February 11, 2016
U.S. Air and Missile Defenses - A Critical Gap
By MajGen Francis Mahon, USA (Ret.)
Did they or didn’t they? Have they and aren’t they? Are they and will they? No, those are not the categories in an episode of Jeopardy but they are relevant questions about three potential adversaries.
As recently as this Sunday missile launch by North Korea, we are reminded ‘this is a period of demonstration’ and our Secretary of Defense’s conclusion “our adversaries are not standing still.”
North Korea recently: launched a three-stage missile that could have ranged the United States; detonated something that caused ‘large seismic readings’; and is clearly working on submarine launched ballistic missiles. Russia’s air and sea-launched cruise missile attacks in Syria is a demonstration of long-range strike capabilities and the Crimea-Ukraine conflict certainly appears to be a proof of concept test bed. China’s man-made islands, expansion of carrier operations and their carrier fleet, and large cruise missile inventory could be regional reach or enhanced anti-access, area denial, or a step towards global force projections.
Collectively, these events demonstrate our adversaries are advancing their capabilities…are we?
Our Services need to invest in capability not merely capacity. Our military is smaller, our budgets constrained; therefore, we must preserve and advance our technological advantage if we are to be effective and successful in countering emerging threats. In other words, we must cover our capability gaps through high-value investments in a new system or system improvements that complicate an adversaries’ situation through technological overmatch, not simply quantity.
Those points are most relevant when you consider air and missile defense where low density, high demand systems operate on the cutting edge of technology. The capability is more than rocket science – it is hitting a missile with a missile:
-Fortunately, 2015 wasn’t a bad year for the Missile Defense Agency or the Services’ either.. Aegis Ashore, integrated with the Army’s AN/TPY-2 radar, defeated a ballistic missile with a Standard Missile-3’s Block-IB interceptor, thereby enabling the Aegis Ashore site in Romania to declare technical capability. The US-Japanese development of the Standard Missile-3, Block-IIA achieved its second successful intercept and the Standard Missile-6 demonstrated terminal defense capabilities against a short range ballistic missile, as well as cruise missiles.
-THAAD demonstrated the criticality of a ‘layered defense’ as it intercepted its target in a joint Aegis-THAAD live fire test; and then intercepted Aegis’ target when Aegis was not able to execute its engagement. And the Army’s Patriot system was 3-for-3 in live fire tests while Saudi Arabian and Emirati Patriot batteries had combat kills.
-The Army’s Integrated air and missile defense Battle Command System (IBCS) demonstrated its open architecture capability and the “any sensor, any shooter” construct when two Sentinel radars passed data on a cruise missile to IBCS and onto a Patriot battery that engaged and intercepted the cruise missile, without ever having the Patriot radar see the cruise missile. Any sensor – Any shooter.
So as we think about these events, our adversaries, and that the President’s Fiscal Year 2017 Budget that is about to be sent to Congress, we should look closely at what investments bring near-term closure to deter our adversaries and provide necessary defenses against their emerging threats?
The gap appears to be in countering cruise missiles, more so than ballistic missiles, and countering Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs). Cruise missiles and UASs are challenging small targets that maneuver at low altitudes, making them difficult to detect, track and intercept. Furthermore, the UAS requires us to know with confidence, “it is NOT ours”.
Given this, priority for investments should be sensors and command and control systems, and a low cost intercept capability to counter the UAS. Congress needs to support investment in programs such as the Army’s IBCS, Patriot radar modernization efforts, and Indirect Fire Protection Capabilities (the Army’s Counter-UAS program) and the Navy’s SM-6 missile and Air and Missile Defense Radar program.
Missile procurement quantities should be held to the number the Services request. More, longer range missiles aren’t necessarily a good operational value if you don’t have sensors and C2 systems to effectively and safely utilize that added range. A rifle with an optical sight is more lethal than one with an iron sight.
In protecting the U.S. Homeland, prioritizing MDA’s Long Range Discriminating Radar, modernizing the Ground-Based Interceptors with a redesigned kill vehicle, and maintaining the momentum in the European Phased Adaptive Approach need to remain on-track. Investments in additional East Coast sites or high risk developmental ventures shouldn’t hold these priorities hostage. North Korea remains the wild card and Iran has not slowed its missile development programs. MDA has a sound strategy; its most recent successful test of the CE-II kill vehicle affirms it is on the right path to achieving its objectives but it requires reliable funding.
Secretary Carter is spot-on with pursuing capability over capacity, but we must ensure our strategy does not defer near-term capability gains on the hope a long-term development program will deliver challenging technology in a timely manner. The Third Offset Strategy is a good concept to explore as a long-term strategy but we are not in a strategic pause – this is not 1992, and we have not the time, nor the fiscal resources for science projects or pet rocks.
We need to stay focused on developing and procuring near-term capabilities that fill critical gaps and provide us overmatch. Congress needs to fund the Air and Missile Defense Programs in the President’s Budget as received if we are to obtain capability, not merely more capacity.
Maj. Gen. Francis Mahon is an independent defense consultant and a former Director of Strategy, Policy, and Plans at NORAD–US Northern Command, and a former Commander of a US Army Air and Missile Defense Command.
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/02/11/us_air_and_missile_defenses_-_a_critical_gap_109012.html
