Caught off guard: why didn’t America see Pearl Harbor coming?

[sneakypete]

---------------------------------
Maxed out fighting and trying to conquer all of Asia??????????
Japan was the dominant Asian power from 1875 onward having
kicked China's butt in every Sino-Japanese conflict since then.
They had driven Russia out of East Asia @ Port Arthur and
occupied the Korean Peninsula since 1905.
They controlled Indo-China and Siam (Thailand)
They had conquered Burma, Malaya and Singapore in days.
They had conquered the Philippines.
They effectively controlled the Dutch East Indies.
What was left??? India, Australia, New Zealand and
a bunch of Pacific Islands, if they had any interest.
Maxed out??? They were just getting started!!!!!
What in the name of heaven are you talking about?????????

@Absalom

I am talking about reality. Conquering another nation militarily is one thing. Administering it and controlling it's people is something else that requires a huge occupation and police force. Not to mention administrators. How many people do you think Japan had available to send off to other countries while still maintaining their police,military,and Japanese homelands?

Everybody says they conquered China. They didn't. They defeated the Chinese Army,which is an entirely different thing. They only controlled the occupied cities,and even then they had to use brute force to do that. Granted,they were good at using brute force,but that is NOT the type of thing that makes occupied people's see you as a favorable replacement to their previous governments.

Winning a war is one thing. Winning a peace is much more difficult,and you end up facing guerilla armies,sabotage,assassinations of your police and officials,etc,etc,etc.

Japan is a small nation,and Asia is one HUGE-ass place. They just did not have the assets needed to police all of Asia while fighting a war with America they knew they would lose. They just did not have the human and material resources to do all that.

[Joe Wooten]

If you want to get a good idea of the relative economic powers of all the participants in WW2, go over to Chicago Boys blog (https://chicagoboyz.net/) and search for Trent Telenko's series of articles on the subject. In fact he just posted another one this morning on the nuking of Hiroshima/Nagasaki. Very revealing series he has written. I'd really like to see him publish them all together in a book sometime.

The gist of it is that the USA had more industrial production potential than ALL of the rest of the world, allied and axis put together. So much so in fact, that by the summer of 1944 the government was starting to cut back on war orders because they could not use or give away what was predicted to be the production in 1945 and 1946. We already had a navy that was bigger than all the other navies combined, same with the air force, and the size of the army was comparable to the German and Russian armies, though it was smaller since manning the navy and air force AND the industrial production took a lot away from the army.

This was probably the only time in world history that one nation could have taken on the entire world and won, and that nation was the USA. Japan was committing suicide by taking us on. We could have lost the entire Pacific fleet in the actions from Pearl Harbor to Midway and still would have won, just 6 to 12 months later. There were already more carriers and other warships under construction than the entire Japanese fleet. I know due to propaganda mostly that a lot of Americans were worried about losing the war, but looking at it rationally, there was absolutely no doubt we were going to win. The only uncertainty was when.

[skeeter]

---------------------------
A strong demurral.
The notion that "no reasonable person ever considered Japan capable of wining a war w/the USA"
is so preposterous, it's goofy. Certainly the Japaneses did or were they all unreasonable louts???

I wouldn't characterize them all as 'louts'. I would say that the reasonable military and civilian leaders in Japan had either been assassinated or were in fear for their lives. I would say that in the late 30s and early 40s army leadership was still a semi feudal body and decidedly unworldly. They wanted to fight - and since they were already 4 years deep in the Chinese quagmire, it would have to either be the USSR or the European colonies in SE Asia (which the navy preferred for its oil). The army tested Georgy Gorkov at Nomonhan and were soundly beaten so on to SE Asia it was. Which led to PH. Madness from the start.

The Japanese never had a hope of winning the war with the US and many of them said so even as they went to war with us. In fact, the most fanatically optimistic never expected anything better than a stalemate, counting on us being too decadent to be determined, which they would consider a victory for themselves.

To a hammer every problem looks like a nail, and the Japanese military, in sole control of Japan's direction at the time, was an irrational hammer.

[PeteS in CA]

They structured a formidable Navy 1. which dominated China, sank the entire Czarist far eastern fleet at the Strait of Tsushima 2. in 1905 and challenged Great Britain for world Naval supremacy in WW 2 3.. As for the surprise attack at Peal Harbor, it's 'what if' conjecture, speculation and surmise, since in 1941 potential Japanese targets in Asia and the Pacific Rim included India, Australia, New Zealand as well as Western Latin America. 4.

1. The first capital ship built in Japan was Hiei, commissioned in August, 1914. Earlier IJN capital ships, including Hiei's class leader Kongo, were built in Europe (England, in the case of Kongo). Dominating China was not a surprise, but defeating Russia was.

2. The Russian fleet defeated at Tsushima Strait was Russia Black Sea fleet, which was coming to reinforce Russia's eastern fleet.

3. The Royal Navy was concentrated in home waters and the Med before and during early WW2. The IJN viewed the USN as its principle potential enemy.

4. Actually Japan's 1941 goals were the resources in the Malay Peninsula and Dutch East Indies areas. What should have made it obvious to WashDC that the Japanese would all but have to attack US territory was simple geography. For Japan to transport those raw materials to Japan, cargo ships would either have to pass between the Philippines and the island of Formosa (the shortest route) or in the open ocean east of the Philippines. Australia, Burma, and India were targets only to the extent that they could threaten SE Asia and the Dutch East Indies.

I have read and heard that the Imperial Japanese Navy Staff understood they could not hope to defeat the US in a protracted war,but the hope was they could strike such a severe blow that they would virtually control the Pacific for long enough to take it over before the Americans could rebuild enough to take them on.

From http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

By the time World War II began to rear its ugly head (formally in 1939 in Poland, informally in China in 1937), America had been in the grips of the Great Depression for a decade, give or take. The net effect of the Depression was to introduce a lot of 'slack' into the U.S. economy. Many U.S. workers were either unemployed (10 million in 1939) or underemployed, and our industrial base as a whole had far more capacity than was needed at the time. In economic terms, our 'Capacity Utilization' (CapU), was pretty darn low. To an outside culture, particularly a militaristic one such as Japan's, America certainly might have appeared to be 'soft' and unprepared for a major war. Further, Japan's successes in fighting far larger opponents (Russia in the early 1900's, and China in the 1930's) and the fact that Japan's own economy was practically 'superheating' (mostly as the result of unhealthy levels of military spending -- 28% of national income in 1937) probably filled the Japanese with a misplaced sense of economic and military superiority over their large overseas foe.  ...
...
When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the sleeping giant was awakened and came looking for trouble. And even though the majority of America's war-making potential was slated for use against Germany (which was by far the most dangerous of the Axis foes, again for reasons of economics), there was still plenty left over for use against Japan. By mid-1942, even before U.S. force of arms was being dramatically felt globally, American factories were nevertheless beginning to make a material effect in the war's progress. The U.S. churned out seemingly endless quantities of equipment and provision which were then funnelled to not only our own forces, but to those of Great Britain and the USSR as well. By 1944, most of the other powers in the war, though still producing furiously, were beginning to max out their economies (i.e. production was stabilizing or plateauing). This resulted from destruction of industrial bases and constriction of resource pools (in the case of Germany and Japan), or through sheer exhaustion of manpower (in the case of Great Britain and, to an extent, the USSR). By contrast, the United States suffered from none of these difficulties, and as a consequence its economy grew at an annual rate of 15% throughout the war years. As scary as it sounds, by the end of the war, the United States was really just beginning to get 'warmed up.' It is perhaps not surprising that in 1945, the U.S. accounted for over 50% of total global GNP.

There is a chart on that webpage I wish I could post as a picture, giving US and Japanese warship production stats for each year from 1941 through 1945. But here are the totals for those years:

US: 141 Carriers, all types; 10 Battleships; 48 Cruisers (light & heavy); 341 Destroyers; 203 Submarines.

Japan: 17 Carriers, all types; 2 Battleships; 9 Cruisers (light & heavy); 63 Destroyers; 167 Submarines.

The US also had a type of escort ship that may not have had a close Japanese equivalent, the Destroyer Escort. The US produced 498 of these, and they accounted for a good number of U-boats and Japanese submarines (e.g. USS England).

[Absalom]

@Absalom
I am talking about reality. Conquering another nation militarily is one thing. Administering it and controlling it's people is something else that requires a huge occupation and police force. Not to mention administrators. How many people do you think Japan had available to send off to other countries while still maintaining their police,military,and Japanese homelands?
Everybody says they conquered China. They didn't. They defeated the Chinese Army,which is an entirely different thing. They only controlled the occupied cities,and even then they had to use brute force to do that. Granted,they were good at using brute force,but that is NOT the type of thing that makes occupied people's see you as a favorable replacement to their previous governments.
Winning a war is one thing. Winning a peace is much more difficult,and you end up facing guerilla armies,sabotage,assassinations of your police and officials,etc,etc,etc.
Japan is a small nation,and Asia is one HUGE-ass place. They just did not have the assets needed to police all of Asia while fighting a war with America they knew they would lose. They just did not have the human and material resources to do all that.

----------------------------------
It's an opinion forum where all are certainly entitled, therefore Peace,
and as I've no interest in relentless back and fourth, this ends now.
So an anecdote from my earlier days at Trinity in Dublin where
I had the good fortune to rub elbows w/some of the best minds in Britain.
They would have been bewildered by your assertions, yet you're entitled.
That Japan was the ranking power in Asia since 1870 was self evident to
all my colleagues.
More importantly size is hardly any determinant of national greatness,
as history has proven again and again.
An example from the 4th century BC, where the Persians under Darius claimed
greatness, ordering the cultures/societies of the greater Fertile Crescent to kow-tow.
The Greeks refused so Darius decided to teach them a permanent lesson.
The antagonists met at Arbela (Gaugamela), Mesopotamia in 332 BC where the
Greeks were outnumbered by more than 5 to 1, yet within less than half a day,
Alexander the Great had shattered the Empire of Darius.
So much for size when in fact grit, resolve and vision are what matters.
Japan has been and remains the ranking Asian power despite the malarkey
that China will rule the world real soon.
In fact, the bet here is that China will be building Marble Battleships again before
it rules the world.

 

[sneakypete]

----------------------------------
It's an opinion forum where all are certainly entitled, therefore Peace,
and as I've no interest in relentless back and fourth, this ends now.
So an anecdote from my earlier days at Trinity in Dublin where
I had the good fortune to rub elbows w/some of the best minds in Britain.
They would have been bewildered by your assertions, yet you're entitled.
That Japan was the ranking power in Asia since 1870 was self evident to
all my colleagues.
More importantly size is hardly any determinant of national greatness,
as history has proven again and again.
An example from the 4th century BC, where the Persians under Darius claimed
greatness, ordering the cultures/societies of the greater Fertile Crescent to kow-tow.
The Greeks refused so Darius decided to teach them a permanent lesson.
The antagonists met at Arbela (Gaugamela), Mesopotamia in 332 BC where the
Greeks were outnumbered by more than 5 to 1, yet within less than half a day,
Alexander the Great had shattered the Empire of Darius.
So much for size when in fact grit, resolve and vision are what matters.
Japan has been and remains the ranking Asian power despite the malarkey
that China will rule the world real soon.
In fact, the bet here is that China will be building Marble Battleships again before
it rules the world.

@Absalom

Apples and oranges. Nobody was using spears and bows,and riding to war in chariots in the 1940's. The Japanese home forces were equipped with bolt-action Arisaka's that were so crudely made they were dangerous to shoot,and they were being given to the police and civilians in case of an American invasion. How well do YOU think they would have fared facing Americans armed with BAR's,Garands,and Thompsons?

Just because your friends in Ireland admired the Japanese,that doesn't mean any of them have ever been to war,or know squat about it other than theories from history books.

[PeteS in CA]

...
kicked China's butt in every Sino-Japanese conflict since then. 1.
They had driven Russia out of East Asia @ Port Arthur and
occupied the Korean Peninsula since 1905. 2.
They controlled Indo-China and Siam (Thailand)
They had conquered Burma, Malaya and Singapore in days.
They had conquered the Philippines.
They effectively controlled the Dutch East Indies. 3.
What was left??? India, Australia, New Zealand and
a bunch of Pacific Islands, if they had any interest.
Maxed out??? 5. They were just getting started!!!!! 4.
What in the name of heaven are you talking about?????????

1. China was not regarded as a major military power in the late 19th or early 20th Centuries. So big whoop! That said, Japan's "successes" in the Second Sino-Japanese War took Pyrrhic Victory to a whole new level. Vast territory was conquered, but with little economic gain and it was a huge resource drain. After December 7/8, 1941, every, man, weapon, plane, etc. fighting in China should have been utilized in Japan's objective of establishing a defensible perimeter and bringing conquered resources online and back to Japan.

2. That statement is just silly. Korea was never Russian territory, nor was Manchuria. Japan did regain the southern half of Sakhalin Island, which they had signed over to Russia 30 years earlier. Aside from that, Russia lost none of its territory in eastern Asia.

3. Basically Japan ran rampant for 6 months, as Admiral Yamamoto said they could do. Then they were stopped at the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway, and by the end of 1942 Japan's conquests started being wrested back. Admiral Yamamoto's fears started coming true.

4. Actually, the territories you listed were Japan's high water mark, the end - not the start - of their conquests.

5. @sneakypete can correct or clarify as he chooses - and maybe has - but military spending and building had had Japan's industrial base and economy running past the "red line" for decades. Their building of warships, for example, had been constricted by the capabilities of their industrial base and economy. The strains can be seen in compromises Japan was forced to make during WW2.

Where the USN had been able to retire or re-purpose its 1920s vintage four-pipers before and early in the war, Japan kept its aging/obsolescent 1920s destroyers in combat roles well into the war. Where the USN had been able to relegate almost all of its aging 1920s vintage Omaha class light cruisers to back-water roles (searching for German blockade-runners and merchant-ship auxiliaries), the IJN had to keep its 1920s vintage light cruisers in front-line combat roles pretty much till the end of WW2. Japan had few light cruisers that were approximate equivalents of the RN's Town class or the USN's Brooklyn and Cleveland classes.

The IJN's Shokaku and Zuikaku were approximately equivalent in quality and utility to the USN's Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet. Ditto for Akagi and Kaga with the USN's Lexington class, and for the IJN's Hiryu/Soryu and the USN's Wasp. BUT a good number of the IJN's front-line carriers were converted from merchant ships, that were not very successful - reliability and utility problems. The IJN had no answer to the USN's Essex class, almost no answer to the USN's Independence class light carriers, and almost no answer to the USN's >120 escort carriers.

The IJN started WW2 with the famous Zero, and the IJA with the Hayabusa. Come 1945, these were still in front-line service because Japanese industry had not been able to build enough of the new/better designs to allow replacing the Zeros and Hayabusas. The US front-line fighters at the start of WW2 were the F4F and P-40. These were adequate if their pilots avoided turning dogfights. But then the USAAF replaced its P-40s with the P-38 and P-51, and the USN replaced its F4Fs with F6Fs and F4Us, and was about to introduce F8Fs when the war ended.

Bombers ........ Japan introduced the G3M Nell and G4M Betty during the China war. Both were twin engine, the G3M obsolescent by 1941, and the G4M was outclassed and soon obsolescent. And that was it for Japan. No four engine bombers, no new models. The USAAF had A-20 light bombers, and B-25 and B-26 medium bombers - all twin engine, all introduced in 1941, and upgraded throughout the war. In heavy 4-engine bombers, where Japan had none, the USAAF had the B-17, and was just transitioning to the much improved "E" model. There were further improvements, with the "F" and "G" models. And then in 1944 came the B-29.

Submarines, well Japan might seem, from the stats I posted earlier, to have done almost OK, but not exactly. Coming into the war, the IJN had a variety of first-class submarines, "I-Boats" that were somewhat equivalent to USN fleet submarines (some I-Boats had hangars and float planes, some thing the USN did not do). But as the war progressed the IJN shifted to building smaller Ro- and Ha Boats (2nd and 3rd class). These were quicker to build, but being smaller, were less capable. The USN, after some experimentation in the 20s and 30s, had settled on the concept of a "fleet submarine". Starting with USS Porpoise in 1935, this concept was evolved over the Porpoise, Salmon, Sargo, and Tambor classes into the "almost just right" Gato class and the "just right" Balao class. While Porpoise through Tambor class boats all served at the start of WW2, toward the end most had been retired. Most USN submarines built in WW2 were of the Gato and Balao classes, with the following Tench class boats coming into commission. Long-winded, I know, but the point is that while the IJN had to lower their standards on capability and utility to produce as many submarines as they did - i.e. work within their industrial base's constraints - the USN continued building and improving their full-sized fleet boats.

I realize Japanese factories were bombed, but realistically this had little effect on ship building until very late, and Japan doesn't seem to have seriously considered producing a 4-engine bomber.

[PeteS in CA]

Conquering another nation militarily is one thing. Administering it and controlling it's people is something else that requires a huge occupation and police force. Not to mention administrators.

I'm not sure Japan ever got the refineries in the Dutch East Indies back online. IJN ships toward the end of the war were using unrefined crude oil. They got away with it, except the crude was more volatile than standard fuel oil, making for more spectacular fire when the oil caught fire.

Everybody says they conquered China. They didn't. They defeated the Chinese Army,which is an entirely different thing. ...

They conquered much of eastern China, and were pretty brutal. As a consequence, to this day the Japanese are hated in eastern China. Where my daughter lives in central China, the Japanese never got that far and attitudes are less hateful.

@Joe Wooten

So much so in fact, that by the summer of 1944 the government was starting to cut back on war orders because they could not use or give away what was predicted to be the production in 1945 and 1946.

Two Iowa class battleships were cancelled while building. The planned Montana class battleships were cancelled. Quite a few Essex class carriers were cancelled, as were most Midway class carriers.

I know due to propaganda mostly that a lot of Americans were worried about losing the war, but looking at it rationally, there was absolutely no doubt we were going to win. The only uncertainty was when.

I think FDR got close to ordering a pull-out from Guadalcanal, between casualties on land and ships lost (Just after Santa Cruz Islands USS Enterprise was the only US carrier in the area, and she was hastily patched; fortunately the IJN's carriers and airgroups were pretty battered as well. But a pull-out would have been a setback, not the end of the war. The Solomons had been every bit as much a Hell-hole for the Japanese as for the US. The USN had the SoDaks, Iowas, Essexes, and Independences coming, and the Japanese, well, they were mostly trying to keep up with repairs.

[Absalom]

1. China was not regarded as a major military power in the late 19th or early 20th Centuries. So big whoop! That said, Japan's "successes" in the Second Sino-Japanese War took Pyrrhic Victory to a whole new level. Vast territory was conquered, but with little economic gain and it was a huge resource drain. After December 7/8, 1941, every, man, weapon, plane, etc. fighting in China should have been utilized in Japan's objective of establishing a defensible perimeter and bringing conquered resources online and back to Japan.
2. That statement is just silly. Korea was never Russian territory, nor was Manchuria. Japan did regain the southern half of Sakhalin Island, which they had signed over to Russia 30 years earlier. Aside from that, Russia lost none of its territory in eastern Asia.
3. Basically Japan ran rampant for 6 months, as Admiral Yamamoto said they could do. Then they were stopped at the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway, and by the end of 1942 Japan's conquests started being wrested back. Admiral Yamamoto's fears started coming true.
4. Actually, the territories you listed were Japan's high water mark, the end - not the start - of their conquests.5. @sneakypete can correct or clarify as he chooses - and maybe has - but military spending and building had had Japan's industrial base and economy running past the "red line" for decades. Their building of warships, for example, had been constricted by the capabilities of their industrial base and economy. The strains can be seen in compromises Japan was forced to make during WW2.
Where the USN had been able to retire or re-purpose its 1920s vintage four-pipers before and early in the war, Japan kept its aging/obsolescent 1920s destroyers in combat roles well into the war. Where the USN had been able to relegate almost all of its aging 1920s vintage Omaha class light cruisers to back-water roles (searching for German blockade-runners and merchant-ship auxiliaries), the IJN had to keep its 1920s vintage light cruisers in front-line combat roles pretty much till the end of WW2. Japan had few light cruisers that were approximate equivalents of the RN's Town class or the USN's Brooklyn and Cleveland classes.
The IJN's Shokaku and Zuikaku were approximately equivalent in quality and utility to the USN's Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet. Ditto for Akagi and Kaga with the USN's Lexington class, and for the IJN's Hiryu/Soryu and the USN's Wasp. BUT a good number of the IJN's front-line carriers were converted from merchant ships, that were not very successful - reliability and utility problems. The IJN had no answer to the USN's Essex class, almost no answer to the USN's Independence class light carriers, and almost no answer to the USN's >120 escort carriers.
The IJN started WW2 with the famous Zero, and the IJA with the Hayabusa. Come 1945, these were still in front-line service because Japanese industry had not been able to build enough of the new/better designs to allow replacing the Zeros and Hayabusas. The US front-line fighters at the start of WW2 were the F4F and P-40. These were adequate if their pilots avoided turning dogfights. But then the USAAF replaced its P-40s with the P-38 and P-51, and the USN replaced its F4Fs with F6Fs and F4Us, and was about to introduce F8Fs when the war ended.Bombers ........ Japan introduced the G3M Nell and G4M Betty during the China war. Both were twin engine, the G3M obsolescent by 1941, and the G4M was outclassed and soon obsolescent. And that was it for Japan. No four engine bombers, no new models. The USAAF had A-20 light bombers, and B-25 and B-26 medium bombers - all twin engine, all introduced in 1941, and upgraded throughout the war. In heavy 4-engine bombers, where Japan had none, the USAAF had the B-17, and was just transitioning to the much improved "E" model. There were further improvements, with the "F" and "G" models. And then in 1944 came the B-29.
Submarines, well Japan might seem, from the stats I posted earlier, to have done almost OK, but not exactly. Coming into the war, the IJN had a variety of first-class submarines, "I-Boats" that were somewhat equivalent to USN fleet submarines (some I-Boats had hangars and float planes, some thing the USN did not do). But as the war progressed the IJN shifted to building smaller Ro- and Ha Boats (2nd and 3rd class). These were quicker to build, but being smaller, were less capable. The USN, after some experimentation in the 20s and 30s, had settled on the concept of a "fleet submarine". Starting with USS Porpoise in 1935, this concept was evolved over the Porpoise, Salmon, Sargo, and Tambor classes into the "almost just right" Gato class and the "just right" Balao class. While Porpoise through Tambor class boats all served at the start of WW2, toward the end most had been retired. Most USN submarines built in WW2 were of the Gato and Balao classes, with the following Tench class boats coming into commission. Long-winded, I know, but the point is that while the IJN had to lower their standards on capability and utility to produce as many submarines as they did - i.e. work within their industrial base's constraints - the USN continued building and improving their full-sized fleet boats.
I realize Japanese factories were bombed, but realistically this had little effect on ship building until very late, and Japan doesn't seem to have seriously considered producing a 4-engine bomber.

------------------------------------
1. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and then 1937-45; China was the loser not the winner.
2. Following the sinking of the Czarist Fleet @ Tsushima, Japan occupied Korea in 1905.
Apparently plain and simple English is a bridge too far for you.
No matter, as I have no further interest in wading trough your relentless litany of excuses and rationalizations. So this ends immediately!

[PeteS in CA]

------------------------------------
1. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and then 1937-45; China was the loser not the winner.
2. Following the sinking of the Czarist Fleet @ Tsushima, Japan occupied Korea in 1905.
Apparently plain and simple English is a bridge too far for you.
No matter, as I have no further interest in wading trough your relentless litany of excuses and rationalizations. So this ends immediately!

1. Where did I say otherwise? You really should explain, though, why the Japanese didn't even conquer eastern China as far inland as Xian, Chongqing, and Guiyang. Chinese armies had been defeated; China was not conquered, not even half of China. In the end, China was one of the allies to whom Japan surrendered. Not just on paper, but China also received several Japanese naval vessels (some of those not sunk, that is).

2. Where did I say Japan did not occupy Korea? I merely pointed out that Korea and Manchuria are not even close to all of eastern Asia and that Russia lost almost zero territory.

Facts are facts, and do not become non-facts by you calling them "excuses and rationalizations". As for your blustery, "So this ends immediately!", you are asserting an authority you do not have.

[bigheadfred]

99 loftballons.;

Close enough.

The date I posted was the day the Federal Reserve was born.

All the harangues afterward are meaningless tripe.

[Joe Wooten]

@Joe Wooten

Two Iowa class battleships were cancelled while building. The planned Montana class battleships were cancelled. Quite a few Essex class carriers were cancelled, as were most Midway class carriers.

The last two Iowas were not scrapped until the late 1950's. The Illinois and Kentucky stayed in the drydocks until they were finally scrapped in 1958. There were proposals to refit as nuke powered BB's and as Regulus missile carriers but those proposals went nowhere. I think the bow from the Kentucky was used to replace the one on the Wisconsin after a collision and the hulks were used as a parts depot for the active Iowas until they were scrapped.

[PeteS in CA]

... I think the bow from the Kentucky was used to replace the one on the Wisconsin after a collision and the hulks were used as a parts depot for the active Iowas until they were scrapped.

There was a bow transplant, and retaining parts for repairs made perfect sense, especially as technologies advanced.

Flipping the script, what was Japan thinking, taking on a war it knew it could not win if it were protracted. My best understanding is the FDR's embargoes on steel and especially oil forced on Japan a trilemma: retreat from China, FDR's condition for lifting the embargo; running out of fuel, reducing the IJN to harbor queens; get oil and other necessary resources by force, with war likely. Japanese culture and politics being what they were, only the last choice was thinkable, and the problem became how to do it and succeed in keeping it.

If western generally and US understanding of Japan was poor and worsened by racism, misunderstanding and racism distorted Japanese thinking as well. They thought the UK an almost defeated (by Germany) shell and the US decadent, lazy and effete. OTOH, Japan could see a problem if they simply conquered the Dutch East Indies and Malay Peninsula (where the needed resources were). The Philippines could obstruct the sea lanes from the conquered territories to Japan, and the USN had a fleet based there (small, but easily reinforced).

So the goal in attacking PH was to disable the USN long enough to conquer all the needed resources and sea lanes, bring everything online, and create a defensive perimeter so strong the US would just throw in the towel and accept the new status quo. In the event, the PH attack failed, on several levels: CV-2,-3, and -6 were all out of port; CV-5 and -7 were in the Atlantic, and -8 was working up or newly in commission; ignoring Arkansas, New York, and Texas (as well as Ranger, CV-4), the three New Mexico class BBs were in the Atlantic, Colorado was completing refit in Bremerton, USS North Carolina was in the Atlantic, and Washington was being worked up. Throw in a quickly repaired Pennsylvania, and the USN was still quite potent. Thus Coral Sea was fought just 5 months after the PH attack, halting Japanese advances in New Guinea, and Midway just 6 months after PH. The 5 months of fighting in the Solomons not only started the reversal of Japanese conquests, it and earlier battles in 1942 showed the Japanese how wrong they were in their assessment of US (and Anzac!) abilities and determination.

[sneakypete]

There was a bow transplant, and retaining parts for repairs made perfect sense, especially as technologies advanced.

Flipping the script, what was Japan thinking, taking on a war it knew it could not win if it were protracted. My best understanding is the FDR's embargoes on steel and especially oil forced on Japan a trilemma: retreat from China, FDR's condition for lifting the embargo; running out of fuel, reducing the IJN to harbor queens; get oil and other necessary resources by force, with war likely. Japanese culture and politics being what they were, only the last choice was thinkable, and the problem became how to do it and succeed in keeping it.

If western generally and US understanding of Japan was poor and worsened by racism, misunderstanding and racism distorted Japanese thinking as well. They thought the UK an almost defeated (by Germany) shell and the US decadent, lazy and effete. OTOH, Japan could see a problem if they simply conquered the Dutch East Indies and Malay Peninsula (where the needed resources were). The Philippines could obstruct the sea lanes from the conquered territories to Japan, and the USN had a fleet based there (small, but easily reinforced).

So the goal in attacking PH was to disable the USN long enough to conquer all the needed resources and sea lanes, bring everything online, and create a defensive perimeter so strong the US would just throw in the towel and accept the new status quo. In the event, the PH attack failed, on several levels: CV-2,-3, and -6 were all out of port; CV-5 and -7 were in the Atlantic, and -8 was working up or newly in commission; ignoring Arkansas, New York, and Texas (as well as Ranger, CV-4), the three New Mexico class BBs were in the Atlantic, Colorado was completing refit in Bremerton, USS North Carolina was in the Atlantic, and Washington was being worked up. Throw in a quickly repaired Pennsylvania, and the USN was still quite potent. Thus Coral Sea was fought just 5 months after the PH attack, halting Japanese advances in New Guinea, and Midway just 6 months after PH. The 5 months of fighting in the Solomons not only started the reversal of Japanese conquests, it and earlier battles in 1942 showed the Japanese how wrong they were in their assessment of US (and Anzac!) abilities and determination.

@PeteS in CA

EXCELLENT summation!

[PeteS in CA]

In the event, the PH attack failed, on several levels: CV-2,-3, and -6 were all out of port; CV-5 and -7 were in the Atlantic, and -8 was working up or newly in commission; ignoring Arkansas, New York, and Texas (as well as Ranger, CV-4), the three New Mexico class BBs were in the Atlantic, Colorado was completing refit in Bremerton, USS North Carolina was in the Atlantic, and Washington was being worked up. Throw in a quickly repaired Pennsylvania, and the USN was still quite potent.

Time got away from me, and I'm a day late and probably several paragraphs short of doing this "right" (though that latter might be some relief). So I'll instead expand on the comment quoted above. I'll go farther and say that, as significant as the ship and aircraft losses were, they were not the most significant loss suffered by the US at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. To explain, here's a list of the USN's capital ships as of that date, their main guns (BBs), what they were doing, and how they fared.

USS Arkansas, BB-33, 12X 12"/50: In the Atlantic, deemed unsuitable for service in the Pacific

USS New York, BB-34, 10X 14"/45: In the Atlantic, deemed unsuitable for service in the Pacific
USS Texas, BB-35, 10X 14"/45: In the Atlantic, deemed unsuitable for service in the Pacific

USS Nevada, BB-36, 10X 14"/45: significantly damaged and intentionally run aground; refloated and repaired/rebuilt, reentering service in January, 1943
USS Oklahoma, BB-37, 10X 14"/45: hit by multiple torpedoes, flooded too fast to counter-flood, and capsized; deemed not worth repairing

USS Pennsylvania, BB-38, 12X 14"/45: in drydock at the time of the attack and was not seriously damaged; repairs were completed at the end of March, 1942
USS Arizona, BB-39, 12X 14"/45: a magazine was penetrated by a 16" armor-piercing shell converted into a bomb and the magazine exploded

USS New Mexico, BB-40, 12X 14"/50: In the Atlantic
USS Mississippi, BB-41, 12X 14"/50: In the Atlantic
USS Idaho, BB-42, 12X 14"/50: In the Atlantic

USS Tennessee, BB-43, 12X 14"/50: Hit by several bombs and damaged by fuel fires in the water of the harbor; repairs were completed at the end of February, 1942
USS California, BB-44, 12X 14"/50: Hit by two torpedoes; while her torpedo defense system (TDS, significantly upgraded from the New Mexico class)) was not breached, water-tight doors throughout the ship were open for inspection and she sank into the harbor mud due to uncontrolled flooding; due to her significant damage and being almost totally rebuilt, she emerged from repair in January, 1944

USS Colorado, BB-45, 8X 16"/45: In Puget Sound for overhaul at the time of the attack; overhaul was completed at the end of March, 1942
USS Maryland, BB-46, 8X 16"/45: Shielded from torpedoes by Oklahoma, she was hit by a couple of bombs; repairs were completed at the end of February, 1942
USS West Virginia, BB-48, 8X 16"/45: She was hit by 5-7 torpedoes, but between her TDS and prompt counter-flooding she sank into the harbor mud on an even keel; due to her significant damage and being almost totally rebuilt, she emerged from repair in July, 1944

USS North Carolina, BB-55, 9X 16"/45: In the Atlantic, working up
USS Washington BB-56, 9X 16"/45: In the Atlantic, working up

USS Lexington, CV-2: Enroute to Midway, ferrying Marine aircraft
USS Saratoga, CV-3: Entering San Diego after drydocking at Bremerton

USS Ranger, CV-4: In the Atlantic, deemed unsuitable for service in the Pacific

USS Yorktown, CV-5: In the Atlantic
USS Enterprise, CV-6: Enroute to Hawaii after delivering a Marine fighter squadron at Wake Island
USS Hornet, CV-8: In the Atlantic, newly commissioned

USS USS Wasp, CV-7: In the Atlantic

The listing is grouped by class, and the gaps in BB hull numbers are due to ships having been cancelled due to the Washington Naval Treaty. There is an 18 year gap between USS West Virginia and USS North Carolina. BB-33 through BB-35 had an armor layout in which every part of the hull had at least some armor, with the most protecting guns, magazines, and engines.

Starting with the USS Nevada, the USN switch to a layout scheme in which all vital areas were in a sort of armored box, including sufficient buoyancy to stay afloat, while other areas of the hull were "just" structural steel. All, except BB-55 and -56 were armored to withstand their own main guns. BB-55 and -56 were "only" armored to withstand 14" guns, due to a late change in their design. The speed of BB-48 and previous BBs was on the order of 20 or 21 knots. The speed of BB-55 and newer BBs was 27 knots or higher, able to keep pace with the USN's carriers.

USS Ranger was not very robust, had no TDS, and fit so much within her hull that upgrading her would have been very difficult (= not worth the $$, time, and materials).

My knowledge of the plane inventory of the Army Air Corp in Hawaii is not great, but many of the planes were obsolescent/obsolete (e.g. P-36 Hawk fighters) or older revs, e.g. B-17Ds and P-40Bs. While their loss was, obviously, significant, all were due for replacement (e.g. a flight of B-17Es was approaching PH at the time of the attack).

Though the USN considered them not suitable for Pacific service, the Arkansas, New York, and Texas - the latter two particularly - were not especially inferior to some of the IJN's battleships (the Fuso and Ise class - 2 each - especially). At need, with those, the 3 New Mexicos, and two North Carolinas, the USN could have had 8 BBs in the Pacific before the end of 1941, 3 fewer than the entire IJN battle fleet. Add in the repaired Tennessee, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and the updated Colorado, and by mid April the USN battle fleet would have outnumbered the IJN's and possibly outgunned it as well (the Yamato had 18" guns, but the 4 Kongos were in places vulnerable to 8" cruiser guns). Not having particular need, the USN quickly moved the New Mexicos to the Pacific, but the older BBs were not, and the two North Carolinas were moved over later in 1942 (along with South Dakota, which was commissioned in March 1942).

All in all, with the USN's carriers untouched and the BBs and planes quickly "replaced", the Pearl Harbor attack did significant damage, but was not crippling. Also untouched were the facilities that made PH and operational base, and USN submarines. Possibly the worst damage, affecting operations for up to a year or more, were the nearly 2400 sailors, airmen, and soldiers who were killed. Most of these had years of experienced, which was much less easily replaced.