Author Topic: Warfighting vs Institution-Building: America’s Chronic Contradiction in Afghanistan  (Read 158 times)

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rangerrebew

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June 8, 2021

Warfighting vs Institution-Building: America’s Chronic Contradiction in Afghanistan

The contradiction between the goals of warfighting and institution-building is just one of many factors in the failures of the United States and NATO countries to build up capable security forces in Afghanistan, but it is one of the most important, most ignored, and unfortunately, likely to be repeated.
by Lauren Woods Elias Yousif

From the earliest days of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, the United States did something perplexing. Even while developing the Afghan National Army as part of a wider state-building enterprise, U.S. forces began training and funding separate units under the command of warlords, to assist in countering Al Qaeda. These were largely independent operations and not coordinated with Kabul. Many within these units were paid at salaries higher than what the formal army was offering—which directed recruits away from the army and empowered warlords over the official security forces the United States was supposedly supporting. In an article for Foreign Affairs, authors Anja Manuel and P.W. Singer commented that as a result, no coherent plan has emerged to integrate or demobilize warlords, and, “If things continue in this way, the present dream of a self-reliant army serving the Afghan people seems almost certainly doomed to failure.” They wrote that in 2002.

Fast forward nearly 20 years, and that prediction seems to have largely borne out. The Afghan security forces’ hold on the country remains tenuous, and they continue to rely on international support, particularly for the air force. The Taliban’s influence has grown steadily, as has its territorial control, its capacity to carry out regular attacks, and its sense that the war itself has been won. The contradiction between the goals of warfighting and institution-building is just one of many factors in the failures of the United States and NATO countries to build up capable security forces in Afghanistan, but it is one of the most important, most ignored, and unfortunately, likely to be repeated.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/warfighting-vs-institution-building-america%E2%80%99s-chronic-contradiction