Jabhat al-Nusra competes with IS to attract new allies
Jabhat al-Nusra has failed to lure Ahrar al-Sham to join its ranks due to preconditions set by both sides. Jabhat al-Nusra then exerted more pressure on Jund al-Aqsa to force it to merge with it, given the importance of this merger in the battle of attraction, which has been recently flaring up between jihadi factions.
Jabhat al-Nusra launches a psychological campaign to prevent Jund al-Aqsa from joining the Islamic State and get the jihadi faction to join Jabhat al-Nusra's ranks instead.
Author Abdallah Suleiman Ali Posted February 10, 2016
TranslatorPascale el-Khoury
Original Article اقرا المقال الأصلي باللغة العربية
Jabhat al-Nusra’s proposal of the idea of merger and unification of ranks with Jund al-Aqsa comes in light of an intensified massive media campaign waged by media activists and leaders of armed factions against Jund al-Aqsa, explicitly accusing it of maintaining secret ties with the Islamic State (IS) and being directly involved in numerous kidnappings and assassinations in Idlib province during the past few months against a number of leaders from various factions. By making this merger proposal, Jabhat al-Nusra is offering Jund al-Aqsa protection to shield it from this media attack.
For Jabhat al-Nusra leaders, attracting Jund al-Aqsa to their side would be much better than seeing the members and leaders of this faction succumb to the campaign waged against it — which even reached the extent of security threats to some of its members — and head toward Raqqa to pledge allegiance to IS.
A source close to Jabhat al-Nusra told As-Safir that several meetings were held between the two sides to discuss the unification step. Jabhat al-Nusra required the formation of a reform committee tasked with purging exaggeration in religion (i.e., any inclination toward IS) from the ranks of Jund al-Aqsa. Indeed, Jabhat al-Nusra feared the merger — if concluded — could be a means through which IS members could infiltrate its ranks and serve as spies for its archenemy.
But it seems that hard-liners within Jund al-Aqsa, accused of being inclined toward IS, sought to obstruct the efforts exerted for the merger with Jabhat al-Nusra and were a stumbling block for the reform committee, preventing it from taking any tangible actions to carry out its mission. Furthermore, the military leaders of Jund al-Aqsa, at the head of hard-line movements, decided to dismiss a group of Sharia emirs showing enthusiasm for the idea of a merger.
In the meantime, Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Maria al-Qahtani reached Idlib, where news circulated about his intention to mobilize the people of the eastern region who had fled with him last year, to form their own battalion tasked with fighting the “Kharijites” (Shiites) and cleansing Idlib of their remnants.
This was understood as additional pressure on Jund al-Aqsa, or on a specific movement in it, aimed at giving it the ultimatum of either choosing merger or getting trapped in the heated battle.
Before that, Jund al-Aqsa withdrew from Jaish al-Fatah because it had refused to sign a document proposed by Ahrar al-Sham during the talks about “controlling Hama” binding all factions to fight against IS until eradicating it. Jund al-Aqsa did not agree to that and declared that it would fight IS only if it attacks the factions, under the Sharia doctrinal principle of legitimate self-defense.
Afterwards, Jund al-Aqsa withdrew from Jaish al-Islam and refrained from taking part in the battles of Aleppo, throwing its military weight on the front in the northern Hama countryside.
The group had to take this position for fear of wide splits within its ranks, because should it endorse fighting against IS, it risks losing an entire movement that still believes in the theory of brothers in religion, led by the Sharia emir Abu Dhar Najdi and Abu al-Faruq, accused of being behind the assassinations. Should it refuse any fight against IS, its opponents will accuse it of being affiliated with IS.
However, Jund al-Aqsa has fallen into the trap it has been trying to dodge. Despite its “moderate” stance on IS, choosing to distance itself from the current groupings, it is now facing major mutinies and dissent within its ranks, as revealed by Abu Mahmud al-Filistini, who was the first to call for reform in Jund al-Aqsa and its merger with Jabhat al-Nusra, as shown in his tweets.
Filistini said that the branch of Jund al-Aqsa in Hama rebelled and stopped “obeying” its leadership in Idlib. He also confirmed the defection of Abu Abdul Rahman al-Maki and Abu Shaima Sahl, at the head of a group of Sharia emirs. Other information confirmed that about 20 military commanders suspended their work with Jund al-Aqsa and declared their support for the dissident groups and their views on reform and integration.
On the other hand, there have been talks in the past month about dozens of Jund al-Aqsa soldiers who went to Raqqa and pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, followed by calls on dissidents to pledge allegiance to and merge with Jabhat al-Nusra.
Two soldiers of Jund al-Aqsa were killed yesterday (Feb. 5) in a bomb explosion they were trying to plant on the road in Saraqib, which had witnessed the targeting of many faction leaders. One of the dead was identified as Mohammad Nuhad Hamoud, known as Abu Basir. He was killed upon his arrival from Raqqa, according to leaked information.
Read more:
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2016/02/jabhat-al-nusra-jund-alaqsa-is-raqqa-syria-division-merger.html#ixzz45QlBJAIs
