RADM J. C. WYLIE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR A U.S. INDO-PACIFIC NAVAL STRATEGY
Posted byFrank Jones
June 1, 2023
[Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control] had a major impact on U.S. Navy thinking in the 1980s when the service formulated its maritime strategy.
The naval historian John B. Hattendorf observed that “Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie was the first serving officer since Luce and Mahan… to become known for writing about military and naval strategy.” Scholars and practitioners consider Wylie’s 1967 book Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control a classic. It had a major impact on U.S. Navy thinking in the 1980s when the service formulated its maritime strategy. Surprisingly, it is not Wylie’s book but an article published years before that remains most relevant as the United States wrestles with its interests in the Indo-Pacific region and China as a strategic competitor.
Wylie (1911-1993) served more than forty years in the U.S. Navy and was a first-rate strategic thinker. Assigned to the Naval War College staff in 1950, he designed a strategy course that likely inspired his first major work, “Reflections on the War in the Pacific,” in the April 1952 issue of the Naval Institute’s Proceedings. It is an appraisal of the U.S. military victory in the Pacific during World War II viewed through four strategic decisions. Revisiting those decisions provides useful insight for today’s U.S. policymakers contemplating a potential conflict with China.
Wylie stated that the first strategic decision was how the Japanese interpreted the November 26, 1941 diplomatic note that the U.S. Secretary of State gave the Japanese ambassador to the United States. Essentially, the note’s wording forced Japan to either withdraw from China or go to war to protect its interests. The United States, Wylie contended, failed “to appreciate a situation as it may appear to a government other than our own.” More recently, scholar Takeo Iguchi notes that withdrawal from China would have undermined Japan’s control of Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan, which were all vital to its interests. Adding to the probability of misinterpretation was Japan’s own problematic foreign policy of 1940 and 1941, which Iguchi characterizes as “inconsistent, unsteady, and a bit haphazard.”
The attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was a result of the next strategic decision: the problem of how to start a war. Wylie noted the Japanese were in a situation not unlike that of England in 1755 as described by Sir Julian Corbett: “The principle of securing or improving your strategical position by a sudden and secret blow before declaration of war is, and was then, well known. Almost every maritime war which [England] had waged had begun this way.” The United States, Wylie contended, failed “to be aware of the normal, routine historical precedents in just such a situation as this one.”
The third strategic decision Wylie discussed was “the decision on how to fight the war,” which he called “the basic strategy of war.” He compared the Japanese and U.S. strategies. Japan realized that beyond China, it “must control southeastern Asia and the Indonesian island groups” for their natural resources. It planned for a war “limited in its scope to the seizure, control, and exploitation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” By early 1942, it had achieved its initial objectives, and, at the height of its military expansion, then had the of controlling and holding its gains. In other words, Japan wanted a war of limited geographic objectives, but it did not have “a control sufficient to limit [the war].”
The United States, using its sea power, turned the conflict “into something approaching an unlimited war.” This asymmetry in how the war was fought was a major factor in its outcome. Japan attempted to fight a limited war encompassing its geographic interests, while the United States fought not only to recapture the conquered areas but also to eliminate Japanese power in Asia by securing an unconditional surrender. Wylie contended that limited war was a “treacherous experiment to embark upon as it requires the participants to have, in reserve, the relative strength to fight an unlimited war.” Japan lacked the strength to keep the war within “pre-selected bounds” and ultimately, it led to defeat.
Wylie also maintained that Japan’s failure to think in global terms was a strategic mistake. If it had been able to control the Indian Ocean in the spring of 1942 rather than limiting itself to a single raid, it would have been disastrous for the Allies; Japanese control might have been decisive since most of the supplies going to the British in North Africa to fight Rommel and to the Soviet Union came around the Cape of Good Hope up through the Red Sea or to the Persian Gulf. The United States would have had to pull more of its resources from the Pacific to fight the war in the Atlantic and in Europe, thereby allowing the Japanese to consolidate their strategic perimeter. In that instance, the “effect of sea power would make itself felt in a chain reaction around the world,” all to Japan’s advantage.
Despite changing contexts and technology, Wylie’s article provides enduring cautionary insight for thinking about U.S. naval strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/wylie/
