@LauraTXNM, looks like there is a lot of blame to share for the deaths and injuries.
http://www.wfmynews2.com/article/news/local/west-fertilizer-plant-explosion-five-years-later/500-540247815...The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board concluded the construction of the facility and its lack of an automatic sprinkler system "plausibly contributed" to the detonation that happened after the fire was set. The CSB estimated total insurance-related losses from the explosion to be approximately $230 million. The West Fertilizer Company, which filed for bankruptcy after the blast, was only insured for $1 million....
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https://www.csb.gov/west-fertilizer-explosion-and-fire-/U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD
INVESTIGATION REPORT, FINAL
WEST FERTILIZER COMPANY FIRE AND EXPLOSION
Page 240
10.0 Key Findings
Technical Findings
1. The presence of combustible materials used for construction of the facility and the fertilizer grade
ammonium nitrate (FGAN) storage bins, in addition to the West Fertilizer Company (WFC)
practice of storing combustibles near the FGAN pile, contributed to the progression and intensity
of the fire and likely resulted in the detonation.
2. The WFC facility did not have a fire detection system to alert emergency responders or an
automatic sprinkler system to extinguish the fire at an earlier stage of the incident.
3. On the basis of interviews with eyewitnesses and supporting photographic evidence, the first
observed fire and smoke originated in and above the seed room and progressed throughout the
northern half of the WFC facility. The radiant heat from the fire, fueled by the structure,
flammable building contents, and the asphalt roof shingles, likely heated the surface of the FGAN
pile. Contamination from soot, molten asphalt, and molten polyvinyl chloride (PVC) from an
overhead conveyer produced a detonable mixture of combustibles and FGAN oxidizers.
Increased ventilation generated a brighter and hotter flame, heating the FGAN-fuel mixture on the
surface of the pile.
Regulatory Findings
4. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) efforts to oversee facilities that store and
handle FGAN fell short at the time of the incident.
a. Section (i) of the OSHA Explosives and Blasting Agents standard, 29 CFR 1910.109(i), was
not very well known among those in the fertilizer industry, likely due in part to the fact that
(1) application of the section was unclear; and (2) the section had rarely been used previously
to cite fertilizer facilities.
b. OSHA inadvertently omitted ammonium nitrate (AN) from the List of Highly Hazardous
Chemicals, Toxics and Reactives in its Process Safety Management (PSM) standard, 29 CFR
1910.119, even though AN possesses reactive characteristics that would have triggered its
inclusion.
5. Because the WFC facility was covered under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Risk Management Program rule for its anhydrous ammonia tanks (but not for its FGAN), WFC
employees and emergency responders demonstrated a greater awareness of the hazards associated
with onsite storage of anhydrous ammonia than those associated with FGAN. AN is not on the
EPA Risk Management Program list of chemicals, so the WFC was not required to take safety
measures for FGAN similar to those for ammonia.
Insurance Findings
6. WFC’s previous property and liability insurer, which provided insurance to WFC from 2006
through 2009, did not focus on FGAN hazards in its annual insurance inspections because it was
not required to do so. However, the insurer did not renew WFC’s commercial property policy in
2010 because WFC repeatedly failed to comply with the insurer’s safety-related
recommendations (e.g., to replace corroded electrical wiring), which were identified in loss
control surveys. The CSB found little evidence of onsite activity or inspections by WFC’s
subsequent insurer, U.S. Fire, which insured the facility at the time of the incident.
Emergency Response Findings
7. The West Volunteer Fire Department (WVFD) did not conduct pre-incident planning or response
training at the WFC facility to address FGAN-related incidents because was no such regulatory
requirement. Thus, the firefighters who responded to the WFC fire did not have sufficient
information to make an informed decision on how best to respond to the fire at the fertilizer
facility.
8. Federal and state of Texas curriculum manuals used for hazardous materials (HAZMAT) training
and certification of firefighters placed little emphasis on emergency response to storage sites
containing FGAN. On the other hand, HAZMAT shipping and transportation were covered
frequently in the courses. Many federal and state grants support the resource needs of firefighters
and fire departments; however, these grants are used more often for resources such as personal
protection equipment or firefighting equipment rather than for training.
9. Lessons learned from previous FGAN-related fires and explosions were not shared with volunteer
fire departments, including the WVFD. If previous lessons learned had been applied in West, the
firefighters and emergency personnel who responded to the incident might have better understood
the risks associated with FGAN-related fire.
Emergency Planning Findings
10. Despite WFC documentation of its FGAN in a 2012 Tier II report, the WVFD did not conduct
drills and exercises at the WFC facility before the 2013 fire and explosion.
11. The agricultural use exemption under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act (EPCRA) is not clear about which facilities are covered under the exemption. Before the
WFC fire and explosion, the state of Texas determined that the WFC was exempt under the
EPCRA agricultural use exemption.
Land Use Planning Findings
12. At the time of its construction, the WFC facility was surrounded by open fields, and no zoning
regulations existed when it began operations.
13. As the city of West developed over the years, it expanded toward the WFC facility.
14. The proximity of the city of West to the WFC facility magnified the offsite consequence impacts.
15. Other FGAN facilities throughout Texas are located in close proximity to schools, residences, and
care facilities. Of the 40 FGAN facilities in Texas as of October 2015, 48 percent are within 0.5
miles of a school, nursing home, or hospital while 83 percent are within 0.25 miles of a residence.
