Author Topic: Wikileaks - Hillary and Podest Directly Discuss Iraq Security and Libya -- Must Read!  (Read 759 times)

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Offline ABX

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This is just a snip where Podesta wants to change communication method with Hillary but the whole thing is a must read-- (note, the hrod17@clintonemail.com is Hillary's personal email) ... Note, scroll down in research thread if you want to not read everything. You'll see it in bold/red font.

Quote
Re: Here's what I mentioned

               From:john.podesta@gmail.com
               To: hrod17@clintonemail.com
               Date: 2014-08-19 16:04
               Subject: Re: Here's what I mentioned
               
            

               Yes and interesting but not for this channel.
On Aug 19, 2014 9:22 AM, "H" <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote:

>  Agree but there may be opportunities as the Iraqi piece improves.
>
> Also, any idea whose fighters attacked Islamist positions in Tripoli,
> Libya?
> Worth analyzing for future purposes.
>
>  *From*: John Podesta [mailto:john.podesta@gmail.com]
> *Sent*: Tuesday, August 19, 2014 09:19 AM
> *To*: H
> *Subject*: Re: Here's what I mentioned
>
>
> Hit send too soon. Meant to say Syria elements are vexing.
> On Aug 19, 2014 9:17 AM, "John Podesta" <john.podesta@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I think we are headed down this path in Iraq, but the Syria elements are
>> On Aug 17, 2014 3:50 PM, "H" <hrod17@clintonemail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Note: Sources include Western intelligence, US intelligence and sources
>>> in the region.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             1. With all of its tragic aspects, the advance of ISIL
>>> through Iraq gives the U.S. Government an opportunity to change the way it
>>> deals with the chaotic security situation in North Africa and the Middle
>>> East.  The most important factor in this matter is to make use of
>>> intelligence resources and Special Operations troops in an aggressive
>>> manner, while avoiding the old school solution, which calls for more
>>> traditional military operations.  In Iraq it is important that we engage
>>> ISIL using the resources of the Peshmerga fighters of the Kurdish Regional
>>> Government (KRG), and what, if any, reliable units exist in the Iraqi
>>> Army.  The Peshmerga commanders are aggressive hard fighting troops, who
>>> have long standing relationships with CIA officers and Special Forces
>>> operators.  However, they will need the continued commitment of U.S.
>>> personnel to work with them as advisors and strategic planners, the new
>>> generation of Peshmerga commanders being largely untested in traditional
>>> combat.  That said, with this U.S. aid the Kurdish troops can inflict a
>>> real defeat on ISIL.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             2.  It is important that once we engage ISIL, as we have now
>>> done in a limited manner, we and our allies should carry on until they are
>>> driven back suffering a tangible defeat.  Anything short of this will be
>>> seen by other fighters in the region, Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, as
>>> an American defeat. However, if we provide advisors and planners, as well
>>> as increased close air support for the Peshmerga, these soldiers can defeat
>>> ISIL.  They will give the new Iraqi Government a chance to organize itself,
>>> and restructure the Sunni resistance in Syria, moving the center of power
>>> toward moderate forces like the Free Syrian Army (FSA).  In addition to air
>>> support, the Peshmerga also need artillery and armored vehicles to deal
>>> with the tanks and other heavy equipment captured from the Iraqi army by
>>> ISIL.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 3.  In the past the USG, in an agreement with the Turkish General Staff,
>>> did not provide such heavy weapons to the Peshmerga, out of a concern that
>>> they would end up in the hands of Kurdish rebels inside of Turkey.  The
>>> current situation in Iraq, not to mention the political environment in
>>> Turkey, makes this policy obsolete.  Also this equipment can now be
>>> airlifted directly into the KRG zone.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 4.  Armed with proper equipment, and working with U.S. advisors, the
>>> Peshmerga can attack the ISIL with a coordinated assault supported from the
>>> air.  This effort will come as a surprise to the ISIL, whose leaders
>>> believe we will always stop with targeted bombing, and weaken them both in
>>> Iraq and inside of Syria.  At the same time we should return to plans to
>>> provide the FSA, or some group of moderate forces, with equipment that will
>>> allow them to deal with a weakened ISIL, and stepped up operations against
>>> the Syrian regime.  This entire effort should be done with a low profile,
>>> avoiding the massive traditional military operations that are at best
>>> temporary solutions.  While this military/para-military operation is moving
>>> forward, we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence
>>> assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia,
>>> which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and
>>> other radical Sunni groups in the region.  This effort will be enhanced by
>>> the stepped up commitment in the KRG.  The Qataris and Saudis will be put
>>> in a position of balancing policy between their ongoing competition to
>>> dominate the Sunni world and the consequences of serious U.S. pressure.  By
>>> the same token, the threat of similar, realistic U.S. operations will serve
>>> to assist moderate forces in Libya, Lebanon, and even Jordan, where
>>> insurgents are increasingly fascinated by the ISIL success in Iraq.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 6.  In the end the situation in Iraq is merely the latest and most
>>> dangerous example of the regional restructuring that is taking place across
>>> North Africa, all the way to the Turkish border.  These developments are
>>> important to the U.S. for reasons that often differ from country to
>>> country: energy and moral commitment to Iraq, energy issues in Libya, and
>>> strategic commitments in Jordan.  At the same time, as Turkey moves toward
>>> a new, more serious Islamic reality, it will be important for them to
>>> realize that we are willing to take serious actions, which can be sustained
>>> to protect our national interests.  This course of action offers the
>>> potential for success, as opposed to large scale, traditional military
>>> campaigns, that are too expensive and awkward to maintain over time.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 7.  (Note: A source in Tripoli stated in confidence that when the U.S.
>>> Embassy was evacuated, the presence of two U.S. Navy jet fighters over the
>>> city brought all fighting to a halt for several hours, as Islamist forces
>>> were not certain that these aircraft would not also provide close ground
>>> support for moderate government forces.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             8.  If we do not take the changes needed to make our
>>> security policy in the region more realistic, there is a real danger of
>>> ISIL veterans moving on to other countries to facilitate operations by
>>> Islamist forces.  This is already happening in Libya and Egypt, where
>>> fighters are returning from Syria to work with local forces. ISIL is only
>>> the latest and most violent example of this process.  If we don’t act to
>>> defeat them in Iraq something even more violent and dangerous will
>>> develop.  Successful military operations against these very irregular but
>>> determined forces can only be accomplished by making proper use of
>>> clandestine/special operations resources, in coordination with airpower,
>>> and established local allies. There is, unfortunately, a narrow window of
>>> opportunity on this issue, as we need to act before an ISIL state becomes
>>> better organized and reaches into Lebanon and Jordan.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             9. (Note: It is important to keep in mind that as a result
>>> of this policy there probably will be concern in the Sunni regions of Iraq
>>> and the Central Government regarding the possible expansion of KRG
>>> controlled territory.  With advisors in the Peshmerga command we can
>>> reassure the concerned parties that, in return for increase autonomy, the
>>> KRG will not exclude the Iraqi Government from participation in the
>>> management of the oil fields around Kirkuk, and the Mosel Dam hydroelectric
>>> facility.  At the same time we will be able to work with the Peshmerga as
>>> they pursue ISIL into disputed areas of Eastern Syria, coordinating with
>>> FSA troops who can move against ISIL from the North.  This will make
>>> certain Basher al Assad does not gain an advantage from these operations.
>>> Finally, as it now appears the U.S. is considering a plan to offer
>>> contractors as advisors to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, we will be in a
>>> position to coordinate more effectively between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi
>>> Army.)

https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/43648





« Last Edit: November 03, 2016, 11:36:12 pm by AbaraXas »

Offline ABX

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Highlighted point.

Quote
bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia,
>>> which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and
>>> other radical Sunni groups in the region.

Offline ABX

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And for the big BOOM!

Quote
>>>
>>> 7.  (Note: A source in Tripoli stated in confidence that when the U.S.
>>> Embassy was evacuated, the presence of two U.S. Navy jet fighters over the
>>> city brought all fighting to a halt for several hours, as Islamist forces
>>> were not certain that these aircraft would not also provide close ground
>>> support for moderate government forces.)