FARA Farce: What The Army Didn’t Learn From The F-35

[rangerrebew]

 FARA Farce: What The Army Didn’t Learn From The F-35
By   Bill Greenwalt on October 15, 2021 at 6:23 AM
 

AVX mockup of their Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) proposal at AUSA 2019. (Courtesy Vertical Flight Society)

As the Army races forward to take flight in its Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA), Breaking Defense contributor and acquisition expert Bill Greenwalt sees too many troubling parallels with the Air Force’s infamous production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. With taxpayer dollars and Army tactical capabilities in the balance, he argues in the op-ed below that Congress should act to prevent a costly repeat of history.

Almost a decade ago, Frank Kendall, the acquisitions official who is now Air Force Secretary, observed that the Air Force had committed “acquisition malpractice” by moving the F-35 to production years before it was ever flight tested. That decision sentenced the program to a plague of cost, schedule and performance problems.

Now, the Army appears to be following in the Air Force’s footstep as its Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) lumbers down this well-trodden path. But with FARA the Army is not just mirroring the F-35’s mistakes, it has achieved bonus points for undermining future US aerospace innovation and limiting incentives for new entrants to ever want to work with the government.

It’s past time for Congress to step in and either defund the program altogether or put money into the innovations that managed to spring from a disturbingly flawed acquisition process.

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/10/fara-farce-what-the-army-didnt-learn-from-the-f-35/

[PeteS in CA]

Per this article, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/04/13/us-army-approves-plan-to-acquire-a-future-attack-reconnaissance-aircraft/ , the FARA program will have a fly-off between two competitive designs in late 2022, which means the choice of which to produce could not be made any earlier than 2023.

  IOW, the Army is not starting production before all the testing is complete. It is having the prototypes for the fly-off (aka "testing") built.

[sneakypete]

Since when did the army get attack fighter aircraft?

Other than flying machines with rotors,that is?

IIRC,the deal back in the late 50's/early 60's was the army could have helicopters if they would agree that airplanes belonged to the USAF.

When was this changed?

BTW,as a former US Army career NCO,I can tell you that system worked great because the army NEVER had any problems getting tactical air support from the USAF,the USN,or the USMC.

I would also like to mention a certain USAF helicopter squadron that flew a HELL of a lot of rescue missions for covert cross-border operations,but won't identify them because AFAIK,they have never identified themselves.
 
AFAIK,there has been ZERO conflicts between any of the operational people in any branch of the US military. When help was needed,it came zooming in from everything flying with no hesitation. We would get an alert on our radios identifying the flight coming in that told us what type of ordinance they had on board,and asking us what we needed and where we needed it.

ZERO inter-service rivilary.

One of the prime reasons I am so proud to have worn the uniform. If civilians could just learn to cooperate with each other like that,it would truly be a wonderful world.

[EdinVA]

We abandoned the idea of delivering a quality product, we now let the customers debug our solutions albeit, microsoft windows, ford focus, f-35 and an assortment of medications......
Get it out the door, cash the check and then we will try and make it work.
 

[sneakypete]

BTW,as a former US Army career NCO,I can tell you that system worked great because the army NEVER had any problems getting tactical air support from the USAF,the USN,or the USMC.

BTW,I just remembered one exception. The USMC at Da Nang was responsible for coming to the assistance of Special Forces "A-Camps" in I Corps. When Ben Het was hit and in danger of being overan,they radioed Da Nang to request assistance because they were in danger of being over ran,and the NVA had tanks.

The USMC commanding General in charge at Da Nang refused to send any support to the camp because he didn't like Special Forces because they were independent from his command and he was obligated to support them,instead of THEM supporting him.

So he just went to bed and let Ben Het get overran. The only assistance they got was some Recon guys from CCN talked a VN helicopter pilot into flying them into Ben Het so they could try to rescue any survivors. Which they did,all on their own with no orders and no offical approval. They just got on the helicopter and took off.

The USMC General,according to what i heard,was surprised to see General William Westmoreland,the commanding General of all US Forces in VN in this office that morning.

Westmoreland had taken off shortly before dawn to get to Da Nang  early to try and arrange to have any survivors rescued. He releived that USMC General on the spot,and named his Number 2 to be the CMMFIC in I Corps,and ordered the new commander to send a relief column. Which the new general in charge did instantly.

PLEASE take note that it was NOT the USMC that refused to help the A camp. It was one butthole USMC General who thought he was so important the rules didn't apply to him.

BTW,the camp may have been at Lang Vei instead of Ben Het. My memory ain't what it used to be,and I am too tired to look it up. Besides,the location is mostly irrelevant.

[PeteS in CA]

Since when did the army get attack fighter aircraft?

Other than flying machines with rotors,that is?
...

@sneakypete, FARA is a helicopter.

[sneakypete]

@sneakypete, FARA is a helicopter.

@PeteS in CA

Thanks! That shines a whole new light on this,doesn't it?

You would think the author would have mentioned that.

[PeteS in CA]

@PeteS in CA

Thanks! That shines a whole new light on this,doesn't it?

You would think the author would have mentioned that.

@sneakypete, the OP article got little correct. Not only, contrary to its claim, is the Army not starting production of the new helicopter, it's following the normal process of fly-offs that narrow the selection of competitors and select a "winner" based on performance. The intended final fly-off will supposedly take place starting late next year. The results of such a process are occasionally weird (e.g. the B-17 losing a fly-off to the B-18 because it was too good; the B-17 was bought later, and the B-18, while it was purchased, fell into second-line usage in WW2), but it's a process that goes back more decades than either of us has been around.

[sneakypete]

@sneakypete, the OP article got little correct. Not only, contrary to its claim, is the Army not starting production of the new helicopter, it's following the normal process of fly-offs that narrow the selection of competitors and select a "winner" based on performance. The intended final fly-off will supposedly take place starting late next year. The results of such a process are occasionally weird (e.g. the B-17 losing a fly-off to the B-18 because it was too good; the B-17 was bought later, and the B-18, while it was purchased, fell into second-line usage in WW2), but it's a process that goes back more decades than either of us has been around.

@PeteS in CA

Yes,but for some odd reason they almost always seem to get it right. Take the venerable Huey,the  Cobra gunships,the C-130,the old Sea Stallions,and one of MY particular favorites,the A1e Skyraiders,for example.

I have never heard anyone bitch about the usefulness of any of them,and I will always have a soft spot in my heart for those old A1E's. They bring the damn-damn like nothing else,and fly slow enough to put it where it's needed.