Essay: China’s Island Building Campaign Could Hint Toward Further Expansions in Indian Ocean
By: Andrew Erickson and Kevin Bond
September 17, 2015 4:50 PM • Updated: September 17, 2015 7:05 PM
China’s creation of military-relevant facilities on its newly-created islands in the South China Sea is a cause for concern for countries in Southeast Asia, and several of its investments in the Indian Ocean are raising more questions over the possibility of China’s first dedicated naval support facility overseas.
As China expands its reach into the Indian Ocean and wraps up construction in Southeast Asia, the same sort of assets that built-up the seven Spratly features that China occupies into artificial islands may decamp for ports in the Indian Ocean, potentially strengthening China’s logistics chain for its naval activities in what its strategists term the Far Seas.
Dredging up ‘Pearls’
Airstrip construction on the Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea is pictured in this April 2, 2015.
Airstrip construction on the Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea is pictured in this April 2, 2015.
China’s controversial island-building in the South China Sea — especially in the Spratlys — has been the subject of foreign speculation as well as international litigation since it began on an industrial scale more than 18 months ago.
While some foreign sources prematurely asserted that China was already establishing a “String of Pearls” composed of formal military “bases” across the Indian Ocean, China’s extant reclamation efforts have instead constituted a step toward establishing militarily-relevant facilities in the South China Sea. China’s construction work on the reefs in the Spratlys is by no means new, though; in 1988 the PLA had already started stationing troops in huts on bamboo poles in the island chain.
Rather than novelty, the main reasons that China’s construction has only recently made headlines is because of both the sheer scale and speed at which it was executed and the implications it has for neighboring countries. China is also the first country in the area to turn fully submerged reefs into full-fledged man-made “islands,” and is the only one to build at least one high-capacity 3,000 meter airstrip with a taxiway on a feature it controls. Such a runway has already been completed at Fiery Cross Reef, with another well underway on Subi Reef and yet another possibly emerging at Mischief Reef. The last is suggested by grading and tamping by bulldozers in two strips visible in satellite imagery of Mischief’s northwest portion.
The speed at which China was able to create these islands owes itself completely to China’s dredger development over the past decade, and the movements of several of China’s largest dredgers have been tracked in the area. China’s large self-propelled cutter-suction dredger (CSD) Tianjing was spotted at the Union Banks and Tizard Banks in 2013 and early 2014, then at Hughes Reef between 20 March and 3 April 2014 conducting land reclamation. The trailing suction hopper dredger (TSHD) Tiankai was also seen operating at Mischief Reef between 14 January and 16 February of this year, while the CSD Xinhaitun was identified in the same location from 24-28 February. According to a Sina.com report, China’s dredgers were able to expand two different islands in the Spratlys to the point that they could support normal construction in the span of only three months, a concrete manifestation of China’s large and rapid construction capacity. Both Tianjing and Tiankai are operated by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) Tianjin, though their website makes no mention of any active projects in the South China Sea region. Pictures in an article on the New York Times website also show dozens of Chinese dredgers working simultaneously at Mischief Reef, demonstrating the sheer numbers China has deployed for feature augmentation.
The Pentagon has stated that although these sand castles are of limited military utility due to their smallness and vulnerability, they could be used to provide logistics support to maritime patrols or an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the long term. The idea of using these islands as a way to extend patrols fits China’s larger “maritime rights” enforcement strategy in the South China Sea, whereby it prevents other countries from pursuing fishing, energy exploration, construction, or other activities in the area, regardless of whether other countries accept China’s claims or not, thereby asserting effective control. This strategy already seems to be paying dividends for China. As Ding Zhile, Chairman of the Qionghai Tanmen Fisheries Association in Hainan province, relates, when fishermen previously went to the disputed Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal), they would always see fishermen from the Philippines, whereas now all they see are Chinese government vessels. Chinese fishermen now feel much safer fishing in disputed waters, Ding adds, as they know Chinese patrol boats are poised to intercede should they encounter trouble.
Beijing’s assertiveness regarding its position in the South China Sea is thus far unwavering, even in the face of international litigation brought against it by Manila and increasing pressure from Washington. The United States has been conducting freedom of navigation exercises in the area in an attempt to ensure that China’s “islands” do not interfere with innocent passage, though Chinese officials have taken the position that freedom of navigation does not extend to warships and planes in territorial waters. Flights near the islands have repeatedly been subject to warnings from China’s navy that they are entering a military zone and should turn back, lending credibility to the possibility of China setting up an ADIZ in the area—as it did over much of the East China Sea in 2013. However, the recent sailing of several Chinese warships within 12 nautical miles of U.S. soil in the Aleutian Islands off Alaska presents a contradiction between China’s words and its actions, and will make it harder for Beijing to object to U.S. naval ships operating closer to China’s “islands” in the Spratlys.
China’s island construction in the Spratlys is not quite finished, with recent photos of Subi Reef showing another 3,000m runway under construction, China’s third on South China Sea features, along with several ships from China’s large dredging fleet. However, this part of construction should wind down soon, with China shifting to fortification of islands thus built, and then these dredgers will leave to find work elsewhere. The question remains of where they might go once their Spratlys building is finished. While China’s own domestic market is impressive, expected to reach between 5 and 7.5 billion cubic meters by sometime this year, the country’s “Maritime Silk Road” program also has a heavy emphasis on port construction, channel dredging, and land reclamation. China’s large construction capacity and new dredger technology will undoubtedly find itself useful along the Maritime Silk Road, expanding ports in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and beyond through investment both from the Chinese government and China’s State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). This construction and expansion has raised the concern of other countries active in the region, notably India, leading to fears of the eventual implementation of some form of a “String of Pearls” network—however difficult and uncertain it might be for China to attempt this in practice.
China’s Maritime Silk Road
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