Rethink the MEU for Tomorrow’s Expeditionary Operations
Hezbollah’s July 2006 war with Israel offers lessons for the Navy and Marine Corps and how they should think about EABO.
By Major Joshua C. Waddell, U.S. Marine Corps
April 2020
In 2006, following the kidnapping of Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers on Israel’s northern border with Lebanon, the IDF launched an aggressive bombing campaign that would eventually escalate into a month-long war. The ensuing conflict is notable for many reasons, from the pitfalls of “effects-based operations†to the first successful tactical employment of the C-802 antiship cruise missile (ASCM) system against a modern navy. While other sources have provided in-depth analysis of the “July War,†offering a variety of lessons learned, some of the less-intuitive lessons that follow here could inform the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ decisions in designing a new composite warfare doctrine.
Specifically, the events that took place during the 11 August drive to the Litani River offer a concise case study. Even as U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701—which eventually would bring an end to organized hostilities—was adopted, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert approved an offensive to push to the Litani River to secure at least the appearance of an IDF victory.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/april/rethink-meu-tomorrows-expeditionary-operations?utm_source=U.S.%20Naval%20Institute&utm_campaign=e654729b4a-Proceedings_This_Week__2020_1_23_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_adee2c2162-e654729b4a-223033233&mc_cid=e654729b4a&mc_eid=b08a2b8a8e
