WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE FROM A CONFLICT THAT HAS HAD VERY LITTLE OF IT? A LOT
Walker Mills and Timothy Heck | 04.22.22
What Can We Learn about Amphibious Warfare from a Conflict That Has Had Very Little of It? A Lot
Why didn’t Russia include a large-scale amphibious landing in its invasion of Ukraine? Russia’s power in the Black Sea region seems to situate it well for just such an operation and Moscow has emphasized the development of its military capabilities in the Black Sea for years. The annexation of Crimea more than doubled its coastline along the body of water, and permanently secured its access to the strategic Sevastopol naval base. Russian modernization of its Black Sea Fleet has “shifted the military balance in the Black Sea region in its favor,” as one analyst has conservatively put it. Another was more direct, observing that Russia “possesses the Black Sea region’s dominant maritime military.”
So, when Russia launched its late-February invasion, clearly seeking to do so from as many directions as possible to overwhelm Ukraine’s defenses and enable quick thrusts toward strategically key terrain, why didn’t the world see ships disgorging Russian forces onto Ukrainian shores?
Reports of Amphibious Warfare’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated
An observer might look at the overwhelming advantages Russian forces would have held during any fight along the Black Sea’s coastlines and interpret Moscow’s decision not to undertake a large-scale amphibious landing as just another sign that the days of ship-to-shore combat are a relic of the past. That observer would be in plentiful company.
https://mwi.usma.edu/what-can-we-learn-about-amphibious-warfare-from-a-conflict-that-has-had-very-little-of-it-a-lot/
