Author Topic: MANAGING RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT  (Read 76 times)

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MANAGING RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT
Posted byAlec Jackson April 14, 2022

THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT
 
Selective engagement entails prudent resource management, whether tangible or conceptual.

As Washington rebalances its force posture to meet rising challenges in the Indo-Pacific and European theaters, U.S. policymakers must adjust existing Middle Eastern policy options. At one end of their spectrum of choices is for the United States to unreservedly guarantee the security of Gulf Cooperation Council states and other U.S. allies in the region. At the other end, America could withdraw and potentially cede its current influence in the region to Russia or China. Between these extremes lies a third choice: selective engagement. It offers a measured approach, focused on supporting U.S. engagement when it has direct implications for great power competition outside the region.

Selective engagement entails prudent resource management, whether tangible or conceptual. For example, supporting Turkey’s continued membership within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and preventing nuclear proliferation are goals worthy of U.S. engagement in the Middle East. Each would promote U.S. foreign policy interests without diverting limited U.S. resources from pressing challenges in other theaters. Before considering selective engagement’s merits, it is worth reviewing its alternatives, such as doubling down on current Mideast policy or withdrawing from the region.

Doubling down on the current U.S. presence and engagement in the Middle East would maintain the U.S.’ regional troop presence and its arms sales to selected local states. Of the three policies considered here, this policy undermines the institutional interests of the fewest number of entrenched players in Washington, D.C. The U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Army, key players within the Pentagon bureaucracy which would be most threatened by a “pivot to Asia,” would support this approach. Many members of Congress, particularly Senate Republicans who oppose any hint of normalized relations with Iran, would also endorse this policy. However, it carries the greatest strategic risks. It would keep a disproportionate amount of U.S. attention and resources focused on a region of declining importance to U.S. interests.

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/selective-engagement/