC program and retire RECs annually. http://www.ercot.com/services/programs/rec/
Credits for renewables but nothing for reliability
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...Toward the end of the House committees' joint hearing, state Rep. Donna Howard, D-Austin, at times seemed to struggle to contain her frustration as testimony stretched past the 15-hour mark.
“Why are people not talking to each other? Why do we have this set up to where the PUC and ERCOT and the Railroad Commission and the Legislature and whoever else needs to be involved here, why are we not talking to each other?†she said. “I am dumbfounded by it. And I don’t want tonight to be the last thing we say about this.â€...
They do talk to one another. But only for peak summer time power usage as evidenced in this article.
RRC Chairman Craddick And PUC Chairman Walker Working To Ensure Availability Of Natural Gas For Electric Service This Summer
February 27, 2019
http://www.rrc.texas.gov/news/022719a-rrc-chairman-craddick-and-puc-chairman-walker-working-to-ensure-availability-of-natural-gas-for-electric-service-this-summer/
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:yowsa: Rows and rows of dominoes stood on end and all interconnected! WAY more complicated than it should be!
K.I.S.S.
K.I.S.S includes competency on who is in charge of managing the grid.
How many lawyers does it take to change a light bulb?
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K.I.S.S includes competency on who is in charge of managing the grid.
How many lawyers does it take to change a light bulb?
You bet your sweet bippy it does! I don't know the answer to your question as I have never seen a lawyer attempt to change one.
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You bet your sweet bippy it does! I don't know the answer to your question as I have never seen a lawyer attempt to change one.
Q: How many lawyers does it take to screw in a light bulb?
A1: How many can you afford?
A2: None, lawyers only screw us.
A3: It only takes one lawyer to change your light bulb to his light bulb.
A4: Three. One to do it and two to sue him for malpractice.
A5: Three. One to change it and two to keep interrupting by standing up and shouting "Objection!"
A6: Fifty four. Eight to argue, one to get a continuance, one to object one to demur, two to research precedents, one to dictate a letter, one to stipulate, five to turn in their time cards, one to depose, one to write interrogatories, two to settle, one to order a secretary to change the bulb, and twenty-eight to bill for professional services.
A7: 65. 42 to sue the power company for insufficiently supplying power, or negligent failure to prevent the surge that made the bulb burn out in the first place, 14 to sue the electrician who wired the house, and 9 to sue the bulb manufacturers.
A8: You won't find a lawyer who can change a light bulb. Now, if you're looking for a lawyer to screw a light bulb...
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Q: How many lawyers does it take to screw in a light bulb?
A1: How many can you afford?
A2: None, lawyers only screw us.
A3: It only takes one lawyer to change your light bulb to his light bulb.
A4: Three. One to do it and two to sue him for malpractice.
A5: Three. One to change it and two to keep interrupting by standing up and shouting "Objection!"
A6: Fifty four. Eight to argue, one to get a continuance, one to object one to demur, two to research precedents, one to dictate a letter, one to stipulate, five to turn in their time cards, one to depose, one to write interrogatories, two to settle, one to order a secretary to change the bulb, and twenty-eight to bill for professional services.
A7: 65. 42 to sue the power company for insufficiently supplying power, or negligent failure to prevent the surge that made the bulb burn out in the first place, 14 to sue the electrician who wired the house, and 9 to sue the bulb manufacturers.
A8: You won't find a lawyer who can change a light bulb. Now, if you're looking for a lawyer to screw a light bulb...
Sounds about right! 888high58888 :beer:
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K.I.S.S includes competency on who is in charge of managing the grid.
I think that's a fundamental part of the problem - no one seems to know who is actually in charge during an emergency.
The de-regulated free market design includes as a feature that no one is in charge - buyers and sellers of power engage in free, voluntary transactions which establish a wholesale price - and I favor that for normal operations. In an emergency some reversion to command/control is necessary and that doesn't seem to be defined well at all.
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I think that's a fundamental part of the problem - no one seems to know who is actually in charge during an emergency.
The de-regulated free market design includes as a feature that no one is in charge - buyers and sellers of power engage in free, voluntary transactions which establish a wholesale price - and I favor that for normal operations. In an emergency some reversion to command/control is necessary and that doesn't seem to be defined well at all.
And it would be VERY helpful for the person in charge to have a working knowledge of the system he is in charge of I think.
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The driver of choice in the oilpatch is electric motors on pumping units, so this makes total sense.
To put it another way, electric power => oil well production => NG production => NG into pipeline => NG power plant feed => Electric power production
Summary: No electric power, no nothing
And the primary means of keeping a gas or oil well flowing in subfreezing temperatures is electric heat trace (heating cable, covered in insulation). No electric -> no heat -> freezing lines. Oil and gas typically bring up water with their flow.
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:yowsa: Rows and rows of dominoes stood on end and all interconnected! WAY more complicated than it should be!
K.I.S.S.
My point is that The left blames lack of green energy and the right blames too much reliance on green energy, and it just isn't that black and white.
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My point is that The left blames lack of green energy and the right blames too much reliance on green energy, and it just isn't that black and white.
Oh but it is! Cut out the government props from under all that "green" energy crap and see how fast it disappears.
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Oh but it is! Cut out the government props from under all that "green" energy crap and see how fast it disappears.
That is one factor, but, naw, more too it than that.
De-regulation worked to keep our light bills down (somewhat) but gave power generators no incentive to provide backups or redundancy, so they didn't, so to keep their cost down and profits up.
Gas transmission stations are covered and heated in the great white north, but not here, and it would be expensive to do so, but a move should be underway to insulate them more somehow,
Channel 26 news in Houston also reported that the winterizing checks done in person each year were done virtually, if at all, due to COVID concerns in 2020/2021.
There's 3 more reasons for you to ponder, and I haven't even mentioned ERCOT or the PUC yet.
Many things to fix and adjust.
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That is one factor, but, naw, more to it than that.
I disagree. I see it as a matter of keeping things as simple as possible.
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I disagree. I see it as a matter of keeping things as simple as possible.
@Bigun
Guess we will have to agree to disagree on this one.
:beer:
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Oh but it is! Cut out the government props from under all that "green" energy crap and see how fast it disappears.
If every Solar and Wind generator in Texas had been replaced with Nat Gas power plants, AND that those Nat Gas generators were properly winterized, we would have had more power outages.
We did not have Nat Gas supply enough to keep those that were available running. More dependable and reliable power plants WITHOUT fuel does not solve our problem.
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@Bigun
Guess we will have to agree to disagree on this one.
:beer:
I have no problem with disagreement. I do have a real problem with circular arguments but I have never found you guilty of that. @GrouchoTex
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If every Solar and Wind generator in Texas had been replaced with Nat Gas power plants, AND that those Nat Gas generators were properly winterized, we would have had more power outages.
We did not have Nat Gas supply enough to keep those that were available running. More dependable and reliable power plants WITHOUT fuel does not solve our problem.
No doubt that is true if you believe that everything else would have been as it was had those things not been in the mix but I happen to not believe that. @thackney
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Channel 26 news in Houston also reported that the winterizing checks done in person each year were done virtually, if at all, due to COVID concerns in 2020/2021.
Doing a winterization check virtually instead of in person is a joke.
What are the checkers afraid of, getting Covid from a pipeline?
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If every Solar and Wind generator in Texas had been replaced with Nat Gas power plants, AND that those Nat Gas generators were properly winterized, we would have had more power outages.
Your own graphs show that is not a true statement. How can replacing Wind which produced almost nil during the storm with Natural Gas be worse than relying on Natural Gas?
And what you seem to be missing is that if there were more broader usage of natural gas as our power fuel, there would have been a more concerted effort to ensure the supply of fuel was less interrupted by nearby storage or by other means.
The prevalent notion by those who control the grid, Ercot and the PUC, is we gain reliability of supply by varying the methods by which we get power onto the grid. That is their way of propping up renewables.
That is a falsehood as we have proven with the absolute failure of renewables to provide ANY power during the freeze. A continued fuel supply to natural gas generators had been consequently deprioritized as the grid operators believed, erroneously, that the renewables would be able to perform. They are novelties, not to be relied upon.
That is the mistake of those who foist political episodes such as increasing renewables onto us instead of achieving the 'R' part of their name, Reliability.
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(https://debunkhouse.files.wordpress.com/2021/02/feb_2021a-1.png?w=1110)
(https://debunkhouse.files.wordpress.com/2021/02/feb_2021b-1.png?w=1110)
(https://debunkhouse.files.wordpress.com/2021/02/wind-takes-a-vacation-1.png?w=1110)
And this puts the lie to these fact checker claims:
Fact check: Renewable energy is not to blame for the Texas energy crisis
No, frozen wind turbines aren’t the main culprit for Texas’ power outages
No, Wind Farms Aren’t the Main Cause of the Texas Blackouts
The truth…
Renewable energy is why Texas has less natural gas and coal capacity than it would have had otherwise.
Frozen wind turbines are why coal-fired power plants were operating at >90% of capacity from February 9-14 and natural gas power plants were operating at 70% to more than 80% of capacity from February 11-14.
Wind farms aren’t the main cause of the Texas blackouts because most of them had already been knocked offline by freezing temperatures and ice… Nearly a week before the blackouts!
https://wattsupwiththat.com/2021/02/25/wind-was-operating-almost-as-well-as-expected-a-texas-sized-energy-lie/
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Your own graphs show that is not a true statement. How can replacing Wind which produced almost nil during the storm with Natural Gas be worse than relying on Natural Gas?
Because we did not have enough Nat Gas to run what was available. More consumers of Nat Gas produces nothing without fuel.
And what you seem to be missing is that if there were more broader usage of natural gas as our power fuel, there would have been a more concerted effort to ensure the supply of fuel was less interrupted by nearby storage or by other means.
I see. When we produce 21~23 Billion Cubic Feet per Day, who cares if they are properly winterized. But if we need ~28 Billion CF/D, just by freaking magic it becomes reliable.
The prevalent notion by those who control the grid, Ercot and the PUC, is we gain reliability of supply by varying the methods by which we get power onto the grid. That is their way of propping up renewables.
Ercot does NOTHING related to choosing generation sources. You need to look to the legislature, the governor, and the feds for pushing renewables over other sources.
That is a falsehood as we have proven with the absolute failure of renewables to provide ANY power during the freeze. A continued fuel supply to natural gas generators had been consequently deprioritized as the grid operators believed, erroneously, that the renewables would be able to perform. They are novelties, not to be relied upon.
That is the mistake of those who foist political episodes such as increasing renewables onto us instead of achieving the 'R' part of their name, Reliability.
This idiocy of trying to find a scapegoat like renewables and not recognizing the problem of not preparing is spread all over multiple industries is going to have us repeat it once again. Just like 1989, 2011, and now 2021.
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No doubt that is true if you believe that everything else would have been as it was had those things not been in the mix but I happen to not believe that. @thackney
You think ~30% of coal dropped off, ~20% of nuclear dropped off, ~35% of nat gas dropped off because the wind went down?
(https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/images/2021.02.19/chart2.svg)
And yet the previous week when the wind power went almost to zero nothing happened then?
Wind is always erratic and not dependable. This wasn't something new. In my opinion, in the ERCOT market system, wind and solar should earn less because of those reasons. But ERCOT deals with that up and down all the time. It was not the cause of the outages. It did contribute, just like all of our forms of power contributed.
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Because we did not have enough Nat Gas to run what was available. More consumers of Nat Gas produces nothing without fuel.
You are failing again to understand that the installation and operation of wind farms deprioritized any supply security for natural gas. Wind is an absolute failure for reliability.
Ercot does NOTHING related to choosing generation sources. You need to look to the legislature, the governor, and the feds for pushing renewables over other sources.
Ercot is front and center promoting renewables while disregarding its innate unreliability as well as natural gas supply security. It even promotes renewable credits for that purpose.
How can you possibly say they have nothing to do with generation sources? That is disingenuous. Their own name is an acronym that includes 'Reliability'.
This idiocy of trying to find a scapegoat like renewables and not recognizing the problem of not preparing is spread all over multiple industries is going to have us repeat it once again. Just like 1989, 2011, and now 2021.
It is idiocy to disregard as irrelevant that a generation source like wind which cannot produce effectively during times of weather. Do you not see the graphs which show we were utterly dependent upon other sources for our electricity during this time?
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More coal! More nukes! Less wind and solar! Hardened NG supplies.
And a command structure with someone at the top who has a full working knowledge of the grid and all its interdependencies.
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You are failing again to understand that the installation and operation of wind farms deprioritized any supply security for natural gas. Wind is an absolute failure for reliability.
You are right. I do not understand that since it has not been shown in any fashion to be true.
Ercot is front and center promoting renewables while disregarding its innate unreliability as well as natural gas supply security. It even promotes renewable credits for that purpose.
Ercot does not create those credits. They are not the source of that issue.
How can you possibly say they have nothing to do with generation sources? That is disingenuous. Their own name is an acronym that includes 'Reliability'.
Because I understand that authority and responsibility does not magically happen because of the title chosen for them by others. Ercot has no authority is selecting fuel types for power generation sources.
It is idiocy to disregard as irrelevant that a generation source like wind which cannot produce effectively during times of weather. Do you not see the graphs which show we were utterly dependent upon other sources for our electricity during this time?
I have repeated said wind is not dispatchable. It is not dependable. That is why it is so limited in Ercot planning. This is no surprise and has always been that way.
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You are right. I do not understand that since it has not been shown in any fashion to be true.
Ercot does not create those credits. They are not the source of that issue.
Because I understand that authority and responsibility does not magically happen because of the title chosen for them by others. Ercot has no authority is selecting fuel types for power generation sources.
I have repeated said wind is not dispatchable. It is not dependable. That is why it is so limited in Ercot planning. This is no surprise and has always been that way.
Do you realize the circular argument you are using?
The Governor cannot by himself understand the complexities of how a grid operates and how differing actions change its nature.
He therefore hires people(hopefully) that do understand these things. They are the PUC and Ercot. They are the ones who (supposedly) study the aspects of the grid, which is the reason they are employed, and make recommendations to ensure reliability is first and foremost.
I have seen no indication within available Ercot or PUC meetings or news reports that mentioned any suggestions of reliability problems that might occur that was reported back to the Governor before this drastic weather event, only in retrospect.
You do not see a problem with this, the PRIMARY role for them, to provide reliability assessments?
So people conclude Ercot and the PUC are not responsible. (Then why did so many Ercot members resign shortly after the debacle?)
Others say the Governor is not responsible, Ercot told him everything was ok with the grid.
So who is ultimately responsible? This is not an engineering issue. It is a political issue.
It is also certainly not the private entities that place power into the grid. They are under the auspices of the governmental authorities.
One other thing: you say we would have had a worst disaster if more natural gas generation was available.
What if on the other hand 100% of our power came from renewables? Would you continue to say that natural gas would still be a worse situation?
The new DOE chief Granholm has guaranteed she will tee up more renewables into our system and to get Texas connected into other states in order to assert more federal control.
Is that not a political issue as well?
We engineers can easily predict what will result with that disastrous policy.
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Do you realize the circular argument you are using?....
We agree on half of that sentence, not much else.
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Another part of the problem appears. Lots of pieces in fixing the problem.
...Nye said before the storm they had identified 35 gas facilities that needed to continue receiving electricity.
But after the outages began, Nye said he received calls from many more them. “During the event, we added 168 new gas critical facilities. We turned them all on immediately and we kept them on the entire time.â€
He told lawmakers that his company and other transmission owners, power plant operators, and the gas industry need to develop an updated list.
Energy experts have told CBS 11 that improvements need to be made to both the electric and gas grids holistically to prevent the kind of widespread power outages that happened last week....