Author Topic: Can Libya escape from terrorist grip?  (Read 162 times)

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rangerrebew

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Can Libya escape from terrorist grip?
« on: February 14, 2016, 01:56:25 pm »

Can Libya escape from terrorist grip?

The countries of the West have been ignoring Libya’s situation for a while. Libya has been ravaged by destruction, disintegration of its state and society, and the spread of terrorism, which took its latest form with the arrival of Islamic State (IS) militants in the country. The recent developments directly threaten Europe, especially the presence of terrorism in coastal areas closest to [Libya], like Rome. This threat has been sufficient enough to shift Europe’s attention to Libya.
 
With terrorism spreading in Libya and threatening Europe, Western countries moved to support the establishment of a consensus government under the Skhirat Agreement.
Author Atef el-Ghomri Posted January 28, 2016
TranslatorPascale Menassa
Original Article اقرا المقال الأصلي باللغة العربية

As a result, Europe became anxious for the establishment of a strong central government. With that, the Skhirat Agreement was signed to establish a national consensus government to pull Libya out of the dilemma it was pushed into by various parties. Libya became the worst model of a failed state — a term coined in the West more than 10 years ago — despite its oil riches, which could have made it a developed, secure and stable country.

Libya's situation, which several domestic and foreign parties contributed to, deserves a comprehensive overview without glossing over any contributing factors. Besides, Libya got into this situation for reasons also found in other countries in the region that have had a similar experience.

Three main parties are responsible for this situation.

First, Western countries, whose leaders admit their responsibility, participated in making Libya what it is today.

NATO made the first mistake by launching raids that toppled Moammar Gadhafi’s rule and disengaging shortly thereafter, leaving the country in complete chaos without contributing to reuniting it.

The Foreign Affairs Committee in the British Parliament made its first confession in this regard when it investigated the failure of the British government's policy in Libya.

President Barack Obama told the New York Times that one of his greatest foreign policy regrets is that he did not make a bigger effort following Gadhafi’s fall and did not realize the extent to which Gadhafi had deprived Libyan society of all forms of political culture.

The Washington Post published news in several editorials about the US failure to help restore Libya’s stability following Gadhafi’s fall. This exacerbated the situation, making it largely unstable.

Second, Gadhafi himself — who ruled for 42 years in a dictatorial and authoritative manner that oppressed liberties and drowned people’s ambitions — can be blamed for the current Libyan situation.

It was only normal for people to react and reject his presence in the hope of gaining a state with its own identity.

This led to the emergence of a domestic resistance movement consisting of intellectuals, citizens and technocrats. Leaders of the movement included Abdel-Fattah Younis, who served as Gadhafi’s minister of interior and former colleague but then split with him. Younis was subsequently killed by a group of opposition factions from the so-called political Islam [movement] that had been active in the 1990s.

At that stage, a split started to emerge between those calling for a revolution for the sake of a state and those who chiefly sought to rob the state and install another brand of individual or collective rule all the while excluding the people, their history and their aspirations.

This subsequently led to a state of chaos that crystalized as Mahmoud Jibril took over the National Transitional Council presidency following the revolution and started organizing planning teams to restore governance, security and economic systems in coordination with UN agencies. This prompted the political Islam groups to obstruct his mission by raising obstacles against him.

Meanwhile, a variety of political Islam factions had begun to emerge during and following the revolution. At the beginning, these were of three types: the Muslim Brothers, who lived in exile under Gadhafi but returned to try to become partners in the governance of the new Libya. Also present were former members of Libyan Islamic Jihad who returned to Libya from Afghanistan — where they had fought the Soviets alongside [al-Qaeda's Osama] bin Laden — to try to get important positions in the government. Add to these the younger generation that is prone to excessive violence. These were the Salafist jihadists, and they founded Ansar al-Sharia, which subsequently changed affiliations and joined IS along with other groups that had the same outlook.

All of these groups share a common goal: to prevent the establishment of a national government, prevent the state from restoring stability, spread terrorism in Libya and expand to neighboring countries.

This led Western countries to support the establishment of a unified central government after they recognized the danger that could threaten them should chaos and division persist. As a result, the Skhirat Agreement saw the light of day, with the understanding that the agreement should be enforced and granted the support of the entire international community.

For other countries to draw a lesson from the Libyan ordeal, they must acknowledge that individual rule that strangles the nation is an omen for a fall into the abyss of a failed state. This allows foreign powers to fertilize the bad seeds planted by domestic parties in the soil of the state.
Published Sharjah, U.A.E. Established 1970
Language Arabic Frequency daily
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Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2016/01/libya-terrorism-chaos-consensus-government.html#ixzz409OMcM7g