WWII “Hit ‘em HARDER” submarine wreck site confirmedhttps://www.history.navy.mil/news-and-events/news/2024/WWII-submarine-wreck-confirmed.htmlUsing data collected and provided by Tim Taylor, CEO of Tiburon Subsea and the Lost 52 Project, NHHC’s Underwater Archaeology Branch confirmed the wreck site they discovered as the final resting place of USS Harder (SS 257).
Taylor received a Distinguished Public Service Award from the Navy in 2021 for Lost 52 Project’s work to locate, discover and memorialize the 52 submarines lost during World War II. Previous submarines located by Lost 52 project include USS Grayback (SS 208), USS Stickleback (SS 415), USS R-12 (SS 89), USS S-26 (SS 131), USS S-28 (SS 133), and USS Grunion (SS 216).
The first USS Harder (SS 257) was commissioned on Dec. 2, 1942, with Cmdr. Samuel D. Dealey in command; and lost at sea with 79 souls aboard on Aug. 24, 1944.
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Harder's fifth war patrol was the submarine’s most successful. Harder depleted the critical supply of destroyers by sinking three of them and heavily damaging or destroying two others in four days, and her frequent attacks resulted in Adm. Ozawa's Mobile Fleet departing Tawi-Tawi a day ahead of schedule. The premature departure upset the Japanese battle plans and forced Ozawa to delay his carrier force in the Philippine Sea, contributing to the defeat suffered by the Japanese in the ensuing battle.
While when the Pacific War was turning against Japan when USS Harder was commissioned in December 1942, the USN submarine force was still fighting problems with the
bleeping Mark 14 torpedo and skippers who were less than aggressive. Commander Sam Dealy was one of a number of skippers who were the
solution-on-steroids to the latter problem.
For both the USN and IJN, destroyers were their workhorses. The Guadalcanal campaign had seen quite a few from both navies sunk. The US had the shipbuilding capacity to crank out Fletchers and Bensons, but Japan's capacity was not equal to repairs plus replacements plus increasing their fleet. Sub skippers who took out destroyers and other escorts not only took out vessels that hunted them and created problems for the IJN in various patrol areas, but also contributed to the IJN's increasing shortage of destroyers (an example of the consequences of this would be the inadequate escort of Kurita's force heading for Leyte Gulf that allowed USS Darter and USS Dace to sink 3 heavy cruisers and force a 4th to return to a port; had those 4 cruisers been in the Battle off Samar, things could have gone worse than they did).
