A Forward-Deployed Naval Force for the Eastern Mediterranean
By Lieutenant General David J. Furness, U.S. Marine Corps
March 2022 Proceedings Vol. 148/3/1,429
The U.S. Navy’s current amphibious ship inventory is a shadow of its former self. The numbers have fluctuated through the decades: from an incredible 2,500 ships at the height of World War II, to just 60 by 1949, back up to 226 during the Korean War, down to 110 in 1961, again up to 156 during the Vietnam War, but plummeting to 64 by 1975 and gradually diminishing to 59 traditional amphibious warships by 1981. Under the extended leadership of the 65th Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman (1981–87), the Navy’s inventory of amphibious warfare ships then grew to a peak of 65 vessels.1 Since Lehman’s era, Marine amphibious lift requirements and shipbuilding objectives have diminished with changing strategic goals and competing fiscal priorities. The Navy no longer links amphibious warfare ship requirements to joint forcible entry operations; rather, it links these requirements to combatant commanders’ (CoComs’) enduring need for Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) that respond to crisis, deter adversary aggression, assure allies and partners, and contest “gray zone” activities.
If met, the current CoCom demand for MEUs would necessitate a fleet of 39 amphibious ships. If maintained at a 63 percent availability rate, those 39 ships would provide sufficient inventory for simultaneously deployed East and West Coast MEUs and the Japan-based Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF). However, only 31 ships remain in the current inventory. The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) proposed fiscal year 22 budget and the associated shipbuilding plans project a further reduction to the amphibious inventory.2 While one might argue the DoD needs greater resources to close the gap, a more pragmatic view is that it needs to change its priorities with respect to amphibious capacity. Unless or until the Navy can elevate and sustain investments into traditional amphibious warfare ships, it must consider alternative concepts to posture the amphibious lift necessary to support an optimized amphibious ready group (ARG)/MEU posture. These new concepts must effectively position the resources forward to compete while decreasing response times by increasing the availability of sea-based forces crisis response forces. One approach worth exploring is a Mediterranean Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF).
Sustained Demand for ARG/MEUs
While the traditional amphibious warfare ship inventory has diminished, demand for the crisis-response capabilities provided by the versatile ARG/MEU team has not. In the past ten years, the nation’s ARG/MEUs have supported embassy evacuations in Yemen, recovered downed pilots in Libya, evacuated noncombatants in Afghanistan, and provided humanitarian assistance in Puerto Rico, Haiti, Pakistan, Japan, and the Philippines. They strengthened alliances and partnerships and participated in more than 100 bilateral and multilateral exercises throughout Asia, Oceania, the Middle East, Europe, and North Africa. Assessing the ongoing and future effects of COVID-19 on the economic and political stability of developing nations and the projected impacts of climate change in terms of more frequent natural disasters, population dislocations, and associated political unrest, the Navy and Marine Corps anticipate an increasing need for ARG/MEUs in the littoral regions of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (IndoPacom), European Command (EuCom), Central Command (CentCom), and Africa Command (AfriCom).
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/march/forward-deployed-naval-force-eastern-mediterranean
