Can Mission Command Actually Work?

[rangerrebew]

Can Mission Command Actually Work?

Travis Zahnow | July 30, 2020
 
 

The US Army’s adoption of mission command is going on its eighth tepid year of implementation, and the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted many of the struggles that have come with adopting a command-and-control system that, at its core, values initiative, adaptability, discipline, and above all else, decentralized operations. Mission command’s rollout has, and continues to be muddled, but the past several months have put many of those flaws and cracks on full display—it took DoD’s most senior military and civilian leaders to stop haircuts during a global pandemic, something mission command should have allowed the most junior of leaders to handle.

In his latest work, Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture, Donald Vandergriff continues his long contribution to the mission command debate. The book is Vandergriff’s attempt to identify and provide what he thinks Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command is missing—how the Army should address the preparation of military officers to operate in a mission command environment. Vandergriff believes the Army has over-invested in the latest command-and-control technology and under-invested in the education of junior leaders.

https://mwi.usma.edu/can-mission-command-actually-work/

[Smokin Joe]

Concentrated and micromanaging command is the hallmark of armies we have traditionally defeated with initiative taken by officers who didn't have to ask permission to use 4 sheets of toilet paper instead of three. Communist countries militaries often have paralysis without close leadership, and to put the US in the same position would negate one of our best advantages in any conflict.

[EdinVA]

To me, the problems is everyone is walking on eggshells, afraid to make a decision out of fear of retribution fueled by felonious reporting by the media.
That is not only what is impacting the military but our governments, corporations and even our citizens..

[Smokin Joe]

To me, the problems is everyone is walking on eggshells, afraid to make a decision out of fear of retribution fueled by felonious reporting by the media.
That is not only what is impacting the military but our governments, corporations and even our citizens..

When the guy in the field is facing micromanagement and second-guess judgement from people who are not even in theater, and some of whom (press, especially) who have never been in combat, they have enemies fore and aft, unfortunately.
If anything 'goes wrong' (which could include everything from not meeting objectives to collateral damage or worse, casualties), they face not only the enemy there, but tribunal or trial in the press here, at a minimum.
Not only does this predictably make acting on initiative less attractive, but there is the ever present threat of being thrown under the bus to save some one else's opportunities for advancement, or to satiate some reporter's lust for lust anti-military stories. Not acting because of those threats could produce results that are hard to live with as well.
Compound this with Rules of Engagement that might be questionable or even dangerous for our service members, and it gets even worse.
Small wonder the suicide rate is so high. There's a lot of "Damned if you do and damned if you don't." involved.

If I am wrong, please, someone who has more than my 'cheap seats' view, enlighten me.
 
With the tech available, I can see coordination, even some serious information exchange, but ultimately the split-second decisions and actions depend on the guys with boots on the ground. It's what they are trained for, and must continue to be trained for, in case the tech doesn't work (for whatever reason). While there is tremendous potential to coordinate forces from all branches in the area of operations, if that communication breaks down, there have to be alternatives that can permit continued tactical and even strategic effectiveness. 

[EdinVA]

When the guy in the field is facing micromanagement and second-guess judgement from people who are not even in theater, and some of whom (press, especially) who have never been in combat, they have enemies fore and aft, unfortunately.
If anything 'goes wrong' (which could include everything from not meeting objectives to collateral damage or worse, casualties), they face not only the enemy there, but tribunal or trial in the press here, at a minimum.
Not only does this predictably make acting on initiative less attractive, but there is the ever present threat of being thrown under the bus to save some one else's opportunities for advancement, or to satiate some reporter's lust for lust anti-military stories. Not acting because of those threats could produce results that are hard to live with as well.
Compound this with Rules of Engagement that might be questionable or even dangerous for our service members, and it gets even worse.
Small wonder the suicide rate is so high. There's a lot of "Damned if you do and damned if you don't." involved.

If I am wrong, please, someone who has more than my 'cheap seats' view, enlighten me.
 
With the tech available, I can see coordination, even some serious information exchange, but ultimately the split-second decisions and actions depend on the guys with boots on the ground. It's what they are trained for, and must continue to be trained for, in case the tech doesn't work (for whatever reason). While there is tremendous potential to coordinate forces from all branches in the area of operations, if that communication breaks down, there have to be alternatives that can permit continued tactical and even strategic effectiveness.

Exactly right... emphasis on Thrown under the bus....