Report slams Army officers over unused $36M facility
By Kevin Lilley, Staff writer 1:45 p.m. EDT May 20, 2015
A report into an unused $36 million command-and-control facility built at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan, recommends that three Army officers be held accountable for their roles in denying plans to cancel the construction and in irregularities with a follow-up investigation — a move the Defense Department rejected.
The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction found then-Maj. Gen. Peter Vangjel, while deputy commander of U.S. Army Central, decided "to construct the [64,000-square-foot] building over the objections of commanders in the field" in 2010.
The report also suggested "appropriate administrative or disciplinary action" for Maj. Gen. James Richardson for "his failure to carry out a fulsome investigation" into matter in 2013, when ordered to do so by Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, then-head of U.S. Forces Afghanistan. It had the same suggestion for Col. Norman Allen, Dunford's legal adviser, finding he had attempted to "discourage full cooperation" with the report.
Vangjel and Allen denied any wrongdoing in their responses to the investigation, which are included in the report. The Defense Department's response backed up their statements, saying the actions of all three officers "do not represent misconduct warranting consideration of administrative or disciplinary action."
DoD also took issue with the $36 million figure, saying the building cost $25 million. SIGAR found DoD's number didn't include infrastructure improvements.
The building was 98 percent complete in April 2013 with construction still ongoing, the report found. It was never used by U.S. forces; Camp Leatherneck was turned over to the Afghan government in October 2014.
Make it a movie theater
Two generals ordered separate investigations into the building, the SIGAR report found. The first, filed in May 2013, found that Marine units at Leatherneck had no interest in occupying the building, and that not enough other units desired the space to make it operational.
The Air Force lieutenant colonel in charged of the investigation recommended the facility be turned into center to "address morale, welfare and recreation needs," the report states, suggesting renovations to include a movie theater and a fitness center. Maj. Gen. Kenneth Dahl, then a deputy commander with U.S. Forces-Afghanistan who commissioned the report, removed those suggestions from the final version.
About a month after Dahl filed his report, Dunford ordered a second 15-6, according to the SIGAR investigation, in part because the building had "potential to draw significant attention from auditors and Congress."
Battle Rattle blog: D'oh! in the Desert: Why was an unwanted $34 million headquarters built at Camp Leatherneck?
Richardson was put in charge of the investigation and given broad resources to conduct it, SIGAR found, but he did not take sworn statements from witnesses, as instructed by Dunford, and didn't ask any questions of Vangjel, though he used previous statements from Vangjel supporting the decision to continue construction.
Richardson filed the report in August. Before Dunford approved it in October, SIGAR found, Allen "emailed certain 'investigation findings' " to Vangjel and Marine Lt. Gen. Richard Mills, who had requested cancellation of the construction in 2010. While Vangjel maintained one of the Marine generals at the base had "requested to leave it as an active project," neither Mills nor his successor remembered making such a request.
The SIGAR investigation found Allen's emails to Vangjel, in lieu of his testimony, "diminished the value of General Richardson's report."
It also found Allen had discouraged cooperation with the SIGAR investigation, sending an email to multiple recipients expressing his desire to "slow roll" responses and questioning the group's legal authority on the matter. For instance, he suggested in an email that responding to questions from the group about the Dunford-approved investigation would be tantamount to participating in an investigation of Dunford, something he claimed was "way outside their purview."
In addition to suggesting possible discipline for Allen, these findings prompted a recommendation for the Defense Department to clarify SIGAR's authority. It was the only recommendation DoD fully endorsed: Two others regarding proper financial management of DoD resources were partially endorsed, but not in relation to the specifics of the case.
In a response to the report, Allen said he "never sought to interfere with legal requirements or to coach the testimony of witnesses," and that he took "strong exception to allegations that I interfered in the process."
Vangjel's three-page response suggested the report included "significant errors throughout" and claimed he supported continuing construction "based on a reasonable determination that the ... building addressed an operational need and a determination that the project was in line with CENTCOM's strategic intent." He offered a change in the facility's contract, one that boosted the final cost to $36 million from $24 million, as evidence that the building factored into long-term strategic plans.
Richardson did not respond to SIGAR's request for a response to the report; he now serves as commanding general of Army Aviation and Missile Command. Vangjel retired in 2014 as a lieutenant general after 37 years in uniform, including a final assignment as the Army's inspector general.
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/05/20/sigar-leatherneck-ig-dunford-afghanistan/27641361/
