Why China’s SSBN Force Will Fall Short for the Foreseeable Future
China simply cannot rely on its SSBN force to act as a reliable second-strike deterrent against the United States.
By Robert Farley
January 14, 2019
Not all ballistic missiles submarines are built equal, and neither is all maritime geography. In a recent article at the Bulletin for Atomic Scientists, Owen Cote examines the boomer balance between China and the United States in light of the long-running competition between the United States and the USSR during the Cold War. Cote suggests that for the foreseeable future the United States can rely on technological and geographic advantages that will keep its own deterrent secure, while putting China’s at risk.
Cote offers a history of the undersea nuclear competition during the Cold War. The United States Navy, first to deploy operational SSBNs, soon became aware that its new submarines were detectable at long range with the appropriate passive sonar technology. Having ascertained the problem, the U.S. Navy first took steps to make its SSBNs quieter (and thus nearly immune to Soviet detection), and second expanded its listening capabilities such that it could more fully monitor Soviet SSBNs. In consequence of technology, and because of certain geographic advantages, U.S. boomers could hide effectively while Soviet boomers were under perpetual threat from U.S. Navy attack boats.
https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/why-chinas-ssbn-force-will-fall-short-for-the-foreseeable-future/
