Some interesting info I found out elsewhere today about this.
There were actually THREE people in the cab of the lead engine:
- the engineer
- someone qualifying on the territory (may actually be a "conductor" or might have been someone else)
- a locomotive technician from Siemens (The German firm which built the engine).
Also heard that some individuals "got qualified" on this territory after a very few trips (as little as two). That's stretching it, for any piece of railroad.
Perhaps the engineer wasn't as familiar with the line as he might have though to himself. I doubt the other two people in the cab would be -more- familiar.
So it's possible the engineer had "made a few trips", and then have been "handed his papers", without being as familiar with the territory as he -thought- he was.
That happens. Sometimes you think you "know what's out there" and then discover surprises along the way (it happened to me -- but luckily, those "surprises" turned out to be smaller ones!)
I've also read that at the time of the derailment (roughly 7.30am), it was still dark or just in the process of sunup. Being from the east coast, it would take someone from way out west to confirm if at this time of year that's actually the case.
But that leads into this next bit of info:
NTSB says that the brakes were never applied on the locomotive by the engineer -- not even as the train reached the entrance to the curve. The brakes -did- apply (in emergency) after the derailment began and the brake pipe (which runs throughout the train) was broken. (A sudden reduction in brake pipe pressure initiates an emergency application of the brakes)
I'm wondering if the engineer had done all his qualifying during the daylight? The same stretch of railroad can "look completely different" in the dark.
I've read that there was an "advance warning sign" for the speed restriction, but it was posted TWO MILES in advance of the actual curve. That's kind of "too far back", in my opinion. Something could intervene between there and the actual point of restriction that could distract the engineer -- perhaps in this case, questions from the person qualifying, etc.
Amtrak (on the Shore Line between New Haven and Boston) does it better. Their warning signs are placed "at braking distance" -- the point where one would begin a normal brake application to comply with the restriction.
It's been mentioned elsewhere that this new bypass (about 14 miles in length) was equipped with the trackside hardware for "positive train control" but that the system was not yet operational.
There's nothing unusual about that. PTC is a very involved and technically complex system that also requires hardware/software on the locomotives, and I believe not all the engines were equipped as of yet. FRA rules require that once you turn a system like this on, ALL engines must be properly equipped. No exceptions for non-equipped engines. Even if they were running with PTC cut in for test purposes, they probably weren't going to "go live" with it until everything was ready and known working.
Just many small factors that -- combined -- caused a big accident...
