Author Topic: Advice for A US Special Operations Unit  (Read 79 times)

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rangerrebew

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Advice for A US Special Operations Unit
« on: August 31, 2021, 04:02:58 pm »
 Wed, 08/25/2021 - 8:52pm

Mission Afghanistan

Advice for A US Special Operations Unit

 
The following notes have been prepared from a sense of moral responsibility and duty (as a former U.S. Army Special Forces NCO/officer) to comrades standing on the threshold of opportunity.  The crux from which these notes are expressed are founded in my experience working with indigenous populations and host government security forces in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, careful study and first/second person interaction with various threat elements related to the theatre and an appreciation of the task presenting itself to the soldiers of SOF.  It is understood that several points herein are in direct contrast and incongruent with current strategic and operational paradigms relating to Afghanistan.  I will leave it to the readership of this document to assess if, and/or how, the advice provided is woven into the fabric of a concept of operations.           

 

15 November 2009


Part I – US

 
To Be or Not to Be…the Once and Future Lawrence

 

1.  Confine infatuations with T.E. Lawrence to the spirit of his philosophy and not the war he fought.  He said it himself, in The Arab Bulletin, dated 20 August 1917, “They [his 27 Articles] are meant to apply only to Bedu; townspeople or Syrians require totally different treatment.”  Therefore, be mindful not to bastardize his 27 Articles in attempts to fit his specific experience with the Hejaz Bedu to the current situation.
 

2.  Between September 2001 and December 2002, U.S. Army Special Forces were indeed Lawrences.  “Their war” [the Afghan civil war], with the advent of Operation Enduring Freedom, was fought with ODAs supporting the anti-Taliban forces against a tyrannical, oppressive regime and their (mostly Arab) allies of Al Qaeda.  In that sense, U.S. Army Special Forces lived up to its motto, De Oppressor Liber, and conducted themselves in sound Lawrencian fashion.  However, the situation has changed and that must be recognized and accepted.  It is no longer “their war.”  In the eyes of the Afghan folk, it is YOUR war.         

3.  In the current phase of this war, the U.S. armed forces are no longer the Lawrences of Afghanistan.  That was a bygone era.  ISAF is now in the role of the Ottoman Turks.  Adjust accordingly.

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/mission-afghanistan-advice-us-special-operations-unit-2009