Author Topic: Preventing the Titanic Syndrome: Monitoring Surface Warfare Experience at Sea  (Read 240 times)

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rangerrebew

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March 13, 2018 munsaldi
Preventing the Titanic Syndrome: Monitoring Surface Warfare Experience at Sea


The kind of accident any organization should worry about is the one that seems impossible. In 2017, the U.S. Navy was rocked with two collisions at sea, first the USS Fitzgerald(DDG-62) on June 17, then theUSS John S. McCain(DDG-56) on August 21. These tragedies resulted in the combined deaths of 17 sailors. Both collisions occurred with vessels managed in the Seventh Fleet operating area—the Pacific and Indian Oceans—causing the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson to force an operational pause for the entire surface fleet. Their goal was to expeditiously find any potential systemic problems on how Seventh Fleet manages its surface naval force. While both collisions were under different circumstances, and in-depth investigations remain ongoing, these events have triggered a service-wide review of the demands placed on surface warfare officers, including manning, sleep deprivation, and rising operational tempos. This article examines the way in which the Navy assigns officers to its surface vessels, and suggests improvements that could mitigate future collisions at sea.

https://asymmetricd.wordpress.com/2018/03/13/preventing-the-titanic-syndrome-monitoring-surface-warfare-experience-at-sea-3/