For one thing, they have Churchill opposing the D-Day landings when in reality he was a huge proponent of it. If they can't get simple facts right, I don't want to watch it.
*Thread Hijack* The hell he didn't -- the entire British strategy was geared to getting us to commit to Europe-first (instead of Japan), but then NOT go to France, instead, fighting around in marginal areas like North Africa, then Sicily, then Italy, and when the thirteen airfields in southern Italy were in allied control, which allowed long range bombers to hit oil fields and such, the British *still* wanted to fight through the rest of Italy for no reason they could justify any longer.
British "historian" Richard Wilkinson -- who accuses anyone who disagreed with British wartime strategy of being an Anglophobe -- rationalizes every bit of it in his Masters and Commanders: How Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall and Alanbrooke Won the War in the West. It's still worth reading, despite his bias, which caused a number of episodes where I wanted to retch, or just throw the thing from where I was reading (often the tub) to the nearest trash can.
Churchill likewise prolonged the struggle for North Africa by intervening against the German invasion of Greece, knowing it was hopeless, but looking beyond the supposedly inevitable eventual defeat of Germany and postwar divisions. Postwar divisions were also under consideration with Churchill's Percentages agreement proposed to Stalin. In US circles (according to the late Paul Varg) it was analogized as trying to keep a woman half pregnant.
The developments that really threw the British approach into the dumper, though, was Stalin's constant insistence that a second front needed to be opened, and needed to be opened in western Europe; and the unexpected scope of the US' ability to build everything needed for the war in general and for the invasion in particular. So many landing craft were ready that the old "first let's use 'em in the soft underbelly, oops, now there aren't enough for Normandy" stopped working.