Essay: Russia’s Military Role in Syria
By: Daniel Trombly
November 13, 2015 4:39 AM • Updated: November 12, 2015 7:33 PM
Screen grab from Syrian State Television
Screen grab from Syrian State Television
The deployment of a major Russian expeditionary force to Syria in late September resulted in a flurry of public attention and heated rumors.
Pro-Syrian regime sources spoke of a massive offensive against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL) that would put the long-frustrated U.S. and coalition effort to shame. Many worried that Russia would flood Syria with new interceptors, such as the Mikoyan MiG-31, or the latest generation of surface-to-air missile systems (Syria’s long-rumored order of MiG-31s remains unfilled, and the Buk and Pantsir surface-to-air missiles defending Russia’s base do not do much more than Syria’s own Buk and Pantsir systems to improve the regime’s air defense capabilities). Even rumors involving Russia’s sole Typhoon-class ballistic-missile submarine and aircraft carrier entered the mix.
Now that the pace and intensity of rumors about Russia’s involvement and Syria have cooled, it is easier to discern the intent and scope of Russia’s overt military intervention in the Syrian conflict. Amidst a highly publicized effort to demonstrate new capabilities of Russia’s aerospace and naval forces, Russia is attempting to restore the Syrian regime’s long-decayed air power and providing piecemeal support to its ground offensives to secure the regime against rebel forces enjoying unprecedented battlefield success. Although Russia’s Syrian expedition evokes the triumphant performance of a traditional great power role, its military success is beholden to the same grueling logic of guerrilla and civil war that has stymied so many technologically-advanced counterinsurgents in the past.
Reviving Regime Airpower
Russia’s highest profile contribution is its deployment of fixed-wing aircraft primarily engaged in strikes on static positions and structures belonging to Syrian opposition forces. While Russia has strong political incentives to portray these strikes as being focused on ISIS, both in terms of legitimizing its intervention and shifting popular discourse about the intentions of Syrian opposition groups, only a small percentage of its airstrikes so far could be credibly interpreted as aimed at these organizations. The types of sorties these fixed-wing aircraft have conducted are not a revolutionary introduction to the battle between the Bashar al-Assad’s regime, its allies, and the Syrian opposition. The Syrian Arab Air Force frequently performed similar missions, often with similar airframes. SyAAF aircraft, however, have suffered from the inevitable fatigue from years of combat operations. The regime has lost much of its pre-war air power through the loss of aircraft to rebel anti-aircraft fire and mechanical failure. The cost of fuel, defection of aircrews, shortages of spare parts, and depletion of munitions stocks also limit the number of viable aircraft and rates of sortie generation available to the regime. On top of this, rebel forces and ISIS have seized multiple military airfields.
On balance, Russia’s aircraft are in better condition than Syrian counterparts and some, such as the Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback bomber, far surpass anything available in the Syrian arsenal. But the simple introduction of dozens of aircraft and aircrews untouched by years of fatiguing combat operations on its own reinvigorated the regime’s aerial capabilities after years of attrition. Although the Su-34s, Russian precision-guided munitions, and previously unseen weapons such as the Kalibir sea-launched cruise missile surpass regime capabilities, the presence of large numbers of Su-25 and Su-24 aircraft in the Russian expeditionary force suggests restoring old regime capabilities is as important to the operation as introducing new ones.
There is a fierce debate among military analysts as to whether or not Russia’s actions are meeting competitor expectations, one that inevitably confounds the broader international debate about the balance of power between Russia and the West and the merit and efficacy of their Syrian policies. In Russia’s initial airstrikes, many focused on the country’s clear demonstration of commitment to its preferred party in the conflict, while others focused on the shortcomings of Russia’s limited ability to employ precision-guided munitions. When Russia launched Kalibir cruise missiles, some emphasized the range of the missiles was a previously unseen capability, while others noted that the range of the launch from corvettes in the landlocked Caspian Sea was a necessity since none of Russia’s other ships could do so.
Although the comparisons between the Russian intervention and the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition are inevitable, it is important to highlight the fundamentally different circumstances shaping these operations. A comparison of their sortie rates in Syria is one crucial example. Many worry that Russia’s air force, conducting up to 96 sorties daily, is far outpacing the anti-ISIS coalition. Russia does enjoy some advantages in sortie generation relative to the coalition. Russia’s aircraft operate from within Syria itself, and the overwhelming majority of their targets are within 300 kilometers of the aircrafts’ takeoff points. The coalition, on the other hand, fly strike aircraft from airbases or carriers outside Iraq and Syria. Unlike ISIS, with a far-flung constellation of holdings between Iraq and Syria, the Syrian rebel groups are concentrated in the more densely populated corridor of western Syria. While coalition aircraft have always primarily been engaged in Iraq, Russia can focus the entirety of its operations in a relatively geographically constrained area. Because of how closely Russia works with regime ground forces and the regime’s disregard for civilian casualties, the availability of ISR and rules of engagement bear far differently on Russian strike sorties than on coalition ones.
Making It Count On The Ground?
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http://news.usni.org/2015/11/13/essay-russias-military-role-in-syria#more-15656
