@HoustonSam , I answer that question the same way you do as a moral matter. There are just two problems with that - I am a man, and I can't bear the burden of the woman I may criticize for answering the question differently than I do.
Nor do you bear the burden of the baker, but you have no hesitation to call for the force of law to be applied to him. I'm not trying to tweak you on the baker issue
@Jazzhead, you and I had a very good discussion a couple of weeks ago and I still appreciate the critical thought you put into some potential legal reasoning consistent with my point of view. I just want to understand how you distinguish cases in which you are willing to invoke the force of law from those in which you defer to the conscience of the individual. I distinguish them on the basis of the harm done to the person whose decisions are constrained and the person on whom those decisions have an impact. The baker's would-be homosexual customers suffered minimal harm, actually I would argue none, in shopping at a different bakery for a cake, while the baker would have been forced to endorse a belief he found odious and contrary to his faith. The pregnant woman experiences 9 months of pregnancy, which is very significant, while the fetus loses it life, which is existentially more significant.
Is it your position that a man's belief on abortion is inherently less valuable than a woman's belief because only a woman can be pregnant? More generally, if an experience is only available to a subset of the population, is it inherently wrong to address that experience in law?
If so, why are there laws against rape? Crude jokes aside, only men are really capable of committing rape, women simply can't do it. So why do we impose a forced morality on all men through laws against rape? Of what value is the moral belief of a woman regarding an experience she simply cannot have? Why do we not defer to men, as individuals, to make their own decisions about rape?
Of course the suggestion that we should repeal laws against rape and defer to the conscience of individual men is intentionally provocative and absurd. However it is based on the same premise you've taken with regard to abortion - I can't impose a moral belief on someone regarding an experience I can't have, therefore the law should defer to the conscience of the individual who can have that experience - and it demonstrates the flaw in the position you've taken. The argument you've made is extremely familiar and compelling to many, but neither its familiarity nor its wide acceptance make it valid.
As an additional aside, it seems that people will be able to choose their sex and reproductive capabilities through therapy and surgery in the future. Will it always be the case that men's beliefs on abortion are unworthy of consideration in law?
But the more serious problem is that the law does not and cannot proscribe immorality. It is not its job. Generally speaking, the law enforces obligations between individuals voluntarily assumed, and proscribes the violation of one individual's legal rights by another.
Contracts enforce agreements voluntarily assumed, but all law is not contracts. Murder, rape, theft, and slavery are illegal because a majority believes they are wrong, not because we all entered into agreements to that effect. The slave owners in no sense entered into a voluntary agreement to manumit their slaves, yet slavery ended by law.
But lots of morally questionable acts are not against the law.
Which *other* morally questionable acts, other than abortion, result in the death of a distinct human being? I'm pretty sure it's none. Of course we recognize that all don't agree on moral standards, so we provide deference to each other in law regarding those moral standards, unless an innocent party is harmed involuntarily.
Here, the practical problem is that the fetus does not, certainly not before it has become viable, have legal rights as an individual vis a vis the mother. It is the relationship of the mother and fetus that the law attempts to control, and the law isn't cut out for the task. The fetus is not physically independent of the mother's body. The woman's liberty (self-determination) must prevail over a portion of her own body.
I agree that the law does not recognize rights of the non-viable fetus. But the question here is not what the law *does* say, rather what it *should* say. One cannot validly justify the current content of the law by referencing the current content of the law.
And while the fetus is dependent on the woman's body, it is not a portion of the woman's body. The fetus has independent DNA.
I've actually thought about this, and considered whether the law can assign a duty of care - akin to that of a fiduciary - to a mother toward her growing child. A fiduciary obligation must, however, be voluntarily assumed. I could support the notion of a mother, having had a prescribed period of time to reject the responsibility, being impressed with the duty to do her potential child no harm. That's certainly the case once birth occurs. A baby, once born, cannot be discarded in the trash without the woman facing charges.
That's a fair distinction. How does that distinction apply to a man? At what point does he voluntarily take on fiduciary responsibility, and at what point is he shielded from that responsibility because he has not volunteered for it? Does the man fully volunteer for fiduciary responsibility at the point of conception? If so, is it your position that the woman has additional rights, rights inherently unavailable to the man, to postpone that decision by 9 months? Would that be equality before the law?
The answer is simple but not particularly satisfactory. A pre-viable fetus has no legal rights vis a vis its mother. It is not independent of the mother. The question is one of personal morality, one of those thorny questions of conscience the resolution of which cannot be compelled by the State.
This is a moral question that each woman must decide for herself.
You'll see clearly from my statements above that I accept your premise that the law in fact does not recognize legal rights of the pre-viable fetus, and I reject the conclusions you draw from that premise.
Jazzhead you and I are clashing directly here, but I feel that we are doing so with personal respect for each other. I hope you feel the same. You are an interesting and compelling opponent, clearly motivated by an enviable sense of humanity and respect for others, and I wish you the best.
