http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/where-donald-trump-went-wrong/article/2588599?platform=hootsuiteByron York: Where Trump went wrongBy BYRON YORK (@BYRONYORK) • 4/14/16 9:30 PM
There have been moments in the Republican campaign when Donald Trump seemed close to locking up the party's presidential nomination. The candidate who won New Hampshire, South Carolina, Nevada, Michigan, Massachusetts, Georgia, Florida, Arizona, and more displayed strength across the country that would, in normal times at least, lead to overall victory. Yet today, despite his solid standing in New York and other upcoming northeastern primaries, and his continued dominance of national polls, Trump has a difficult and shaky path to the 1,237 delegates required to win the GOP nomination on the first ballot.
His prospects for the second and later ballots look iffy, as the Cruz campaign works with #NeverTrump operatives to peel away delegates who are required to vote for Trump initially but will be free to go elsewhere on later ballots. In short, Trump had better win the nomination on the first pass. If he doesn't, the front-runner could well lose.
How did that happen? Talks with people knowledgeable about the Trump campaign point to two moments — one in February, one in March — when Trump and his aides made mistakes that would undermine all the work they had done to take them to the verge of the GOP nomination.
The first moment occurred in February, in the first weeks of voting. After a second-place finish in Iowa, Trump won New Hampshire in a near-landslide, South Carolina by double digits, and then cleaned up in Nevada. He took three of the four early states in impressive fashion.
At that point, it was not unusual to hear Trump aides declare confidently that they had the race wrapped up. That wasn't a crazy idea; after all, there had never been a Republican candidate who won those states and didn't go on to claim the nomination. The plan was for Trump to win big on March 1, Super Tuesday, after which the race would effectively be over. Or perhaps the campaign would go to March 15, when Trump would again win big and it really would be all over. The Trump campaign oozed confidence and the belief that victory was at hand.
In retrospect, the importance of the February confidence was that it convinced Trump and his aides — reinforced their inclination, really — that they did not need to do the ground-level, shoe-leather work of organizing and delegate recruitment required to solidify ballot-box victories in many states. With big popular votes, the feeling was that Trump did not have to line up people to attend county, district, and state-level conventions in the states he had won to make sure that the delegates picked would be loyal to him, not just on the first ballot, when most would be bound to vote for him, but on the second ballot and beyond.
The view from TrumpWorld was that there would be no second ballot, so all of that county convention stuff was unnecessary. In a number of key states, Trump laid off most or all of his staff almost immediately after the voting was over. Doing so was not an inadvertent mistake; it was a strategic decision.
Some have suggested that the damage was already done by February, that Trump should have started delegate-courting many months ago. Yes, that would have been ideal. But even if Trump had gotten going in February, he would have had time to reinforce his victories in many states. The job was doable even then. Trump just didn't do it.
One note: It's important to point out that the recent controversy in Colorado was not part of Trump's delegate problem. Colorado did not have a primary or caucus for Trump to win and then organize. Prevailing in Colorado's complex set of precinct, county, district, and state caucuses would have required an extensive effort, which might or might not have been worth it for Trump.
After all, Colorado might not have been terribly fertile ground for Trump even if it had a primary or caucus. So the campaign made an explicit decision not to do what was required in Colorado, which looks like a misjudgment in hindsight but was not an unreasonable decision to make. And of course, the fundamental reason Trump didn't go to the trouble was because he believed he would have the race in the bag before Colorado.
So the first mistake was the cumulative effect of hubris and overconfidence that grew from Trump's early victories. Trump's second mistake, in March, was his failure to consolidate support at the moment of greatest opportunity, when through a series of unfiltered statements and tweets he squandered the sense of inevitability he had begun to build.
There comes a time in a primary race when voters decide it is settled. In the 2012 primaries, for example, Rick Santorum pushed Mitt Romney hard, coming close to victory in Michigan and Ohio and taking wins in Colorado, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and other states. But as the race wore on, Santorum slowed down, with his final win in Louisiana on March 24. On April 3, Romney's victory in Wisconsin effectively put an end to the race. After that, Romney's margins of victories increased dramatically, and Santorum was less and less of a factor. On April 10, Santorum withdrew.
Of course the 2016 campaign has not followed the same path. But after a strong Super Tuesday and his decisive March 15 victory in Florida, Trump approached a moment in which millions of Republicans were starting to wrap their brains around the idea of Trump being their nominee, if not yet their president. They were likely approaching a sort of Wisconsin moment in which they would put an end to the race.
Trump seemed to realize the time was near on the night of March 8, when he held a news conference in Jupiter, Florida to mark his victory in the Michigan primary. "I say let's come together, folks," Trump said. "We're going to win ... I think it's time to unify. We have something special going on in the Republican Party."
A week later, Trump won Florida by a huge margin, driving rival Marco Rubio from the race. Then a week later, he won Arizona. (Yes, John Kasich won Ohio, but that was his home state and (still) his only victory; Ted Cruz remained far behind.)
On March 21, Trump traveled to Washington, where he met with a few senators and representatives, held a news conference, and gave a fairly well-received speech to AIPAC. Trump even read the AIPAC address from a prepared text, an apparent first for him. Those in his extended circle who had long wanted to see a more presidential Trump cheered. It was, all in all, a sorta statesmanlike performance, providing at least some evidence to back up Trump's claim that he could become "presidential" any time he wanted.
The next morning brought the Brussels terrorist attacks. Trump's tough reaction to a previous European terrorist incident, in Paris last November, undoubtedly strengthened his appeal to GOP voters. Brussels could have done the same, especially since President Obama was visiting Cuba, appearing unconcerned during a high-profile trip to a baseball game, while Europe suffered.
It was a big chance for Trump to play President Trump. So what did he do, the very next day? He used Twitter to attack Heidi Cruz, not only changing the subject of the campaign but also reinforcing earlier charges that he does not respect women — all while alienating Republican primary voters at the very moment some of them were coming around to the idea of Trump the nominee.
"I'd say the biggest mistake he's made has been allowing the #NeverTrumpers to sow doubt about him right at the moment he should have been consolidating support," a #NeverTrump activist told me via email. "If Trump had really made the 'strategic pivot' that some of his apologists claim he is capable of for the general, he would have done it after his March 15 wins and dispatching of Rubio. Instead, he continued the same controversy-stoking, cable-news baiting behavior as before, creating big questions about his electability and buying time for his opponents to demonstrate that there is a path to beating him."
The problem was not that one tweet could bring Trump down. After so many controversies, beginning with John McCain, Megyn Kelly, Mexicans, and going on and on — Trump's opponents had long ago abandoned the idea that any one statement could end his candidacy. But they believed Trump's words could have a cumulative effect, especially after Trump's February 28 Sunday-show refusal to disavow David Duke and the Ku Klux Klan.
It's hard to overstate the effect that interview had on Republicans who have for years defended the party against the various race cards played against them by Democrats. From that moment on, #NeverTrumpers were able to cast Trump's various outrageous statements in a different, and darker, context.
As all that was coming together at the end of March, Trump went to Wisconsin, where he made the mistake of attacking Gov. Scott Walker and then ran into a wall of opposition from the state's formidable conservative talk radio machine. In addition, Trump blundered badly, almost unimaginably so, when MSNBC's Chris Matthews asked him some simple questions about abortion. His problems were accumulating. The brief Trump presidency had dissolved into the old Trump style, only this time his adversaries were better organized and public opinion was in a different place.
Trump's poll numbers plunged among all sorts of groups. A recent Washington Post poll found him with the following unfavorable ratings: 67 percent with all Americans; 75 percent with women; 81 percent with Hispanics; 91 percent with blacks, 59 percent with whites; and 74 percent with young voters. Numbers like that left already-panicky Republican insiders beside themselves with worry that a Trump candidacy would lead to a general election disaster that would lose not just the White House but the House and Senate, too.
Two moments, and two miscalculations by Trump and the people around him. Had they chosen a different course, Trump might already be the Republican nominee.
Despite it all, Trump could still win. He is, in fact, the only candidate with a chance to clinch the nomination the old-fashioned way, before the convention. After April 26, Cruz will be mathematically eliminated from winning the nomination going into the convention; his strategy will be entirely about keeping Trump from 1,237 and scrambling to grab Trump's supporters on later ballots. Trump, on the other hand, will still have a way to win all the way to California and the big June 7 primaries. In addition, there's a widespread belief among Republicans that if Trump gets to Cleveland close to 1,237, perhaps within 75 delegates or so, he can still win on the first ballot. So he still has a solid chance.
It also appears Trump is about to have a good run. The only question about next Tuesday's New York primary, with its 95 delegates, is how big Trump's victory will be. Then come contests in Connecticut, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and other states that look positive for Trump, before the campaign turns to some more Cruz-friendly states. The news for Trump in coming days could be very, very good.
But the fact is, the race should never have gotten this far, and the path to 1,237 should never have gotten so narrow. For all his missteps and controversies, Trump had a huge opportunity to strengthen and consolidate his support in the GOP race, and he didn't do it.
