Russian Hybrid Warfare as Unconventional Warfare: Implementing a Counter-Unconventional Warfare Stra

[rangerrebew]

Russian Hybrid Warfare as Unconventional Warfare: Implementing a Counter-Unconventional Warfare Strategy

Drew Shepler

Introduction

In a 2013 article, Russian General Valery Gerasimov published an article, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations.” Western media frequently cite this article as laying out a new Russian-specific method of hybrid warfare. Labeled the “Gerasimov Doctrine” or Russian Hybrid Warfare, Western discourse has subsequently focused on debating whether “Gerasimov’s ideas represent old or new ways of war.”[ii][iii] This discourse has contributed to decision-making paralysis, as policymakers struggle to find appropriate responses for a “new type of warfare.” According to Dr. Damien Van Puyvelde, “when any threat or use of force is defined as hybrid, the term loses its value and confuses instead of clarifying.”[iv] Despite the fact that Russian hybrid actions caught the United States (U.S.) off guard, Russian hybrid warfare doctrine is not particularly innovative and is comparable to U.S. military unconventional warfare (UW) doctrine.[v] Instead of continuing to focus on defining the nature of Russian Hybrid Warfare, policymakers in the U.S. should recognize that U.S. military doctrine has already defined the principles of Russian Hybrid Warfare in U.S. UW doctrine and they should now focus on implementing a strategy of counter-unconventional warfare.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/russian-hybrid-warfare-unconventional-warfare-implementing-counter-unconventional-warfare