What is Our Theory of Victory?
By Robert Kozloski | June 17, 2019
Since the forced subordination of naval strategy to military strategy after the National Security Act of 1947, the sea services continue to lose their naval identity in favor of “jointness.†Many naval officers now view the sea services solely as a warfighting organization without regard for its full range of impact—economic, financial, and influential. Falling victim to this intellectual trap diminishes not only potential naval contributions to national security and prosperity, but the future of U.S. power itself and with it, our very way of life.
The naval services revere the proper place of strategy, meaning the continual adjustment of ways and means to achieve political ends. Since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986, our naval strategy must also align to higher-level strategies, such as the National Security Strategy of the United States and National Defense Strategy, which constrain its span and scope. Operationally, combatant commanders develop plans to meet specific threats based on their best estimates of the enemy, the environment, and the policies of U.S. political leaders. Between these two layers of strategy and operations lies doctrine.
https://blog.usni.org/posts/2019/06/17/what-is-our-theory-of-victory
