The roots of readiness – the six logistics factors shaping strategic choice
Posted on July 3, 2017 by logisticsinwar
By David Beaumont.
When we think of readiness, we tend to confuse it with preparedness terms such as a ‘notice to move’. However, it is common to find that despite a unit being well within its designated ‘notice’ when time comes for action, the unit is constrained because of the availability of kit, a lack of enabling elements available in supporting formations, the slow activation of national commercial resources by strategic organisations as well as a variety of other logistics factors. In some cases, strategic-level decisions result simply because available capabilities cannot be appropriately sustained and, accordingly, are unable to be deployed. Sometimes conscious decisions result in considerable advance moves based on combat forces being available, only to find these forces combat ineffective until the logistics ‘tail’ catches up. Operational experiences from Operations Desert Shield and Storm exemplify this problem; although there was reason to have coalition forces available soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 as a disincentive to further aggression, it took six months before the coalition force was logistically ready for a major combat operation.
https://logisticsinwar.com/2017/07/03/the-roots-of-readiness-the-six-logistics-factors-shaping-strategic-choice/
