The Briefing Room
General Category => Military/Defense News => Topic started by: DemolitionMan on October 11, 2017, 05:15:20 am
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Sebastien Roblin
Two deadly collisions involving U.S. Navy destroyers in June and August 2017 cost the lives of 16 sailors, leading the Navy to declare a day-long operational pause to reflect upon its safety culture. That such similar accidents took place in such close proximity reflects stresses and failings common to the maritime fighting branch.
Indeed, the recent spate of collisions echoes a succession of even more catastrophic accidents aboard U.S. aircraft carriers between 1966 and 1968 that between them claimed the lives of more than 200 sailors.
These incidents were the result of a Navy taxed by the enormous demands of the Vietnam War. In their wake came major reforms addressing the inherent dangers of operating ships packed full of explosive munitions, fuel and jet planes. This three-part series will examine why each of the accidents occurred, how the crew responded and the lessons that were drawn from the tragedies.
In July 1966, the USS Oriskany deployed for its second tour in Vietnam at Yankee Station, a point in the Gulf of Tonkin roughly 100 east of Da Nang. The 900-foot-long Essex-class carrier was one of several rotating there to serve as floating air bases for nearly continuous airstrikes over Vietnam.She had been launched at the end of World War II, commissioned and served in the Korean War. Now her five combat squadrons — including A-1 Skyraider propeller planes, as well as F-8 Crusader and A-4 Skyhawk jets — would fly nearly 8,000 combat missions in four months.
By October, the Oriskany’s air wing was nearing exhaustion, as its pilots were flying two missions a day. On Oct. 1, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara visited the carrier and upbraided Capt. John Iarrobino when he learned that the air wing was not adhering to Pentagon guidelines stipulating that pilots should not fly more than 1.5 missions per day.
The Oriskany’s skipper replied that there simply were not enough airplanes and crew to meet the demands expected of them any other way.Weeks later, on Oct. 26, 1966, two apprentice airmen were stowing an unexpended magnesium flare into locker A-107-M when something went wrong.
The roughly three-foot-long Mark 24 Mod 3 cylindrical flares were usually dropped by parachute during night operations to illuminate targets with their two-million-candlepower glow. A wire lanyard taped to the airplane was used to trigger the flare — but after being carried on a combat mission without being used, the lanyard’s safety had not been reset
https://warisboring.com/how-fire-and-fatigue-almost-destroyed-an-american-carrier/
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www.youtube.com/watch?v=eth5TZPOByY