The Stand-In Force Needs Sea Legs
By Captain Paul R. Watson, U.S. Marine Corps
May 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/5/1,443
The Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 and complementary conceptual frameworks such as A Concept for Stand-in Forces describe promising solutions to the challenges of the current and emerging operating environment. Among these solutions, the stand-in force is a viable means to counter adversary actions across the competition continuum. However, the units designed to accomplish this, such as the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), are woefully unprepared to operate effectively as “small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces . . . within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth.”1 Currently fielded transportation platforms lack the mobility and lethality necessary to insert these forces over the sea to key terrain, maneuver within the restricted maritime environment of China’s first island chain, and persist while enabling the tasks envisioned by A Concept for Stand-In Forces.
For the stand-in force to succeed, the MLR must be task organized with fast assault craft such as the CB90 or Mk VI.
A Mobility and Sustainment Shortfall
A Concept for Stand-in Forces largely overlooks the importance of inserting forces in contested terrain undetected, asserting that entry into and persistence within an adversary’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ) can be achieved through host-nation support and consistent forward operations with allies and partners.2 This does little to generate uncertainty regarding unit locations and presents the adversary starting points from which it can direct collections efforts. The MLR needs platforms that will enable it to enter the WEZ with a low probability of detection.
Current ship-to-shore connectors leave the MLR vulnerable as it enters the WEZ. Large surface vessels, while possessing greater capacity for Marines and their equipment, are too large, slow, and easily targeted.3 The sinking of the Russian warship Moskva by Ukrainian Neptune missiles is a sobering reminder of the significant risks to large vessels operating within an adversary’s WEZ.4 The MV-22, with its remarkable speed and range, is a capable option for aerial insertion; however, landing zone requirements restrict its utility in the densely vegetated terrain of the first island chain. In addition, adversary ship- and ground-based radars can identify markers for the aircraft to cue additional reconnaissance and surveillance assets that could compromise or target the MLR. Smaller platforms such as the amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) or combat rubber reconnaissance craft (CRRC), while benefiting from reduced signature, lack the necessary range and are too slow in the water to rapidly penetrate defensive bubbles.5
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/may/stand-force-needs-sea-legs
