Author Topic: NOVEMBER 2020U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021 Marine Corps  (Read 158 times)

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NOVEMBER 2020U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021 Marine Corps
« on: November 18, 2020, 11:06:50 am »
NOVEMBER 2020U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021 Marine Corps

Mark F. Cancian
Part of U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021.

The Marine Corps begins a major restructuring to develop capabilities for great power conflict after two decades of conducting counterinsurgency ashore. The budget cuts units and personnel to pay for these new capabilities. However, many commentators worry that the restructuring will make the Marine Corps too narrowly focused.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

▪General Berger’s new guidance aims to restore the Marine Corps to its naval roots after two decades of operations ashore, invest in capabilities focused on great power conflict in the Pacific, and divest unneeded forces.

▪To pay for this, the Marine Corps’ active-duty end strength begins a decline to about 172,000, the level before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

â–ªDespite a continuing high operational tempo, the Marine Corps is pursuing modernization over expanding force structure.

â–ªGround forces would gain long-range precision fires but give up three infantry battalions, tanks, and some counterinsurgency capabilities. Most artillery would convert from cannon to missile units

▪UAVs would increase in number, but the Marine Corps is far behind the Air Force in this regard and the Marine Corps’ UAV development program is in disarray.

▪The amphibious fleet will include large numbers of light amphibious warships (LAWs). These will provide more distributed capabilities that can implement the Marine Corps’ intention to be a “stand in” force that can operate inside an adversary’s defensive bubble. The trade-off is that, because of the LAWs small size, they will not be able to support the customary level of global forward deployments, which may decline as a result.

â–ªThe restructuring has been criticized for focusing too much on a maritime campaign in the Western Pacific, ignoring other global conflicts, and relying on unproven operational concepts

https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/201114_Cancian_FY2021_Marine_Corps.pdf