Naval Battles of Guadalcanal

[PeteS in CA]

http://combinedfleet.com/battles/Guadalcanal_Campaign#First_Guadalcanal

First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

By early November, the Japanese had finally come to two important (if belated) realizations: one, that the Americans had far more troops on Guadalcanal than earlier estimates had indicated, and two, Henderson Field had to be neutralized in order for the Japanese to control the seas around the island. Consequently, on November 11th, the Japanese assembled a large convoy of merchant vessels, loaded with enough supplies and ammunition for a month's worth of fighting. And in order to assure the delivery of those supplies, they assembled a very powerful force, centered on the battleships Hiei and Kirishima, whose job would be to bombard Henderson Field into impotence. Around 1:00 AM on the 13th, this bombardment force entered Ironbottom Sound. Waiting for them was an American force of heavy and light cruisers, and destroyers.

The Japanese force had fallen into disarray during the night's steaming through rain squalls. The American formation, under Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan, was hampered by poor radio discipline, and the fact that an American commander had once again decided to hoist his flag in a vessel with inferior sensors. As a result, even when the Japanese force was detected on radar, Callaghan suffered from a murky perception as to their composition, speed, and course. His attempt to cross the Japanese 'T' instead placed his ships on a collision course with the enemy. By the time fighting commenced at 0148, the range between the leading elements of each force had closed to a ludicrous 1000 yards.

The result was a point-blank brawl of monstrous proportions ...

Setting the scene a bit more broadly, both the USN and IJN were trying to reinforce their forces on Guadalcanal, with Henderson Field being the dominating focus. The USN had gotten their transports there, and on the 11th Adm. Callaghan's force of cruisers and destroyers had helped defeat an IJN air attack on the ships. Meanwhile, the IJN sent their own convoy of transports, with a bombardment force going ahead of it to try to neutralize Henderson Field, thus protecting the transports from air attacks.

The IJN force uder Adm. Hiroaki Abe consisted of two Kongo class battleships (Hiei and Kirishima, faster than most IJN battleships and using less fuel than Yamato and Musashi), a light cruiser, and nine destroyers. The IJN used light cruisers as the lead ships of destroyer squadrons. Hiei and Kirishima carried special ammunition for the bombardment that would blast aircraft, supplies, and facilities with fragments.

Adm. Callaghan's force consisted of two heavy cruisers (CA), three light cruisers (CL), and eight destroyers (DDs). While several of Callaghan's ships had the most current radar, he was not familiar with the technology and did not place those ships in the lead. That error plus poor communication discipline and lack of information coordination left Callaghan in confusion about a fast-developing situation.

The two forces collided, almost literally, on the night of the 12th-13th. Between night, weather conditions, formation confusion on the Japanese side, and delayed identification, the battle was more of a melee, with ships firing on each other at ranges under 5000 yards. On a couple of occasions, USN DDs were peppering Hiei's superstructure from a range so close that Hiei's main and secondary guns could not depress low enough to return fire. Both USN CAs were heavily damaged, while their 8" guns could not penetrate battleship armor. However, CA San Francisco did manage to disable Hiei's steering, which was to lead to Hiei's eventual sinking.

The IJN lost a couple of destroyers, and a few more were damaged. The USN lost CL Atlanta, and the next day an IJN submarine would sink the badly damaged CL Juneau. Four USN destroyers were sunk, and a fifth heavily damaged.

As a battle, it was sort of a draw, with heavy losses on both sides. But strategically, the IJN force failed in its primary mission. Henderson Field was not bombarded. And that failure had major consequences during the days of the 13th and 14th. Planes from Henderson (and USS Enterprise) sank the crippled Hiei and despite bombardment during the night of the 13th-14th, were able (with reinforcements from USS Enterprise) to sink one of the bombardment cruisers, damage a second, and 7 transports. While some soldiers the transports were carrying did make it ashore, much of their equipment and supplies were lost.

[truth_seeker]

Shouln't the Commanders have waited for transgender replacements, to fill out the diversity quotas?

Obama leftover Ensign Vindman could have reused to set sail, until they arrived.

Or if Admiral Trump set go ahead anyway, Vindman could run to tattle at Congress, before Schifty

[skeeter]

This action is one of my favorites. Dan Callahan, a staff guy with no combat experience, traditionally comes in for alot of criticism in his handling of his fleet on this Friday the 13th battle.

Unfairly IMO, since he basically was handed a suicide mission at the last minute by Halsey.

Critics ask why he didn't place his more modern ships with search radar up in the front of his column, what was up with his 'odd ships fire to starboard' even to port' order, why he ended up colliding with the Japanese formation. The only legitimate criticism, IMO, was his handling of radio communications.

Facing what he was facing, with a pickup team of ships, some of which were completely unsuited for serious surface combat let alone with BBs, he did pretty well & accomplished his mission, albeit not in the manner intended.

Its clear he was trying to duplicate Admiral Scott's success at Cape Esperance a month earlier. Maybe its better that he did not successfully cross the Japanese T, because facing a pair of heavies with nothing more than two heavy cruisers and a couple of AA light cruisers it would offer no advantage. He was better off getting in really close as he did where his puny guns might have some actual effect.

Anyway, it is an inspiring story.

[PeteS in CA]

This action is one of my favorites. Dan Callahan, a staff guy with no combat experience 1., traditionally comes in for alot of criticism in his handling of his fleet on this Friday the 13th battle.

Unfairly IMO, since he basically was handed a suicide mission at the last minute by Halsey. 2.

Critics ask why he didn't place his more modern ships with search radar up in the front of his column 3., what was up with his 'odd ships fire to starboard' even to port' order, why he ended up colliding with the Japanese formation. The only legitimate criticism, IMO, was his handling of radio communications 4..

Facing what he was facing, with a pickup team of ships, some of which were completely unsuited for serious surface combat 5. let alone with BBs, he did pretty well & accomplished his mission, albeit not in the manner intended.

Its clear he was trying to duplicate Admiral Scott's success at Cape Esperance a month earlier. Maybe its better that he did not successfully cross the Japanese T, because facing a pair of heavies with nothing more than two heavy cruisers and a couple of AA light cruisers it would offer no advantage. He was better off getting in really close as he did where his puny guns might have some actual effect. 6.

Anyway, it is an inspiring story.

1. At that point in the war that was not entirely unusual. Halsey, who was sick, just before Midway handed command of TF16 over to Spruance, whose experience was in cruisers rather than carriers.

2. Two 8" gun cruisers vs. two 14" gun fast battleships was not a great match. Hiei and Kirishima had started out as battle cruisers and later up-armored and re-engined so as to be considered battleships, so they weren't the heaviest armored 14" gun battleships, but their armor was good against 8", 6", and 5" guns. San Francisco had the skill and luck to hit Hiei in a vulnerable spot, achieving a "mission kill" and setting in motion events leading to Hiei being sunk.

3. That is a common criticism, but apparently SG radar had only started being widely installed some 7 months earlier, http://microworks.net/pacific/equipment/sg_radar.htm , which to me mitigates what in hindsight seems an error.

4. This, too, was in part due to force wide inexperience. Radio discipline had not kept up with radio capability, and the information control/integration of a CIC was yet in the future (and at least in part grew out of this battle). Which raises doubt that better placement of SG-equipped ships would have made a huge difference (= an unknown).

5. I'm not sure what you mean by this. The oldest DD was Cushing, Mahan class, but I'm not aware that these were unsuitable for combat. The torpedoes they carried were a scandal, but that was not understood at the time.

6. Since the hit that crippled Hiei was toward the stern, a T-crossing would not have achieved that. Getting mixed into Abe's formation also enabled the DDs to do a lot of superstructure and personnel damage they probably would not have accomplished otherwise. But the big thing, probably, was that the fight so disrupted Abe's formation that reforming would have consumed a lot of time. It also led to much of the bombardment ammunition being expended in the fight, and Abe being uncertain as to what USN forces might be effective and where they might be.

The confusion the melee caused led to Abe concluding that if he bombarded as planned, it would not be as effective, and his timing would be sufficiently delayed that if Henderson Field were not out of action, his force would still be within range of air attack. All in all, Callaghan did better than he "should have", an example of why guns 'n' armor ship-on-ship comparisons don't play out that way in real life. Callaghan was successful in his mission, shielding Henderson Field.

[skeeter]

Atlanta and Juneau were AA cruisers, thin armored and while they had 16 rapid firing 5"/38 guns they were never intended to fight surface actions against anything larger than destroyers. They should never have been there that night and by all accounts did not account for much other than be victimized by torpedos and friendly fire.

I agree with the rest of your response. I met a couple of USS San Francisco vets at a function aboard the USS Hornet a few years ago and although they were gobs at the time they thought highly of the Admiral, if the navy's official WWII scribe Samuel Elliot Morrison didn't.

I also was very fortunate to correspond briefly with Capt'n Jack Bennett, who gave a fascinating account of his impression of the battle. I am so glad I had a chance to interact with those guys before they left us.

[PeteS in CA]

Atlanta and Juneau were AA cruisers, thin armored and while they had 16 rapid firing 5"/38 guns they were never intended to fight surface actions against anything larger than destroyers. They should never have been there that night and by all accounts did not account for much other than be victimized by torpedos and friendly fire.

I agree with the rest of your response. I met a couple of USS San Francisco vets at a function aboard the USS Hornet a few years ago and although they were gobs at the time they thought highly of the Admiral, if the navy's official WWII scribe Samuel Elliot Morrison didn't.

Got it. The Atlantas were on the order of 3000 tons lighter than, e.g., the Brooklyn CLs. They were originally conceived as lead ships for DD flotillas, and were sized and armored for that role. Their armor was similar in scale to the much older Omaha class CLs, which mostly served in secondary roles. The destroyer-leader role seems not to have worked for the USN - maybe Fletchers were up to that task - but IJN light cruisers (5.5" guns) had some success in that role. Atlanta was significant in sinking one IJN destroyer, but Helena (Brooklyn class CL) probably accomplished more and handled damage better.

[PeteS in CA]

During the night battle of the 12th-13th the IJN force was centered around two Kongo class battleships, Hiei and Kirishima. For the bombardment mission, these were the best combination of heavy guns, speed, and moderate fuel usage. The four Kongo class ships - the two that fought in this battle plus Kongo and Haruna - were Japan's oldest battleships and have an interesting history, and are relevant for having fought in this series of battles.

The ships were an English battle cruiser design, with Kongo being the last IJN capital ship built outside of Japan. Kongo was built in England, while Hiei, Kirishima, and Haruna were built Japan. As built, the Kongos had eight 14"/45 main guns in twin turrets (two turrets each fore and aft). In addition they carried sixteen 6" secondaries to defend against smaller, faster ships. The belt armor was 6" in the upper and 8" in the lower belt, tapered to 3" toward the bow and stern. Deck armor was 1.5"-2.75", and turret armor was 9". The ships' speed was 27.5 knots.

The WW1 Battle of Jutland showed that battle cruisers were a limited and vulnerable concept, so Japan, in the 1920s and 1930s rebuilt the Kongos significantly, increasing armor and replacing the engines. The end result was upper and lower belts that were full thickness for the length of the ships, turret armor of 10", and 4" of armor added to parts of the deck. The number of 6" guns was reduced to fourteen. For all the nearly 5000 tons added displacement, the speed of the rebuilt Kongos was 30.5 knots.

By way of contrast, the IJN's first by-design battleships, the Fuso class had twelve 14"/45 guns in six twin turrets, fourteen 6" guns, 9"-12" belt armor, 11" turret armor, and a speed of 24.5 knots. Even this heavier armor was vulnerable to 14" shells at some ranges.

So the Kongos had much-better-than-a cruiser armor, but were quite vulnerable to opposing battleships with 14" and larger guns, which all but one US BB was (during WW2). On the other hand, their speed allowed them to keep pace with IJN aircraft carriers, which the IJN's Fuso and Ise class battleships could not. That speed also made them suitable for the bombardment mission in the Solomons, as they could do their business and be out of range by daylight.

Hiei's steering was disabled during the night battle, thus Hiei was still in range of Henderson Field when day came. Hiei was attacked by planes from Henderson Field and USS Enterprise pretty much all day long and finally had to be abandoned and scuttled. More will be heard of from Hiei's classmate, Kirishima.

[truth_seeker]

During WWII about 16 million Americans served in uniform Or about ten percent of the 160 million population

Partisipation in miitary activity is a tiny fraction of that today.

Fewer and fewer serve, and that means fewer even have family or friends that serve/served.

[PeteS in CA]

USN dreadnought battleships (DDs) can be sort of sub-divided into four types/eras. The original dreadnoughts had 12" main guns, as did HMS Dreadnought. Of these, only USS Arkansas survived being scrapped to comply with the London and Washington Naval Treaties. Next were super-dreadnoughts with incremental armor, USS New York and USS Texas. These had 14" guns (hence the "super") and every part of the ship was armored to some degree. These three BBs were viewed as unsuitable for service in the Pacific, and were kept in the Atlantic until very late in the war. Starting with the Nevada class, subsequent USN BBs used an "all-or-nothing" layout. All vital areas were concentrated in a sort of citadel, with sufficient armor and buoyancy to protect against being sunk by the ship's own guns (with two exceptions to be noted shortly). The "all-or-nothing" BBs can be divided between those with a top speed of ~21 knots - built just before, during, and just after WW1 - and fast battleships (>/= 28 knots), built as a result of Japan formally dropping out of the naval treaties. Some slower "all-or-nothing" BBs (most) had 14" guns, while several had 16" guns.

The 21-knot BBs could not keep pace with the carriers (CVs). In 1941, just one fast BB was in commission, but it was in the Atlantic working out some "teething" problems. The BBs damaged or sunk at Pearl Harbor were all of the slower variety. The USN built three classes of fast BBs, the North Carolina class, which were just in or coming into commission, the South Dakota class, and the Iowa class. All three classes had 16" guns. Because USS North Carolina and USS Washington originally were going to have 14" guns, but were changed during construction, those two were armored for 14" guns while carrying 16" guns.

By November, 1942, both North Carolina class BBs were in the Pacific - North Carolina was being repaired from a torpedo hit - as was USS South Dakota. Washington, https://www.hazegray.org/danfs/battlesh/bb56.htm , had been part of the support force for USS Hornet, recently sunk, and had just joined the force supporting USS Enterprise. SoDak, https://www.hazegray.org/danfs/battlesh/bb57.htm , was part of the support force for the recently damaged USS Enterprise.

Commanded by Willis Lee, these two BBs, which had not operated together, supported by four destroyers (DDs) from four different squadrons (and DD classes; chosen because they had sufficient fuel) were about to face a cruiser force commanded by Nobutake Kondo that had been joined by battleship Kirishima and several destroyers that had survived the melee of two nights previous. Kondo's total force had Kirishima, with eight 14"/45 guns, two heavy cruisers with 8" guns, two light cruisers, with 5.5" guns plus torpedoes, and nine destroyers with 5" guns and torpedoes. The numeric odds, obviously, were not in Lee's favor, though the 16"/45 guns of his two BBs did outgun Kondo's one battleship's 14"/45s.

As he approached Guadalcanal, Kondo had divided his force into three groups: one light cruiser and destroyer group sent ahead to sweep the east side of Savo Island; one light cruiser and destroyer group sent ahead to sweep the west side of Savo Island; his bombardment group of Kirishima, heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, and three supporting destroyers.

Lee's force was steaming in column, with the DDs leading. As a consequence of this formation, USN DDs were spotted fist by the IJN destroyers, with disastrous results. Two were quickly sunk by gunfire and torpedoes, a third damaged and sinking later, and a fourth seriously damaged. In this action USN DDs did what was needed, absorbing much of the punishment while giving Kondo (via reports from his destroyers) the impression that the USN force had been defeated.

Washington kept coming, setting an IJN destroyer afire, and SoDak did as well, though she went through electrical problems that disabled her radar and most of her guns. Washington sailed behind a burning DD, while SoDak passed by on the other side, which silhouetted her for Kondo's oncoming cruisers and battleship. As a result, SoDak came under heavy fire which, while not threatening to sink her, resulted in significant damage to her communications and gunfire control systems and many casualties.

Meanwhile, Washington was unseen, and in firing on SoDak, Kirishima made herself a target. In minutes, Washington disabled all of Kirishima's turrets, hit Kirishima below the waterline, causing flooding and jamming her radar, and set Kirishima afire. Both SoDak and Washington had to avoid Japanese torpedoes.

Kondo ordered his force to head for "home", leaving behind several destroyers to rescue survivors from the destroyer that had to be scuttled and the sinking Kirishima. The US force, again, was heavily damaged. On the other hand, the IJN had lost yet another battleship and had failed to bombard Henderson Field. Four Japanese transports managed to reach and beach themselves on Guadalcanal, and land 2000-3000 soldiers, but planes from Henderson Field destroyed the transports and much of the food and equipment the soldiers needed.

From the point of view of the Guadalcanal campaign, this was the last major effort by the Japanese to reinforce their troops on the island. The IJN tried for a few weeks to supply their troops via fast destroyer runs and submarines, but by the end of December, 1942 the decision had been made to evacuate their troops.

The term "turning point" is, perhaps, overly dramatic and over-worked. And how to choose from among Coral Sea, Midway, and the Solomons Campaign? Coral Sea and Midway were the first failures of planned invasions. But the months-long Solomons Campaign was the first time territory the Japanese had taken was reconquered.