Assessing Early Cold War Overestimations of Soviet Capabilities and Intent and its Applicability to

[rangerrebew]

Assessing Early Cold War Overestimations of Soviet Capabilities and Intent and its Applicability to Current U.S.- China Relations
Posted byDivergent Options
February 22, 2021

Major John Bolton is a U.S. Army officer and doctoral candidate at the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies. He previously commanded Bravo Company, 209th Aviation Support Battalion, served as the Executive Officer for 2-25 Assault Helicopter Battalion, and the Brigade Aviation Officer for 4/25 IBCT (Airborne). He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s Art of War Scholars Program and holds degrees in military history and mechanical engineering. An AH-64D/E Aviator, he has deployed multiple times with Engineer, Aviation, and Infantry units. Divergent Options’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.

Title:  Assessing Early Cold War Overestimations of Soviet Capabilities and Intent and its Applicability to Current U.S.- China Relations

Date Originally Written:  January 5, 2021.

Date Originally Published:  February 22, 2021.

Author and / or Article Point of View:  The author is an Active Duty U.S. Army Officer attending a PhD program focused on American Foreign Policy. The author believes America tends to overestimate threat capabilities and too quickly resorts to military analysis or responses without considering better Whole of Government approaches.

Summary:  Though it can illuminate adversaries’ worldview, when predicting actions, analyzing ideology is less effective than traditional balance of power frameworks. During the Cold War, American assumptions about a monolithic Communist block controlled by Moscow blinded American policymakers to opportunities (and challenges) from China to Vietnam. Even in ideological conflicts, states tend to act rationally in the international sphere.

Text:
 
https://divergentoptions.org/2021/02/22/assessing-early-cold-war-overestimations-of-soviet-capabilities-and-intent-and-its-applicability-to-current-u-s-china-relations/

[The_Reader_David]

This analysis, if it really can be called that, overlooks the fact that the whole point of the Korean War was to bog down the U.S. and our allies so the Soviet Union could launch an invasion of Western Europe.  It was only the death of Stalin and the repudiation of the plan by Malenkov that prevented the plan from being carried out -- leading to the rift between the Soviet Union and Red China, as the Chinese felt betrayed when the plan for which they had sacrificed millions of soldiers in human wave attacks was called off. 

We, in fact, assessed Soviet intentions (world conquest) correctly, and were only saved from finding out whether our early Cold War assessment of their capabilities was an over- or underestimate by their adopting a gradualist strategy once Stalin was no longer at the helm.